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ABSTRACT
The abstract and dissertation of Timothy Carl Winchell for the Doctor of
Philosophy in Public Administration and Policy presented May 29, 2008.

Title:

The Washington State Patrol, Accountability-Driven Leadership, and the
organizational factors that propelled their success: An organizational
analysis

In January 2002, Washington State Patrol (WSP) Chief Ronal Serpas, Ph.D.,
implemented his Accountability Driven Leadership (ADL) philosophy throughout
the entire statewide public safety agency. The initiative was intended to re- focus
personnel on agency strategic goals, objectives, and performance. ADL stressed
Computer Statistic (CompStat) management tenants, decentralized decision-making,
and efficiency and effectiveness performance measures.
Most CompStat research has been anecdotal in nature, meaning little
empirical analysis has scrutinized the implementation of these initiatives in policing.
Additionally, the principal researcher could not locate any research that examined
these changes in a statewide law enforcement agency. Therefore, this case study
contributes to this scholarship through its rigorous investigation of the WSP's
adoption of ADL and application across a wide variety of statewide public safety
activities.
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The research project used the organizational development literature as a
means to develop its preliminary theoretical model and central research question,
which was: What executive leadership and management strategies were utilized by
WSP executives during the implementation of ADL between 2002 and 2004? It
examined four organizational factors as a means to better understand their influence
on organizational change during this period. These included: executive leadership,
organizational culture, employee motivation, and strategic management principles.
This case study relied on several data sources. The WSP's three-year
performance results highlighted many statewide public safety achievements
throughout its six organizational bureaus and their major divisions. Additionally, the
WSP change efforts were scrutinized in a variety of external reviews. Finally, 34
semi-structured, key informant interviews solicited respondents' own views, words,
and reflections about how the organizational factors contained in the proposed model
of change may have shaped WSP success.
The historical document reviews and interview analyses produced a more
complex theoretical organizational change model than first envisioned. While the
new model still contained the earlier organizational factors, the project revealed their
manifestation within the WSP was influenced by a myriad of internal forces and
external pressures. The utilization, integration, and alignment of these concepts in
the WSP, in combination with the implementation of ADL, appear to be the real
catalysts for agency success during the project time frame.
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Preface
"Not everything that can be measured counts,
and not everything that counts can be measured. "
— Albert Einstein

CHAPTER ONE
Project Introduction
In their seminal book entitled Reinventing Government, Osborne and Gaebler
(1993) argued that the public sector must begin its late twentieth century
transformation by emphasizing results-oriented government, focused on measurable
performance outcomes. Alpert and Moore (1993) succinctly described the
conundrum facing modern police executives. "The urgent need today in measuring
police performance is to move away from a sterile conversation about performance
measurement as an abstract technical problem and to understand it as a device that
can be used managerially to shape the future of policing" (p. 57).
Bayley (1996) felt there were four reasons why executives must work toward
comprehensive performance evaluations in policing: the general public continues to
demand it, as they perceive crime rates spiraling out of control; governments at all
levels continue to economize; police managers are beginning to equate performance
measures with quality management practices; and police mangers' abilities to collect,
analyze, and utilize data has grown exponentially in the last ten years. Moore (2002)
offered three tangentially related reasons to measure police performance: "External
accountability to citizens; promoting internal accountability; and aligning external
and internal demands for accountability" (p. 3-11).
By 1993, the New York Transit Police was already hard at work transforming
their organization and setting the standard for the entire profession of law
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enforcement, using many of the techniques these authors endorsed. The Transit
Police had implemented Computer Statistics or CompStat to manage their
departmental operations and increase public safety. The remainder to this chapter
describes CompStat in greater detail, as a means to focus this research project.
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani
Former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani (1994-2002) described the
magnitude of the public safety problems facing the city in the early days of his
administration: "We were looking at 9,000 to 10,000 felonies a week, and anywhere
from 1,800 to 2,200 murders a year" (Giuliani & Kurson, 2002, p. 71). Mayor
Giuliani named Bill Bratton as his police commissioner, based partly on his earlier
leadership of the transit police and the commensurate reduction of serious crimes in
the subway by 75 percent (1990-1995). (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Giuliani &
Kurson, 2002; McDonald, Greenberg, & Bratton, 2002)
New York Police Department (NYPD) Commissioner Bratton served from
1994 to 1996. (Bratton, 1996; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Giuliani & Kurson, 2002)
Bratton (1996) found the NYPD employed 38,000 police officers and 6,000 civilians
spread across eight boroughs and 76 precincts. Although the NYPD public safety
strategy utilized a combination of reactive policing, random patrols, and reactive
investigation, average response time was used as their sole performance measure.
Unfortunately, this singular focus on efficiency failed to evaluate the effectiveness or
the quality of police services the NYPD provided.
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Computer Statistics (CompStai)
Commissioner Bratton implemented Computer Statistics or CompStat, as a
means to improve police services in the NYPD. Since then, the initiative has been
characterized in a variety of different ways. This introduction describes five key
CompStat elements: major principles, management strategy, outcomes focus,
lessons learned, and law enforcement proliferation.
Major Principles
CompStat utilized "... computerized crime statistics, electronic crime maps,
and intensive crime-control management meetings to guide and monitor the
department's anti-crime strategies" (Bratton and Andrews, 1999, p. 4). CompStat's
management techniques stressed four principal tenets: accurate, timely data;
effective tactics; rapid deployment of personnel and resources; and relentless followup. (Bratton, 1996; Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Dodenhoff, 1996; Dussault, 1999;
Guilianni & Kurson, 2002; McDonald, 2004; McDonald, et al., 2002; O'Connell,
2001; Serpas, 2003, 2004; Shane, 2004a, 2004b; Stephens, 2005; Thibault, Lynch, &
McBride, 2001) The iterative use of these management principals is depicted below.
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Figure 1. The CompStat Management Process
McDonald et al. (2002) and McDonald (2004) believed crime data should
focus on identifying three key problems: crime hot spots; suspect patterns across
geographical areas; and crime category trend analyses. McDonald (2004) defined
useful crime data by its "accuracy, completeness, availability, timeliness, and
visibility" (p. 2). Walsh (2001) suggested tactical discussions regularly involved
strategy makers' consideration of desirable organizational ends in light of the
organizational operating environment. In other words, "objectives are the ends, and
strategy is the means for achieving them" (p. 352). Deployment decisions attempted
to apply resources where they are needed, which Shane (2004) felt involved "an
array of city, county, state, and federal resources..." (p. 15) Follow-up usually
occurred weekly, during which time successes and challenges are discussed and the
process reiterated when necessary.
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Management Strategy
CompStat has been viewed as a revolutionary change initiative within police
departments. McDonald et al. (2002) believed CompStat principles helped create
meaningful law enforcement change along several continua: "from reaction to
prevention; from isolation to integration; from intuition to data; from incidents to
problems; from outputs to outcomes; from summary results to feedback; from
control of serious crime to public safety; from accountability for rules to
accountability for problems solved; and from individual attribute-based performance
evaluation to unit or agency performance management" (p. 78-82). Firman (2003)
observed that CompStat helped balance several key organizational tensions in the
departments he studied: "reform versus problem solving; hierarchy versus
leadership; and control versus creativity" (p. 458). Walsh (2001) simply described
CompStat as a "goal-oriented strategic management process" (p. 347), which he later
described in greater detail. CompStat".. .builds upon police organizational
paradigms of the past and blends them with the strategic management fundamentals
of the business sector" (p. 349). Serpas (2003) felt CompStat leads to "full
organizational integration" (p. 7).
Outcomes Focus
CompStat has been recognized for its ability to re-focus police performance
on public safety outcomes. Following many other observers, Finnan (2003) and
Serpas (2003, 2004) suggested CompStat's public presentations heighten public
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management accountability. McDonald (2004) summarized by noting CompStat's
ability to focus police management and behavior on public safety promotion. This
emphasis included crime reduction and criminal behavior, performance outcomes
rather than performance outputs, and management based on collective wisdom.
Between 1994 and 1996, the NYPD CompStat implementation was credited
with dramatic crime reductions throughout the city, however these results mirrored
similar reductions in crime rates across the United States. "During this period, the
city achieved a phenomenal 36 percent decrease in serious crime, including a 45
percent drop in murder" (Bratton, 1996, p. 1). Ward (1997) summarized these
successes. "The city has seen three straight years of double-digit declines in crime
numbers" (p. 28). Giuliani and Kurson (2002) further recounted CompStat successes
between 1994 through 2001:
"In addition to reducing murder by two-thirds, overall crime fell by 57 percent,
and shootings by 75 percent. There were nearly 1,200 fewer rapes in 2000 than
in 1993, and police shooting incidents fell from 212 to 73. Robbery fell from
85,883 to 32,213. Burglary tumbled from 100,933 to 38,155, while auto theft
plummeted from 111,611 to 35,673. The crime decline was citywide. In 1993,
there were 92 murders in Crown Heights and 35 in Harlem. By 2000, those
numbers were 35 and 5. Emergency response time fell from 8:36 to 7:30- a
minute that saved lives" (p. 381).
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Lessons Learned
Shane (2004c) stressed the dynamic nature of the CompStat, which involved
several common concerns: crime motive; victim characteristics; offender profile;
suspect connections to other crimes; gang, drug, or organized crime involvement;
forensic evidence leads; organizational progress to date; general performance trends;
deployment strength; incident prevention; and future management plans. Following
Serpas (2003, 2004), Shane (2004c) noted the adaptability of the process by calling
attention to its usefulness managing specialized divisions within police departments,
such as internal affairs, special weapons and tactics, canine units, and mounted
patrols, purchasing, and procurement, to name a few.
Walsh's (2001) review of NYPD CompStat practices revealed four lessons
for those considering similar implementations. Accurate and timely intelligence
gathering will require commanders to reach out to community leaders, associations,
and citizens, and to embrace their input. It will also necessitate officers to do more
than simply take incident reports. Intelligence use will require sophisticated
information systems to help analyze crime statistics, crime locations, and public
opinion. Deployment issues will necessitate a shift in the control of many police
resources, including their centralized command structure and tight personnel
controls. Effective tactics will require higher levels of knowledge in order to elevate
the conversations related to possible cause and effect relationships. Finally,
CompStat will shift police management focus from bureaucracy to crime reduction.
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Law Enforcement Proliferation
Several scholars have noted the rapid diffusion of CompStat across American
law enforcement agencies. (McDonald et al., 2002; O'Connell, 2001; Shane, 2004c;
Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003). O'Connell (2001)
described Baltimore's adoption of the principles during the late 1990s and the
commensurate drop in their homicide rate to a ten year low during the first year.
McDonald et al. (2002) added.
"The first department other than the NYPD to fully implement a crime
control model was the Boston, Massachusetts, police department. Others
soon followed: Indianapolis, Indiana; Baltimore, Maryland; Prince George's
County, Maryland; New Orleans, Louisiana; Broward County, Florida;
Washington D.C.; Austin, Texas; Seattle, Washington; Mount Vernon, New
York; Durham, North Carolina; Lowell, Massachusetts; Longmont,
Colorado; Maryland State Police; Los Angeles, California; Chicago, Illinois;
and San Diego, California. Most of these departments have experienced
significant crime reduction, or at least they have improved control over
crime, which they attribute, in part, to the implementation of the crime
control model. At a recent International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP) conference, two thirds of all major cities indicated that they were
replicating CompStat" (p. 26). (cf, Shane, 2004c)
Weisburd et al. (2003) analyzed Police Foundation mail survey data gathered
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from a national sample of police departments with a hundred or more sworn officers
and a random sample of those departments with 50-99 sworn officers. They found
that one third of the respondents from the larger departments had already adopted
CompStat type programs, while another quarter said they intended to do so soon.
"Although not evenly distributed across the nation's regions, there was sufficient
distribution among large departments to say that CompStat enjoys widespread
interest across the country (42% of departments in the South, 32% in the West, 27%
in the Northeast, and 22% in the North Central regions)" (p. 431). Finally, 11
percent of small departments reported using CompStat, while 30 percent indicated
they were planning to implement it soon.
Moore (2003) described CompStat's complexity using a series of conceptual
lenses. The narrowest revealed CompStat as a statistical program used to collect
information about police services. A slightly broader view combined CompStat's
technical capacity with a managerial system that relied on specific managers to
achieve organizational objectives. Firman (2003) concurred by describing CompStat
as "elegantly simple: leaders leading, information systems providing critical
knowledge, and entire departments targeting and solving prioritized issues" (p. 458).
Moore's (2003) two larger views respectively highlighted CompStat's
tendency to reinforce traditionally centralized managerial control and crime fighting
strategies. Weisburd et al. supported these latter two assertions, using results from
their earlier reported survey. They found CompStat was widely utilized as an
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internal accountability check for police commanders and middle managers. They
believed both groups had been charged with achieving crime control objectives with
sworn personnel under their command, but had not been given similar flexibility
with departmental overtime, civilian staff, or criminal investigators. Both findings
led the researchers to suggest that executive accountability for crime control had
been decentralized without the commensurate devolution of management authority.
In sum, the implementation of CompStat appeared to alter the delivery of
police services in a manner that re-focused these organizations on: key change
initiative principles, management strategies, performance outcomes, lessons learned,
and law enforcement success. With this in mind, let us now consider the focus of
this research project.
Research Problem
Most CompStat research has been anecdotal in nature. Indeed, little
empirical research has examined the implementation of CompStat in policing. This
case study will contribute to this scholarship through its rigorous investigation of one
northwestern law enforcement agency that adopted a management strategy similar to
CompStat. The project will utilize organizational development theory as a means to
develop its central research question, which is: What organizational leadership and
management strategies were utilized by Washington State Patrol executives during
the implementation of Accountability Driven Leadership (ADL) between January
2002 and December 2004? In essence, it will examine five organizational factors as
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a means to better understand their influence on organizational change. These
include: executive leadership, organizational culture, employee motivation, strategic
management, and CompStat principles.
Let us now shift our focus to the theoretical framework of the case study. Its
content will help inform the research design, methods, and outcomes.

CHAPTER TWO
The Theoretical Review and Preliminary Conceptual Framework
The single greatest oversight of the recent computer statistics (CompStat)
research, descriptive, and evaluative writings has been their general assumption of a
positive correlation between the implementation of the initiative or its principles and
later organizational changes. (Bratton, 1996; Bratton & Andrews, 1999; Bratton &
Knobler, 1998; Firman, 2003; Kelling & Sousa, 2002; McDonald, 2004; McDonald
et al., 2002; O'Connell, 2001; Serpas & Morley, 2008; Sousa, 2003; Weisburd, et al.,
2003) In doing so, these writings have ignored much of the organizational
development literature, which generally suggests change results from an integrated
confluence of organizational factors. The failure to consider CompStat in light of
this organizational development literature means that any number of alternative
organizational factors may have been the true catalyst(s), or at least contributory
variables, for the changes that have been linked historically with the implementation
of the initiative or its principles.
This chapter begins by identifying four of these organizational factors as a
means to develop a preliminary theoretical model. These include: organizational
leadership, culture, motivation, and strategic management theory. Essentially, this
organizational change model represents an attempt to clarify the leadership and

management strategies required to create results-oriented change in a state law
enforcement agency. Therefore, its elements will be examined throughout the
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remainder of the case study.
Conceptual Framework
Jack Maple, the architect of CompStat, called attention to the relationships
among organizational leadership, CompStat adoption, and crime reductions. "An
organization takes on the characteristics of the leader and if the leaders take on this
posture [CompStat], this will change not only policing in America, this will change
the crime picture in America" (Dodenhoff, 1996, p. 6). Walsh (1983) argued the
quality of a police department would be defined by its leadership. Consequently, he
suggested police leaders must learn to adapt their managerial styles to the situation at
hand, (cf., Bratton, 1996; Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Couper & Lobitz, 1993;
Dodenhoff, 1996; Guilianni & Kurson, 2002; McDonald, 2004; McDonald et al.,
2002; Thibault et al., 2001; Serpas, 2003, 2004; Shane, 2004a, 2004b; Stephens,
2005)
Organizational leadership theory also reminds its readers of the essential
linkages between leadership, strategy, and success. Mosley, Pietri, and Megginson
(1996) argued, "Leadership is based on a person's ability to influence others to work
toward achieving personal and organizational goals" (p. 393). Kotter (1990)
believed leadership involved setting the direction, aligning people, and motivating
and inspiring. Kouzes and Posner (1995) described respondents' characterizations of
their exemplary performances. The results of their personal-best leadership
experience survey of thousands of private, public, nonprofit, community, and student
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leaders since 1983, revealed five themes: leaders challenge the process; inspire a
shared vision; enable others to act; model the way; and encourage the heart.
Several scholars have written about the essential link between law
enforcement leadership and police culture. Couper and Lobitz (1993) believed
strong law enforcement subcultures could not be changed through external sources.
The two authors felt any real change required internal change agents who were
strong enough to re-shape the dominant subcultures, using five strategies: "a clear,
shared vision; a personal commitment; a system that empowers people; a method
that develops and rewards people; and the ability to think and live in the long-term"
(p. 19). (cf., Cummings & Worley, 1993; Kotter, 1990; Kouzes & Posner, 1995;
Quinn, 1996; Rainey, 2003; Schermerhorn, Hunt, & Osborn, 1997; Smith, 1996)
Harrison's (1998) essay supported this view and argued police leaders needed
to understand how new police officers were assimilated into the culture in order to
influence these human resources. He noted that officers were inculcated during each
phase of their career, beginning with their selection, continuing through training, and
culminating with their final acceptance into the larger force.
Organizational culture theory also explores the relationships between
leadership and culture. (Aragon, 1993; Bass & Avolio, 1993; Cameron & Quinn,
1999; Daft, 1999; Harrison, 1998; Heifetz & Laurie, 1997; Nahavandi, 1997;
Robbins & Coulter, 1996; Schein, 1992b, 1999; Shafritz & Russell, 2003; Trice &
Beyer, 1993) Aragon (1993) believed leaders could cultivate a healthy culture by

Washington State Patrol Change

15

paying attention to values, beliefs, and behaviors. He felt this foundation could serve
as the basis for fostering employee involvement, high morale, agency success, and
citizen satisfaction, (cf., Center for Effective Leadership, 2003; Jones, 1981; Pfeiffer,
2003)
Fry and Berkes (1983) suggested modern law enforcement has seen a general
surge in its professional identity. Consequently, they felt this movement had also
shaped the ethics, institutionalized values, internal controls, and individual behaviors
in police departments. They concluded:
"There is evidence that police attach a great deal of importance to need
gratification through their jobs, especially the higher needs, when compared
to industrial workers. Police are relatively more satisfied with the type and
variety of their work and their co-workers and supervisors, but less satisfied
with pay, work schedules, promotional examinations, and service ratings"
(p. 228).
Organizational motivation theory calls attention to the criticality of individual
behavior and its link to agency success. "Motivation refers to the forces either
internal or external to a person that arouse enthusiasm and persistence to pursue a
certain course of action" (Daft, 1999, p. 238). (cf. Robbins & Coulter, 1996)
Aragon (1993) added, "motivation involves employees' willingness to expend effort
to accomplish tasks" (p. 10). Natemeyer and McMahon (2001) declared, ".. .an
understanding of human behavior is imperative if mangers are to improve the
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performance of their organization's human resources" (p. 51). Robbins and Coulter
(1996) reminded readers of the oftentimes hidden nature of attitudes, perceptions,
group norms, informal interactions, and interpersonal and inter-group conflicts below
the surface of visible behaviors in the workplace.
Dilulio (1993) observed: "A first step in defining appropriate measures for
the goals of the criminal justice system is for practitioners to ask four questions:
A. What do we want to achieve?
B. What human and other resources do we have (or can we obtain) that
might enable us to achieve it?
C. How can we know the relationship between the levels and modes of our
resource deployments, on the one hand, and the achievement of our goals,
on the other?
D. How can we measure routinely the extent to which we are achieving what
we want to achieve, or moving toward achieving it?" (p. 66). (cf. Dobbs
and Field, 1993; Mendofik, 1994)
Dilulio's (1993) observations highlighted criminal justice agencies' strategic
management through planning initiatives and the successful management of change.
However, strategic management theory also reinforces many of these themes.
Shafritz and Russell (2003) suggested modern strategic management is the art
of applying resources to achieve a desired objective. Bryson (2004) believed these
results should "add public value" (p. 239), which he felt could be achieved through
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three processes: the rapid and smooth infusion of change strategies; a clear
delineation of "what needs to be done when, why, and by whom" (p. 239); and a
process to identify and fix problems as new solutions are implemented. Finally,
Robbins and Coulter (1996) described the integrated nature of the strategic planning
and management processes, which included an eight step process: "identify the
organization's current mission, objectives, and strategy; analyze the environment;
identify the opportunities and threats; analyze the organization's resources; identify
strengths and weaknesses; formulate strategies; [strategic planning] implement
strategies; and evaluate the results" [strategic management] (p. 259).
The Preliminary Organizational Change Model
The previous presentation highlighted four organizational factors, which will
constitute the preliminary organizational change model to be examined throughout
the project. In other words, the confluence of executive leadership, organizational
culture, employee motivation, CompStat principles, and strategic management
controls shape the successful implementation of the change initiative. A depiction of
this model appears below.
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Figure 1. The Preliminary Organizational Change Model
The remainder of this chapter explores each of the organizational change
model elements in greater detail. In doing so, it also suggests their individual and
collective importance to the larger case study. The chapter concludes by
summarizing the theoretical themes outlined in throughout the chapter.
Leadership Theory
The study of leadership contingency theory, or the interaction between leader
and follower, began in the 1970s and continues today. Stogdill (1974) believed
contingency theories emphasize:
A. "The type, structure, size, and purpose of the organization
B. The external environment in which the organization functions
C. The orientation, values, goals, and expectations of the leader, his
superiors, and subordinates
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D. The expert or professional knowledge required of the position"
(as quoted in Shafritz & Russell, 2003, p. 333-334).
Several scholars suggested contingency researchers were motivated to find
more comprehensive explanations of leadership than their earlier counterparts, who
focused principally on leadership traits and behaviors. (Daft, 1999; Mosley et al.,
1996; Nahavandi, 1997; Rainey 2003; Robbins & Coulter, 1996) Four contingency
leadership theories have been reviewed repeatedly in the recent theoretical literature
and remain relevant to CompStat implementation. These include: situational
leadership, transactional and transformational leadership, and path-goal theory.
(Daft, 1999; Denhardt, Denhardt, & Lyon, 2001; Mosely, Pietri, & Megginson,
1996; Rainey, 2003; Robbins & Coulter, 1996; Shermerhorn et al., 1997, Yukl,
1998) All four theories will be reviewed in greater detail below.
Situational Leadership
The implementation of CompStat naturally results in varying degrees of
change breadth, depth, velocity, and success. The public performance reviews are
designed to scrutinize these exact variances, management tactics, and resource
deployments. (Bratton, 1996; Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Dodenhoff, 1996;
Dussault, 1999; Guilianni & Kurson, 2002; McDonald, 2004; McDonald, et al.,
2002; O'Connell, 2001; Serpas, 2003, 2004; Shane, 2004a, 2004b) Therefore, a
leader's ability to manage situational performance outcomes becomes an essential
leadership attribute.
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Hersey, Blanchard, and Natemeyer (1979) posited a situational leadership
model, which built on French and Raven's (1959) earlier bases of power work:
"There appears to be a direct relationship between the level of maturity of
individuals and groups and the kind of power bases that have a high probability of
gaining compliance from or influencing those people" (p. 322).
Hersey et al., (1979) envisaged a four-way matrix to classify leadership style
by the amount of direction required to guide task behavior and the extent of two-way
communication in the relationships: delegating (low direction- low relationship);
telling (high direction- low relationship); participating (low direction- high
relationship); and selling (high direction- high relationship). Follower maturity is
judged as low, low to moderate, moderate to high, and high. The authors prescribed
the following leadership style and follower maturity matches: "telling" for low
maturity; "selling" for low to moderate maturity; "participating" for moderate to high
maturity; and "delegating" for high maturity.
Kuykendall and Unsinger (1982) surveyed 155 police managers from 104
agencies in Arizona and California between 1978 and 1980. Nearly all the
respondents had experience levels ranging from 3 to 24 years. Additionally, 153
managers had completed some college education, while 72 reported they had
completed four or more years of college.
Kuykendall and Unsinger's (1982) participant responses revealed their
favorite leadership style: selling (51%); no dominant style (45%); participating
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(3%); and telling (.6%). None of the respondents indicated they used a delegating
style. The managers also reported the number of styles they used: one (3%); two
(43%); three (54%). None of the respondents had used all four styles. The
researchers also found that police managers were more effective in those situations
with a high task emphasis (telling and selling) and least effective in those situations
with a low task emphasis (participating and delegating). Overall, the results
indicated that the respondents favored several style combinations: participating and
selling (59%), telling and selling (19%) styles, and no two-style pattern (16%).
Bruns and Shuman (1988) surveyed 365 law enforcement supervisors, who
were participating in 10 management-training programs in Arizona between 1978
and 1982. The researchers were interested in learning more about how the
supervisors would describe their organizational leadership, using Likert's (1981)
four management styles: "exploitive- authoritative," "benevolent-authoritative,"
"consultative," and "participative-group." Bruns and Shuman asked their
participants to rate their current departmental environments and preferred styles
when considering several operational components. These components included the
departmental leadership, motivational, communicative, interactive, decision-making,
goal setting, and control styles.
Bruns and Shuman's (1988) respondents included 298 sergeants and 67

lieutenants, who were employed by police departments of many different sizes. The
departments were grouped into three departmental sizes for purposes of the study:
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small (1-50 officers), medium (51-150 officers), and large (150+ officers). Nearly
all the sergeants and lieutenants rated their current departmental environments as
benevolent-authoritative in nature. Sergeants in larger departments gave lower
ratings to statements such as: motivation- "responsibility felt for achieving goal";
communication- "communication accepted by subordinates"; decision making"extent of awareness of decision makers" and "extent to which decisions are made at
the best level"; goal setting- "manner in which usually done"; and control- "degree
of concentration." Sergeants in medium- and smaller-sized departments duplicated
the lower ratings of their peers in two areas: decision making- "extent of awareness
of decision makers" and goal setting- "manner in which usually done." Otherwise,
sergeants from the medium sized agencies generally rated their organizations toward
the higher end of the benevolent-authoritative scale and sergeants from the smaller
sized agencies rated their organizations at the lower end of the consultative scale.
Sergeants from smaller agencies noted moderate consultation in: leadership- "use of
subordinates" and decision making- "level in organization decisions are made" and
"extent to which subordinates are involved."
Brans and Shuman (1988) found the lieutenants from large and medium sized
departments generally rated their organizations at the higher end of the benevolentauthoritative scale. Lieutenants from larger agencies gave somewhat lower ratings in
several categories: communication- "flow of information"; decision making- "level
in organization decisions are made" and "extent to which knowledge is used in
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decision"; goal setting- "manner in which usually done"; and control- "degree of
concentration." Lieutenants from medium agencies generally rated their
organizations toward the higher end of benevolent-authoritative as compared to their
larger department peers, but they provided similarly lower ratings in one category:
decision making- "extent to which knowledge is used in decision." Lieutenants from
smaller agencies generally rated their organizations as moderately consultative,
except for three areas of decidedly low consultation: decision making- "level in
organization decisions are made"; goal setting- "manner in which usually done";
control- "degree of concentration."
Brans and Shuman (1988) found nearly all the respondents wanted their
departmental management systems to operate between the high-end of consultative
and the low-end of participative-group. They concluded: "The results of this study
indicate that law enforcement supervisors and middle managers in the state of
Arizona strongly support a leadership style that is highly participative" (p. 156).
Willis (1998) was interested in learning how situational leadership influenced
leader-follower relationships. Her survey of metropolitan police officers from a
department in the southeastern United States provided contrary results.
Willis' (1998) respondents included 205 police officers and 61 sergeants and
lieutenants, which represented 12% of the entire department. Her analyses revealed

no statistically significant support for her hypotheses. She found supervisor and
subordinate matches did not affect employees' views about their supervisors, job
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satisfaction, performance evaluations, or the reported quality of the supervisorsubordinate relationship anymore than those of mismatches. She also found no
statistical differences based on employee tenure, race, ethnicity, or gender.
Transactional and Transformational Leadership
As an organizational change strategy, CompStat relies on engaged executive
leadership. (Bratton, 1996; Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Dodenhoff, 1996; Guilianni
& Kurson, 2002; McDonald, 2004; McDonald, et al., 2002; O'Connell, 2001;
Serpas, 2003, 2004; Shane, 2004a, 2004b) Consequently, a thorough understanding
of the influences of transactional and transformational leadership becomes critical to
initiative success.
Burns (1978) is credited for being the first scholar to define transformational
leadership, by contrasting it with transactional leadership while studying exceptional
political figures. (Anderson-Rudolf, 1996; Bass 1990b; Castro, 1998; Denhardt,
Denhardt, & Aristigueta; Mosely et al., 1996; Nahavandi, 1997; Tracey & Hinkin,
1998; Tucker & Russell, 2004; Van Wart, 2003; Yukl, 1998) He described
transactional leadership as a function of power, intention, and exchange, based on
reciprocity, rewards, and conflict resolution, (cf., Davidhizer & Shearer, 1997)
Bass (1990a) characterized transactional leadership as using contingent
rewards, active management by exception, and passive management by exception.

Bass (1990b) and Bass and Avolio (1990) believed transactional leadership was the
most common form of organizational leadership.
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Bums (1978) defined transforming leadership as ideological and moral with
an emphasis on leadership vision. He believed transforming leadership occurred
when leaders and followers found mutual engagement, support, and purpose in a way
that elevated the "motivational levels" and "morality" of both sides.
"Power bases are linked not as counterweights but as mutual support for
common purpose. Various names are used for such leadership, some of them
derisory: elevating, mobilizing, inspiring, exalting, uplifting, preaching,
exhorting, evalangelizing.. .But transforming leadership ultimately becomes
moral in that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of
both leader and led, and thus it has a transforming effect on both" (p. 20).
In contrast, Bass (1990b), Bass and Avolio (1990), and Avolio, Waldman,
and Yammario (1991) argued transformational leaders enhanced their transactional
skill base in order to influence their followers by using four skills: idealized
influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized
consideration. Bass (1990a) further clarified these concepts:
A. "Charisma: Provides vision and sense of mission, instills pride, gains
respect and trust.
B. Inspiration: Communicates high expectations, uses symbols to focus
efforts, expresses important purposes in simple ways.

C. Intellectual Stimulation: Promotes intelligence, rationality, and careful
problem solving.
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D. Individualized Consideration: Gives personal attention, treats each
employee individually, coaches, advises" (p. 20).
Dess, Picken, and Lyon (1998) believed "successful transformational leaders:
move quickly and decisively; create a sense of urgency; develop and communicate
both a vision and a plan; set stretch goals and empower others to act; consolidate the
gains by institutionalizing the change" (p. 724). Davidhizer and Shearer (1997)
added: ".. .Transformational leaders motivate people to work for a new and greater
good and to create change. Ritscher (1986) concluded:
"Transformational leadership is fundamentally linked to intention. It is not
enough to have a vision; you must have a sufficient level of intention to carry
out the vision... Intention belongs to the world of action... Intention, in its
purest form, involves making a gut-level decision, at a deep level, to bring a
vision into reality. It is a sheer act of will... Transformational leadership is
leadership by bonding and attracting rather than by coercion... The nature of
this kind of vision and intention attracts people... When the vision is
attractive and fulfilling, and when the commitment to fulfilling the vision is
sufficiently great people are drawn to participate" (p. 67, 68)
Girodo (1998) surveyed 240 federal, state, and local police officers from 102
North American, West European, and Australian police organizations, who were

attending an 11-week FBI Academy training program, in order to learn more about
their leadership styles. Girodo utilized 197 completed surveys from respondents of
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traditionally structured departments his final analyses. The respondents reported
their ages ranging from 28 to 55 years and their law enforcement tenure ranging
from 8 to 36 years. They classified their roles as mid-level (43%) or upper-level
(41%).
Girodo (1998) sought to measure three types of law enforcement leadership
styles: Machiavellian or "means-end," bureaucratic "rules-governed," and
transformational or "personalistic." His analyses revealed:
".. .Machiavellian scores did not differ across age groups, the Bureaucratic
Style increased significantly in reported use from the younger (28-35 years)
to two older (41-45 years, p<.05) and (46-55 years, p<.01) age groups...the
Transformational Style was significantly more popular among 46-55
compared with 28-35-yr.-old managers (p<.01).. .Machiavellian influence
methods were reported significantly more by managers in administration
compared with managers in training and watch/shift (community-oriented
service) positions. Also, the Transformational Style was more strongly
endorsed by managers in the training and watch/shift area compared with
managers involved in administration" (p. 424-425).
Castro (1998) surveyed 149 police officers from a county law enforcement
agency in a southeastern U.S. jurisdiction about their perceptions of transformational

leadership. Her analyses revealed strong support between transformational
leadership styles and subordinate job satisfaction and commitment. She found
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moderate support between transformational leadership and individualized support,
career mentoring, and role modeling dimensions. Castro found weak support
between transformational leadership and subordinate performance.
Stathatos (1999) surveyed New York Police Department (NYPD) police
sergeants in order to learn more about leadership styles. His research design was
altered from its intended survey of 200 sergeants, due to a contemporaneous review
by an external panel. Instead, his participants included 80 newly appointed NYPD
police sergeants and five of their subordinates.
Stathatos' (1999) analyses revealed no statistical support for his hypotheses.
Leaders who utilized a transactional style in a traditional environment or a
transformational style in an innovative environment did not possess higher job
satisfaction, performance ratings, or commitment, or lower frustration levels.
Several researchers have found empirical evidence in support of Bass
(1990b), Bass and Avolio (1990), and Avolio et al. (1991) integrated views
transformational and transactional leadership styles. (Anderson-Rudolf, 1996;
Deluga & Souza, 1991; Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Morreale, 2002) Deluga and Souza
(1991) surveyed 117 police officers from one police department that served a
jurisdiction on the East Coast of the United States. They were interested in learning
how leadership styles affected subordinates' application of soft ("friendliness"), hard
("assertiveness, coalition, and higher authority"), and rational ("bargaining and
reason") strategies.
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Deluga and Souza's (1991) survey resulted in 53 useable responses. The
respondents were all males, whose average age was 36.49 years and average
departmental tenure was 10.83 years.
Deluga and Souza's (1991) results led to several conclusions. "Contrary to
the study's hypotheses, transformational leadership was found to be more closely
associated with subordinate officer influencing than transactional leadership.
Further, although the three approaches emerged as interconnected, only rational
upward influencing was found linked with transformational leadership" (p. 54).
Morreale (2002) surveyed 465 sworn police officers, who worked in 75
different organizations throughout New England. His purpose was to measure
subordinates' beliefs about transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire
leadership styles and their influence on subordinate satisfaction and "extra effort."
Morreale (2002) received 177 useable surveys for his analyses, which led
him to several conclusions.
"The literature review showed that there is strong empirical evidence
showing that transformational leadership is both a desired and effective
leadership style in law enforcement. This study supported that, finding that
there is a strong positive relationship between the transformational style of
leadership of police supervisors and subordinate sworn officer's willingness

to exert extra effort, their job satisfaction, and their perception of their
manager's effectiveness... The study results show that leaders in law
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enforcement, rated for this study by subordinates, utilize both transactional
and transformational leadership styles in New England law enforcement
agencies..." (p. 212, 216)
Judge and Piccolo (2004) completed a meta-analysis of 87 leadership studies
to assess the validity of transactional and transformational leadership theories. Their
studies included 68 journal articles, 18 dissertations, and 1 unpublished data set,
which produced a total of 626 correlations. Their analyses revealed five findings
based on their earlier hypothesis:
A. Transformational leadership had the highest validity followed closely by
contingent reward leadership. Both leadership behaviors had positive
relationships with: follower job satisfaction; follower leader satisfaction;
follower motivation; leader job performance; group or organization
performance; and rater leader effectiveness.
B. Transformational and charismatic leadership had similar validities.
C. Laissez-faire leadership had a strong negative correlation to "follower
satisfaction with the leader" and "leader effectiveness," and moderate
negative correlation to the remaining leader criteria.
D. Passive management by exception exhibited a moderately negative
correlation with follower motivation, group or organization performance,
and leader effectiveness.
E. Transformational leadership variables significantly predicted the
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transactional and laissez-faire criteria in four of their five analyses.
Path-Goal Theory
Arguably, CompStat clarifies work paths and their respective goal linkages
for all workers. It does so through its relentless focus on timely, accurate
performance data, effective tactics, and rapid resource deployment.
House's (1971) path-goal theory built on earlier contingency leadership
scholarship. House (1996) described his path-goal theory, its related variables, and
its underlying logic.
"The essential notion underlying the path-goal theory is that individuals in
positions of authority, superiors, will be effective to the extent that they
complement the environment in which their subordinates work by providing
the necessary cognitive clarifications to ensure that subordinates expect that
they can attain work goals and that they will experience intrinsic satisfaction
and receive valent rewards as a result of work goal attainment" (p. 328).
House (1996) classified these leadership activities into two broad types:
"path-goal clarifying behavior and behavior directed toward satisfying subordinate
needs" (p. 328). House's (1971) observations led him to posit four theoretical
propositions:
A. ".. .the motivational functions of the leader consist of increasing personal
pay-offs to subordinates for work-goal attainment, and making the path to
these pay-offs easier to travel by clarifying it, reducing road blocks and
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pitfalls, and increasing the opportunities for personal satisfaction en
route...
B. In increasing path instrumentality by clarifying path-goal relationships,
the leader's behavior will have positive motivational effects to the extent
that it reduces role ambiguity or makes possible the exercise of externally
imposed controls...
C. .. .where path-goal relationships are apparent because of the routine of the
tasks or objective system-fixed controls, attempts by the leader to clarify
path-goal relationships will result in increased externally imposed control
and will be seen by subordinates as redundant...
D. Leader behavior directed at needs satisfaction of subordinates will result
in increased performance to the extent that such satisfaction increases the
net positive valence associated with goal-directed effort" (p. 323-324).
House and Mitchell (1974) noted path-goal theory was concerned with
leadership influence of "subordinates' perceptions of their work goals, personal goals
and goals to attainment" (p. 81). They believed a leader's behavior was motivational
to the degree it facilitated subordinate goals or clarified the paths to subordinate
goals. The two authors added two propositions to the original theory:
A.

"Leader behavior is acceptable and satisfying to subordinates to the
extent that the subordinates see such behavior as either an immediate
source of satisfaction or instrumental to future satisfaction.
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Leader behavior is motivational, i.e., increases effort, to the extent that
such behavior makes satisfaction of subordinate's needs contingent on
effective performance and (2) such behavior complements the
environment of subordinates by providing coaching, guidance, support
and rewards necessary for effective performance" (p. 84).

Robbins and Coulter (1996) concluded path-goal theory highlights three sets
of variables that affect worker performance and satisfaction:
A. Leader behavior (directive, supportive, participative, or achievement
oriented) (cf., Rainey 2003; Robbins & Coulter 1996; Yukl 1998);
B. Organizational environment beyond the control of the subordinate (task
structure, authority system, and work group); and
C. Subordinate behaviors (locus of control, experience, and perceived
ability).
Jermier and Berkes (1979) studied path-goal theory principles in a subset of
survey responses from 800 police officers and support staff in a mid-western police
department. "The sample included 127 police officers, 26 sergeants, and 5
lieutenants (primarily drawn from patrol and special investigation bureaus), of which
68 worked the first watch, 50 the second, and 40 the third" (p. 11).
Jermier and Berkes' (1979) analyses found their respondents held differing
views about law enforcement task structure:
"When subordinates perceived their tasks as unpredictable, they preferred
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their leader to clarify their roles. Both directive and participative role
clarification improved job satisfaction, but only participative role clarification
improved organizational commitment. When they reported their tasks as
relatively predictable, role clarification seemed largely unnecessary and
supportive leadership had its most positive effect.
Jermier and Berkes' (1979) research highlighted the importance of job task
interdependence and variability:
"Participation had its most positive impact upon organizational commitment
and job satisfaction when tasks were interdependent, suggesting that where
alternate sources of guidance and role definition exist, the formal leader may
be most effective with a consultative rather than directive style. This finding
was reversed, however, for subordinates performing essentially "one-person
tasks." In this situation, the formal leader was important as a role definer and
a source of performance feedback" (p. 17-18).
Leadership Summary
Several scholars suggested contingency researchers were motivated to find
more comprehensive explanations of leadership. (Daft, 1999; Mosley et al., 1996;
Nahavandi, 1997; Rainey 2003; Robbins & Coulter, 1996) Yet, many of their
theories have been presented regularly as independent means to lead, change, and
motivate followers. Since CompStat appears to introduce a level of added
complexity into the constant interactions among leaders, cultures, and individuals in

Washington State Patrol Change

35

an organization, these observations seem to call into question whether any one
contingency leadership approach would be sufficient to implement CompStat.
The level of this complexity seems to arise from CompStat's strategic
managerial characteristics, which Walsh (2001) has suggested include both "reactive
and adaptive" practices as well as "proactive and intended" strategies. In short, these
interactions call leaders' attention to the need to: communicate their vision to
multiple levels of the organization, in a variety of individual encounters and group
forums with supporters, neutrals, and opponents; demonstrate organizational
commitment beyond the short and intermediate performance gains, recognition, and
rewards; and to listen, respond, and adjust to a wide variety of feedback.
These observations suggest a more complex model of leadership may be
necessary to fully integrate CompStat into an organizational setting. At the same
time, this more comprehensive understanding may involve some common nexuses
noted by earlier leadership contingency theorists, such as: leadership and culture
theories; and leadership and motivation theories. (Nahavandi, 1997; Daft, 1999;
Rainey 2003) As a result, let us now consider culture theory and motivation theory
as a means to better understand how they can inform a more complex understanding
of the leadership theory and techniques needed to implement CompStat.
Culture Theory

Organizational culture theory often examines the relationship among
organizational values, norms, and individual behavior. Schein (1992a, 1992b, 1999)
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offered his widely quoted view of organizational culture:
"A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its
problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked long
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems"
(1992b, p. 12).
Shafritz and Russell (2003) also noted the relationship between
transformational leadership and organizational culture. "A transformational leader is
one with the ability to change an imbedded organizational culture by creating a new
vision for the organization and marshalling the appropriate support to make that
vision the new reality" (p. 334). Bass and Avolio (1993) concurred:
"There is a constant interplay between culture and leadership. Leaders create
mechanisms for cultural development and the reinforcement norms and
behaviors expressed within the boundaries of culture. Cultural norms arise
and change because of what leaders focus their attention on, how they react
to crises, the behaviors they role model, and whom they attract to their
organizations" (p. 113).
Schein (1992b, 1999) recommended six "primary embedding mechanisms"
leaders could utilize to shape the climate of their organizations: what leaders pay

attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis; how leaders react to critical
incidents and organizational crises; observed criteria by which leaders allocate scarce

Washington State Patrol Change

37

resources; deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching; observed criteria by
which leaders allocate rewards and status; observed criteria by which leaders recruit,
select, promote, retire, and ex-communicate organizational members" (p. 231-245).
Schein (1992b, 1999) also suggested six "secondary articulation and
reinforcement mechanisms" leaders could use with the primary mechanisms to shape
their organizational cultures: "Organization design and structure; organizational
systems and procedures; organizational rites and rituals; design of physical space,
facades, and buildings; stories, legends, and myths about people and events; formal
statements of organizational philosophy, values, and creed" (p. 231, 245-252).
The success of CompStat rests on its ability to change law enforcement
culture. However, police culture is a complex concept in itself. Paoline's (2000,
2003) review of the police culture literature revealed the concept had been used as a
broad means to describe the entire profession as well as individual organizations.
This distinction will be pursued in greater detail below.
The law enforcement professional culture has been classified in a variety of
ways:
A. Order maintenance, law enforcement, and service (Bittner, 1970, 1974,
1983; Brown 1988; Kelling, 1988; Kelling and Coles, 1996; Paoline,
2000; Paoline, Myers, & Worden, 2000; Rumbault & Bittner, 1979;
Wilson, 1968)
B. Crime fighting (Jermier & Berkes, 1979; Jermier, Slocum, Fry, & Gaines,
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1991; Kelling, 1988; Kelling, Wasserman, & Williams, 1988; Moore &
Kelling, 1983; Klockars, 1985; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988a; Moore,
Trojanowicz, & Kelling, 1988; Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990;
Westley, 1970)
C. Professional Model (Community Policing Consortium, 1994; Cordner,
1978; Fry & Berkes, 1983; Goldstein, 1979, 1990, 1993; Hansen, 1991;
Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Kelling & Coles, 1996; Kelling & Moore, 1988;
Kelling & Stewart, 1989; Kelling, Wasserman, & Williams, 1988;
Kennedy, 1993; Moore & Kelling, 1983; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988a;
Sandler & Mintz, 1974; Peak and Glensor, 1999; Sparrow, 1988;)
D. Political, bureaucratic, community, and professional models (Hernandez,
1982; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Peak & Glensor, 1999)
Early law enforcement scholarship oftentimes characterized organizational
culture by its homogenous nature. For example, it focused on the profession's
coercive authority, (Bittner, 1970, 1974, 1983) and discretionary power (Brown,
1988; Davis, 1969; Goldsmith, 1990).
More recent law enforcement scholarship has characterized organizational
cultures by their heterogeneous nature through the elucidation of their subcultures.
(Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Britz, 1997; Harrison, 1998; Herbert, 1996; 1998;

Maguire, 2003; Paoline 2000; Paoline et al. 2000; Reuss-Ianni 1983; Schmalleger,
2003; Simon, 1999) Herbert (1998) defined a normative order of policing, or ".. .a
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set of generalized rules and common practices oriented around a common value" (p.
347), based on observations of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers,
between 1993-1994. He concluded police culture was shaped by six normative
orders: law, bureaucratic control, adventure/machismo, safety, competence, and
morality.
Hernandez's (1982) review of the literature led him to identify four dominant
models of police culture, (cf., Wilson, 1968) The political model described a
context where rewards, promotions, and punishments were heavily influenced by
external and internal political relationships. He felt officer motivation suffered in
such environments, as lack of trust, support, and guidance became the norm.
The bureaucratic model relied on military bearing, professionalism, and law
enforcement. Hernandez (1982) believed officer motivation was often bifurcated in
such environments: some officers were enthusiastic about the directions of their
departments, while others bemoaned the over-emphasis of law enforcement, rigid
structure, and inability to make larger internal and external contributions. Other
scholars noted such formalized agency culture emphasized vertical and horizontal
identities based on individual rank, job task, or specialized unit. (Angell, 1971,
Bratton, 1996; Bratton & Andrews, 1999; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Cordner, 1978;
Hansen, 1991; Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Moore &

Trojanowicz, 1988a, 1988b; Reiter, 1999; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Sandler & Mintz,
1974)

Washington State Patrol Change

40

Hernandez's (1982) community model focused on enlarging police services
delivery through participative management, programmatic innovations, and
teamwork. Consequently, officer morale was extremely high and turnover quite low.
Hernandez (1982) described the Mesa Police Department (Arizona) as a
professional model. His structured interviews revealed officers felt the department
provided a professional service, based on effectiveness, and utilized progressive
programs. The officers' motivation was high, as they were complimentary of their
relationships with administrators, supervisors, and one another.
Jermier et al. (1991) interviewed 42 police employees in a small southern
city, which formed the basis for their survey of 208 departmental employees. The
useable sample included 136 officer responses, after the civilian responses (62) and
the incomplete questionnaires (10) were excluded. They typified the official culture
as a "crime-fighting command bureaucracy" based on their observations.
Jermier et al.'s (1991) findings also identified five subcultures, which
appeared to vary across "personal, task, organizational, and performance related
variables" (p. 178). The "ceremonial crime-fighting commandoes" identified closely
with the official culture, based on the traditional model of policing, but expressed the
lowest level of organizational commitment. This group was spread fairly equally
across the three work shifts in patrol operations (86%). The "anti-military social
workers" were senior, elite, well-educated officers. They worked primarily on
dayshift where their assignments were split evenly between patrol (9%) and
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detectives (9%). "They were exposed to minimal physical danger, expressed the
highest level of organizational commitment, and received top performance ratings"
(p. 184). The "crime-fighting street professionals" worked as fairly autonomous
groups of specialists with higher reported militaristic practices than the ceremonial
crime fighting commandoes. Sixty-one percent reported working the dayshift, 36%
were detectives, and 30% were managers. The "peace-keeping moral entrepreneurs"
viewed their role as maintaining peace and order. However, they also reported the
second lowest levels of organizational commitment. This group represented senior
patrol officers (75%) and detectives (19%), nearly one-third of which worked the
nightshift where they were often exposed to high levels of danger. The "asscovering legalists" reported strong support for the formalized departmental practices,
but their goal was to avoid trouble. They modified or rejected some of the
militaristic aspects of the department. This group included average-tenured patrol
officers (73%) with little education, who worked the evening or night shifts.
Paoline (2000) and Paoline et al. (2000) interviewed patrol officers in the
Indianapolis and St. Petersburg Police Departments (IPD) (SPPD) to learn about
agency culture. The interviews included 398 of the 426 patrol officers in the IPD and
240 of the 246 patrol officers in the SPPD. The discussions examined officers'
views about law enforcement, order maintenance, community policing,

aggressiveness, selectivity, distrust of citizens, and citizen cooperation.
Paoline (2000) and Paoline et al. (2000) found that over 80 percent of their
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respondents felt law enforcement was their most important responsibility. The
researchers learned officers were generally supportive of aggressive patrol and
selective enforcement. They found the officers who embraced community policing
principles were more likely to believe they had a role in community disorder
activities, as compared to their counterparts. The researchers' analyses found no
widespread distrust of the citizenry.
Britz (1997) surveyed 148 police candidates in four classes of a regional
police academy, which resulted in 131 usable surveys. She evaluated recruits'
knowledge of organizational culture and politics by assessing their socialization
levels, occupational solidarity, and feelings of isolation.
Britz (1997) found the training candidates' socialization was significantly
related to their age, gender, law experience, and departmental size. Overall, 74% of
the candidates appeared to understand organizational goals, while those over the age
of 36 were found to possess the greatest understanding of these goals. Males,
experienced officers, and small department candidates were more likely to say they
understood the informal power structures as compared to their respective candidates.
Britz (1997) found the training candidates' solidarity was significantly related
to their age, race, law enforcement experience, and educational levels. All the
recruits indicated they had friends within their respective departments, but non-

White and female respondents were found to be statistically significant. Candidates
with more than 9 months of prior law experience reported the most occupational
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friendships. Forty-two percent of candidates over 40 years of age were less likely to
feel they were apart of the cohort network. Candidates with prior military service
reported fewer departmental friendships, were less likely to feel they were apart of
the cohort network, and reported less involvement with social gatherings after work
hours. College educated candidates reported the most difficulty with old friends
being uncomfortable around them in their new roles, while females expressed the
fewest problems with old friends being uncomfortable around them.
Hunt (1997) surveyed a stratified sample of 690 Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) officers, which resulted in 566 usable surveys. He asked
officers about their perceptions of the actual LAPD culture and their views of the
ideal culture to learn how these beliefs and values, which contribute to police culture.
Hunt's (1997) analyses revealed no significant difference between
respondents' views of authenticity, collaboration, and experimentation. His findings
indicated significant differences between both cultures with regards to openness,
confrontation, trust, "proaction," and autonomy. Hunt concluded future values
training within the LAPD should seek to address this cultural dissatisfaction
affecting five of nine cultural variables measured.
Motivation Theory
Latham and Locke (1979) asserted: "The problem of how to motivate
employees has puzzled and frustrated managers for generations" (p. 129).
Schermerhorn et al. (1997) defined motivation:
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"Formally defined, motivation refers to the forces within an individual that
account for the level, direction, and persistence of effort expended at work.
Level refers to the amount of effort a person puts forth... direction refers to
what the person chooses when presented with a number of possible
alternatives... and persistence refers to how long a person sticks with a given
action..." (p. 87) (cf., Rainey, 2003)
Brewer, Selden, and Facer (2000) interviewed and surveyed 69 local, state,
and federal employees to learn more about their motivations. Their analyses led
them to describe four principal personality types working in the public sector. The
Samaritans took great personal gratification from helping people, especially those
who were politically or economically vulnerable or underprivileged. The
communitarians were motivated by their belief in civic duty and public service and
their desire to give something back to society. These individuals were interested in a
public sector that represented the whole community, rather than individual actors
own interests. The patriots sought to contribute to causes that are larger than
themselves by protecting, advocating, and working for the public good. They are
often aggressive risk takers. The humanitarians were driven by a strong sense of
social justice and public service and act out of a strong sense of citizenship, duty, and
patriotism.

Perry (1996) surveyed a 376 local, county, university, state, and federal
employees as well as social science students to test a public service measurement
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scale designed to measure public servant motivation. His results demonstrated that
public service personnel appear to be motivated by their attraction to the public
policy process, commitment to the public process, compassion for others, and selfsacrifice.
Chusmir's (1984) research using the Dictionary of Occupational Titles job
descriptions examined the needs profiles of police work. It confirmed Sheppard,
Bates, Fracchia, and Merlis' (1974) earlier survey findings of 33 New York
metropolitan police officers enrolled in the New York Institute of Technology's
College Accredited Program. These scholars' research suggested their subjects were
motivated by a power motive and were less motivated by a need for affiliation.
Chusmir (1984) added:
As lower level officers are promoted or moved into specialties such as
detectives or investigators, need for affiliation seems to be more important to
the job, indicating that concern for friendly relationships with other people
increases along with extra responsibility. The most balanced profile belongs
to activities performed by sergeants, ID commanders, desk officers,
community relations officers..." (p. 143-144)
Simon (1999) surveyed three police cohorts in order to learn more about their
motivation, beliefs, ethnocentrism, anger, and coping mechanisms. The first cohort

consisted of 64 pre-academy cadets, which included 49 males and 15 females. The
second cohort included the remaining half of the first cohort still employed by the
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Miami Police Department after 15 years. The third cohort consisted of 43 preacademy cadets surveyed 15 years after the first cohort.
Simon's (1999) analyses revealed the first and second cohorts indicated they
did not feel emergency motorist assistance or reducing community tensions were as
important to police work, as the third cohort members did. The first cohort did not
feel arresting criminals was as important as their counterparts. Experienced police
officers reported feeling it was important to create a positive occupational image,
than they did earlier in their careers. They also reported higher feelings of physical
aggression, resentment, irritability, and suspicion than their counterparts. The third
cohort felt the occupation was a more "thankless job," than either of the other
cohorts. Simon's analyses failed to substantiate higher levels of hostility for more
experienced officers.
Several scholars have examined law enforcement organizations and their
influence on employee motivation. Angell's (1971) essay highlighted his belief that
low law enforcement morale was often heightened by the centralized organizational
structures and the vertical- and horizontal- organizational differentiation. Angell
also thought these difficulties were exacerbated because executives could not
simultaneously respect the chain of command, manage departmental affairs, and
communicate to employees. Sandler and Mitz's (1974) two-year consultancy with
the NYPD appeared to reinforce these earlier observations, as both scholars noted the
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centralized nature of the NYPD created "a sense of demoralization and
powerlessness at the lower ranks" (p. 458).
Van Maanen (1975) examined police recruits' attitudes as they progressed
through their academy training and began their work as police officers in an urban
department with over 1,500 uniformed personnel. All recruits from four academy
classes participated in the initial survey, which resulted in 136 useable responses.
However, some recruits failed to participate in the following four month surveys.
The final 30 month survey of the fourth class yielded a 72 percent response
rate. Van Maanen's (1975) analyses led him to identify five distinctly different
occupational phases: entry, introduction, encounter, and metamorphosis. Recruit
entry was characterized by strong positive attitudes, often shaped by peer friendship
networks and rigorous screening processes. The recruits' first encounter with law
enforcement was often the police academy, although many respondents reported
declining motivational levels, organizational commitment, and significant
dissatisfaction. The researchers suggested this may result from recruits' personal
expectations failing to match to their academy experiences. Metamorphosis referred
to the conclusion of the recruits' training, where their attitudes and behaviors tended
to mirror those of more experienced officers.
Reiter (1999) discussed the addition of newer police officers born between
1963 and 1977 to police departments. He reminded readers of these cohorts'
differing views about organizational commitment, based on their cultural
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socialization, as compared to their senior counterparts.
Morris, Shinn, and DuMont (1999) used focus groups and informal
interviews with police officers to develop a survey questionnaire related to
organizational commitment. They administered their survey to New York City
Housing Authority police officers to learn how their organizational commitment was
influenced by individual characteristics, managerial factors, individual perceptions,
interpersonal interactions, family support, and their views about other jobs. The
researchers received 372 useable responses.
Morris et al. (1999) analyses revealed the most important predictors of
organizational commitment were individual perceptions of management support and
fairness, followed by the social support in the command. Overall, the researchers
concluded: "For police officers in the current study, the setting level consensus
about management support and fairness in the command was directly related to
organizational commitment" (p. 96).
Winegar (2003) surveyed 352 Oregon police officers representing twenty
organizations in order to learn more about their motivation. The organizations
ranged in size from 14 sworn personnel to 167 sworn personnel. He found that
officer's feelings of empowerment were related to their perceptions of enhanced
feelings of control and competence within their work environment. He also found

that officers who were motivated by intrinsic factors felt more empowered than those
motivated by extrinsic factors. Winegar was unable to substantiate his hypothesis
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that work motivators would mediate officers' perceptions of the work environment
or their feelings of empowerment.
Strategic Management Theory
Shafritz and Russell (2003) suggested modern strategic management is the art
of applying resources to achieve a desired objective. Schaffer and Thomson (1992)
argued successful organizational change ought to focus on results in order to achieve
four benefits: Firms introduce managerial and process innovations only as they are
needed; empirical testing reveals what works; frequent reinforcement energizes the
improvement process; and management creates a continuous learning process by
building on the lessons of previous phases in designing the next phase of the
program.
Lewin (1947) believed a "force field" protected social organizations from
change initiatives. He prescribed a series of change stages, which involved
"unfreezing," changing, and "refreezing," as a means to create permanency and a
new force field to protect the changes.
Conner (1992) classified change as macro-level (contextual), organizational,
or micro-level (individual). Quinn (1996) described deep change as ".. .major in
scope, discontinuous with the past and generally irreversible" (p. 3). Nadler and
Tushman (1995) proffered four-way types of change: tuning involved incremental
anticipated change, while adaptation resulted from incremental reactive change; and
reorientation described anticipatory discontinuous change, while re-creation resulted
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from reactive discontinuous change.
Robbins and Coulter (1996) clarified strategic management principles by
suggesting they involved implementing organizational strategies and evaluating their
results. Each of these areas will be considered in further detail below.
Strategic Planning
Kouzes and Posner (1995) noted contemporary strategic leadership thinking
has become virtually synonymous with a leader's ability to transform their
organization, using a strategic or future oriented view. Shafritz and Russell (2003)
suggested governmental agency strategic planning efforts usually involve six
features. These include:
A. "The identification of objectives to be achieved in the future (these are
often announced in a vision statement)
B. The adoption of a time frame (or "planning horizon") in which these
objectives are to be achieved
C. A systematic analysis of the current circumstances of an organization,
especially its capabilities
D. An assessment of the environment surrounding the organization-both now
and within the planning horizon
E. The selection of a strategy for the achievement of desired objectives by a
future date, often comparing various alternatives
F. The integration of organizational efforts around this strategy" (p. 293).
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Goold and Campbell (1987) felt executive involvement in strategic planning
led to three positive outcomes: more ambitious planning initiatives; broader
perspective planning across organizational units; and better coordination of unit
plans across the organization. Drucker (1994) warned executives such endeavors
should focus on the uncertainty of our times. "Planning for uncertainty asks...
'what has already happened that will create the future?'" (p. 39-40).
Bryson (2004) identified a ten-step strategic planning process for public
organizations, which described the integrated nature of the strategic planning
process: "Initiate and agree on a strategic planning process; identify organizational
mandates; clarify organizational mission and values; assess the external and internal
environments to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats; identify
the strategic issues facing the organization; formulate strategies to manage the issues;
review and adopt the strategies or strategic plan; establish an effective organizational
vision; develop an effective implementation process; and reassess the strategies and
the strategic planning process" (p. 33-34). Bryson admitted the last two processes
completed the transition from strategic planning and strategic management.
Finally, Mintzberg (1987) likened strategic planning to skill craft work. He
noted: "My point is simple, deceptively simple: Strategies can form as well as be
formulated. A realized strategy can emerge in response to an evolving situation, or it
can be brought about deliberately, through a process of formulation followed by
implementation" (p. 407).
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Moore (1991) summarized by suggesting public sector strategies must
contain three essential elements.
"First, it must define a goal or purpose that, if achieved, would be worth the
cost to the public. Second, it must capture and sustain the support of the
elected representatives who oversee the organization's operations. Third, it
must be doable. If any of these criteria are not met, the strategy will fail"
(p. 122).
Management of Change
Kaplan and Norton (1996) proposed the Balanced Scorecard, which
structures organizational change focused on: the agency vision and strategy,
customer focus, internal business processes, learning and growth, and financial
needs, (cf., Kaplan & Norton, 2004; Niven, 2005; Niven & Kaplan, 2002; Niven &
Mann, 2003) Niven and Mann identified seven benefits with a public sector
Balanced Scorecard system. They noted it would: "demonstrate accountability and
generate results, attract scarce resources (funding and employees), create a focus on
strategy, produce information, not data, self preservation, drive change, and inspire
trust" (2003, p. 39-42).
Van De Ven and Poole's (1995) inter-disciplinary literature review of the
biological, physical, and social sciences and identified four general theories of

change: life-cycle, teleological, dialectical, and evolutionary. They posited these
theories could serve as "building blocks for explaining processes of change in
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organizations" (p. 1).
Van De Ven and Poole (1995) suggested life-cycle theory views change as a
constant process guided by an intrinsic development process. Teleological theory
associated change with the pursuit of some purpose, goal, or outcome. Dialectical
theory recognized change as the resultant between two opposing forces.
Evolutionary theory suggested change was a continuous process of variation,
selection, and retention often based purely on random chance. The authors felt the
first two theories best described single units of analysis, while the latter two theories
should be used to explain two or more units of analysis. They proffered that the lifecycle and evolutionary theories helped describe incremental change because any new
initiative is always judged against the backdrop of the larger patterns of change.
Similarly, teleological and dialectical theories tended to produce more dramatic
changes because there is no reference to an underlying pattern.
Jansen (1999) envisioned an integrated typology of change involving three
integrated areas in the change literature: organization development (OD), strategy
implementation, and organization theory. She identified the overlap between the
first and second areas as strategy organization development, the second and third
areas as organization adaptation, and the third and first areas as organization
transformation.

Jansen (1999) tested her hypotheses related to momentum of change at the
United States Military Academy (USMA). Her survey sample included 100 non-
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commissioned officers in staff and tactical positions, 110 cadet officers, and 660
non-officer cadets, who were chosen randomly from the 4000 cadets at the
institution.
Jansen (1999) analyses revealed mixed results. She found that participants
who perceived greater support for change among their peers and greater progress
toward change reported higher levels of momentum. She also found that managerial
support positively influenced the participants' perceptions of momentum and that
participants' commitment was positively influenced by their views of momentum.
Finally, she found ".. .that momentum was significantly different before and after a
competing project took priority" (p. 58).
Jansen (1999) failed to find momentum was related to the actual number of
participants involved in a change initiative, their percentage over time, or their
frequent interactions. She suggested that this may be because participants were
unaware of how much support an initiative has attracted and that the number of
participants is only relevant at certain times during a change initiative. She also
failed to find support for the notion that progress toward goals increased the
participants' views about momentum.
Little empirical research has been conducted on strategic management in law
enforcement organizations. This case study hopes to rectify this oversight through
its scrutiny of the aforementioned organizational elements, including strategic
management.
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Theory Summary
This chapter proposed a theoretical model of organizational change that will
help focus the remainder of this case study. In essence, the model argues a thorough
understanding of executive leadership, organizational culture, employee motivation,
and strategic management is critical to understanding state law enforcement change.
Executive leadership influences organizational culture, employee motivation,
and strategic management controls. Indeed, the scientific study of leadership
focused most recently on contingency theories, which are concerned with the
interaction between leader and follower. Situational leadership classifies leadership
style based on the amount of direction required to guide task behavior and the extent
of two-way communication between leaders and followers. Some empirical law
enforcement studies have found its principles in use, while others have failed to
substantiate a link between these practices and greater follower satisfaction.
Transformational leadership generally builds on transactional skills and involves a
leader's ability to provide charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and
individualized consideration to their followers. Strong meta-analytical support
exists, including law enforcement studies, that transformational leaders enjoy
widespread organizational approval. Path-goal theory is concerned with how a
leader's behavior clarifies the work path and worker goal attainment. However, very

little research has been conducted on its use in law enforcement. Finally, this
literature suggests contingent leadership styles have proven to be powerful forces
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that help shape organizational culture and individual motivation.
Culture theory examines how shared assumptions shape organizational
behavior and productivity. There appears to be growing empirical evidence that law
enforcement agencies can be described in terms of the values, beliefs, and
perceptions of their dominant cultures and subcultures. Therefore, any successful
law enforcement change initiative must remain sensitive to re-shaping the
organizational culture as a means to facilitate organizational change.
Motivation theory is concerned with the external and internal forces that
inspire worker action and contribute to organizational results. There is very little,
quality, empirical evidence related to what specifically motivates law enforcement
officers, beyond that which has been discerned for public sector employees. In
general, this research suggests individuals are motivated by a complex interaction of
rational, cultural, and affective motives.
Strategic management includes a focus on the internal or external factors that
can influence operations. It is recognized as the art of applying resources to achieve
desired objectives. (Shafritz & Russell, 2003) Consequently, it involves planning,
implementation, and evaluative functions. CompStat was designed to utilize crime
data to plan effective tactics and efficiently deploy staff, so improved law
enforcement performance outcomes could be achieved. In many ways, the
proliferation of its principles throughout law enforcement speaks to its effectiveness.
In conclusion, this theoretical review investigated several organizational
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factors that may have helped propel CompStat performance gains. At the same time,
this theoretical presentation will serve as a benchmark for a similar management
strategy implemented in the case study's organizational setting discussion, both of
which will be presented next.

CHAPTER THREE
The Organizational Setting for the Case Study
The Washington State Patrol (WSP) serves as the organizational setting for
the case study. Therefore, the chapter examines three recent administrations which
worked together to re-define how the agency linked its organizational performance to
desirable public safety outcomes. It concludes with a concise description of the
research problem.
The Washington State Patrol
The WSP was created as a statewide highway patrol on June 8, 1921, and
commissioned its first six officers on September 1, 1921. Over the years, these
meager beginnings gave way to additional public safety legislative mandates and a
comprehensive, statewide, public safety mission. (Bechtel, 1995; Torres, 1987; WSP
Strategic Plan, 2004; WSP Website, 2005) These responsibilities are outlined in
Appendix A, and differ from local and regional law enforcement efforts due, in large
part, to their broader statewide jurisdiction, different criminal focus, and nature of
the collaborative services provided.
In order to place the case study and the recent WSP changes into proper
perspective, it is necessary to examine three recent administrations and their service
from 1995-2004. Chief Annette Sandberg and her executive staff were responsible
for a significant shift in the agency's managerial focus, which contributed to later
agency success. (Rene' Ewing & Associates, 2004; Serpas, 2003, 2004) Chief
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Ronal Serpas and Lowell Porter's change initiatives built on this earlier foundation
and will become the central focus of this case study.
Chief Annette Sandberg
Chief Annette Sandberg served as the sixteenth chief of the WSP between
1995 and 2001. She implemented several strategic management initiatives during
her tenure. The most important included the drafting of the first comprehensive
strategic plan in 1998, with leadership accountability linkages and data measures.
These attempts to create greater accountability within the commissioned ranks led to
efforts to refine the job performance appraisal (JPA) for troopers and sergeants and
to create a new JPA for lieutenants in 1998. Several members of the JPA committee
also became involved in creating, designing, and naming the first Strategic
Advancement Forums (SAFs) in the summer and fall of 1999. In the committee's
view, the forums were intended to: "bridge the communication and accountability
gap" between the executive staff and commanders; provide regular interaction
between these two organizational groups; and measure the successes associated with
the agency strategic plan implementation, using an open forum, without the
adversarial environment created by the New York Police Department's (NYPD)
CompStat forums. After a successful executive staff briefing in late 1999, the plan
was approved and initiated and the first SAF occurred in the WSP in February of
2000. In essence, the SAFs served as biannual, public, performance reviews
designed to assess district and divisional contributions to organizational strategic
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plan. (Interview Participant (IP), 131; Cederblom & Pemerl, 2002; Dr. Doug
Cederblom, personal communication; Ewing et al., 2004; Serpas, 2003, 2004)
Chief Sandberg's change initiatives failed to achieve complete organizational
acceptance. SAF presentation questions changed frequently, which made proactive
data collection difficult and presentation preparation very time consuming. Many
data systems were antiquated, which resulted in supervisors hand-counting specific
work measures. In traffic law enforcement (TLE), these workgroup results were
then combined with adjacent work zone outputs in order to evaluate work measures
for larger geographical areas. Other individual and workgroup activity reports were
often delayed several months before they reached frontline supervisors, which made
timely data collection, analysis, or triangulation nearly impossible, using these
reports. Finally, some managers questioned the relationship between regional
performance indicators and larger public safety goals.
Chief Sandberg resigned in February 2001, in order to pursue other career
opportunities. Her resignation triggered an especially tumultuous period in recent
WSP history, as interim Chiefs Robert Leichner and James LaMunyon were
appointed and two executive search processes attempted to locate a more permanent
replacement.
Chief Ronal

Serpas

Washington Governor Gary Locke appointed Dr. Ronal Serpas as the
1

The interview participants (IP) will be referred to by number, which has been scrambled, placed in
ascending order, and grouped where possible to protect their anonymity.

Washington State Patrol Change

61

nineteenth chief of the WSP in August 2001, after conducting regional and
nationwide searches. Prior to his appointment, Chief Serpas had served as the Chief
of Operations for the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), where he helped lead
a dramatic change in the delivery of municipal police services. The NOPD
leadership had implemented CompStat and had been credited with drastically
reducing crime rates and citizens' fear of crime. (Serpas, 2003, 2004) However,
these management principles, techniques, and analyses had never been applied to a
statewide law enforcement agency with as diverse a public safety mission as the
WSP.
Early observations
Chief Serpas was impressed by the fact Governor Locke, the legislative
leadership, and members of the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police
Chiefs (WASPC), all possessed immense respect for the WSP. In fact, he was
"awestruck" by the agency and its culture, which he felt exemplified pride and
respect for the nature of the work. He said he found it refreshing to work in a law
enforcement agency like the Patrol.
However, he also found several alarming trends. He suggested external
stakeholders described the WSP as "non-yielding," "unbending," and having "lost
sight of its mission." He added that Governor Locke, state senators, and
representatives felt the WSP had "lost its balance," but he was quick to clarify:
"They had not lost faith, but they had lost the sense that the Patrol, really
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knew what it wanted to be and where it wanted to go. Now some of that
could've been... all of the 200[1] transition... [But, there was] a very sincere
concern that the Patrol was just kinda rudderless and had been like that way
for several years... They were concerned about the troopers because what
they saw was the troopers, you know not out there pounding the pavement,
looking for drunk drivers, handling drugs, and serving warrants..." (Serpas,
2007)
One senior executive recalled an illustrative example of this legislative
uncertainty, which surfaced as they joined a meeting with Chief Serpas and the
legislator early in the administration. The respondent suggested the legislator was
very concerned with the WSP's Field Operation Bureau (FOB) performance in the
last biennium, which he then outlined using his own observations. These included:
additional budgetary appropriations for traffic law enforcement activities were made,
including additional staffing appropriations; collisions rose; overall bureau
productivity fell; and overtime grew to one million dollars. The legislator reportedly
vocalized his intention to vote against any significant budgetary increases for FOB
until he felt the management problems had been corrected.
At the time of these observations, the FOB and its TLE mission were a
central focal point of the entire agency, both externally and internally. Nearly all the
agency's sworn personnel were assigned to FOB workgroups, as was a large segment
of the civilian staff who worked to support these efforts. If FOB were perceived to
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be straggling to fulfill its mission, it could have a cataclysmic effect on the public's
perceptions about the WSP's contribution to statewide public safety. A review of the
FOB 20-year historical overview of core TLE activities (driving while under the
influence (DUI), aggressive driving, speed, and seatbelt enforcement) and collision
investigation performance data appears to bolster Chief Serpas' early observations
and discussion themes. Therefore, a quick review of its major trends is in order.
FOB Core Traffic Law Enforcement Performance Data
For over 20 years, every WSP trooper who contacted a motorist completed
administrative paperwork designed to track the purpose for the contact, its
disposition, and a variety of other descriptors related to the incident. And, for at
least as long, FOB personnel used this performance data to assess its TLE results and
their impact on collisions outcomes across the state.
More recently, this performance data has been aggregated from troopers'
time and activity reports (TARs) to create a series of summary tables detailing the
statewide core TLE results from 1986-2006. (WSP Historical Overview Trooper
Traffic Contacts, and Collision Investigations and Arrests, 1986-2006) Although not
totally inclusive of all troopers' TLE activities, these targeted analyses do provide
several lenses with which to view WSP TLE efforts during these two decades. As a
result, these findings warrant a closer examination, especially the performance
results leading up to Serpas' arrival. Statewide demographic shifts and FOB line
trooper staffing levels provide an important backdrop against which to review the

Washington State Patrol Change

64

remaining TLE activities and their trends over time.
Statewide demographics and FOB line trooper staffing levels. In 1986, the
Washington State population was estimated to be 4,527,1002, while the WSP FOB
line staffing included 495 troopers, or 1 line trooper for every 9,145 estimated
residents. By 2001, the statewide population had grown steadily to an estimated
6,041,700 (33.5%) residents, while the WSP FOB line staffing had grown to a high
of 701 troopers (41.6%), or 1 line trooper for every 8,618 estimated residents.
(Washington State Office of Financial Management, 2007; WSP Historical
Overview, p. 4) Meanwhile, the annual vehicle miles travelled by Washington State
residents grew steadily throughout this same time period: 1986: 19,718,419,700
miles and 2001: 30,670,693,000 (55.5%) miles. (Washington State Department of
Transportation, 2007)
Total violator contacts. A review of the 20-year performance results
suggests total violator contacts ranged from 870,805 in 1986, to 782,548 (-10.1%) in
2000. These results represented 1,759 contacts per FOB line trooper in 1986, which
fell to 1,154 (-34.3%) contacts per FOB line trooper in 2000. Interestingly, after the
first SAFs were introduced in July 2000, a bow wave of TLE activity seemed to
occur in 2001, when compared to the 2000 TLE efforts: total contacts surged to
1,449,618 (85.2%) or 2,067 (79.1%) contacts per FOB line trooper, which equated to

2

Washington State Office of Financial Management Data publishes yearly population numbers using
April 1st estimates. Consequently, each succeeding year was used as a rough estimate for the
December 31 st data.
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about 172 violators a month. All three results represented historically unprecedented
violator contact achievements.
Driving under the influence (DUI) enforcement. Historically, DUI
apprehension had been a major focus of WSP TLE activities, as decades of WSP
training had stressed the disproportionate representation of impaired drivers across
all categories of collisions. (Baker, 1981, 1985, 1986, 2002) This emphasis is
clearly evident in the statewide DUI apprehension performance data from 1986 to
1992, when total arrests increased from 14,999 to 20,774 (38.5%) and respective
average annual arrests per FOB line trooper grew from 30 to 34 (13.3%). Both
categories began a dramatic descent soon thereafter, and fell to a 15 year low of
14,617 (-29.6%o) arrests or 21 (-38.2%) per FOB line trooper respectively, in 2001.
Arguably, some portion of this slippage could be attributed to the increasing
complexity of all TLE activities in general and DUI administrative procedures in
particular. The latter evolved increasingly in response to the latest public and special
interest demands, DUI legislation, prosecutorial requirements, and case law.
Aggressive driving. In 1998, the WSP formed its Aggressive Driving
Apprehension Team (ADAT). The purpose of the program was to place a group of
highly productive troopers into unmarked patrol vehicles to apprehend habitual,
aggressive, and dangerous traffic offenders. In the four years that followed,

statewide annual aggressive driver contacts grew from 4,368 to 5,044 (15.4%), but
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the average number of aggressive driver contacts per FOB line trooper remained
constant at 7 during this same time period.
In later years, the definition of aggressive driving was refined, largely in
response to an executive recognition of fluctuating FOB standards in combination
with SAF discussion, debate, and problem solving. It remains very unclear how the
20-year TLE study attempted to apply this narrower aggressive driving definition to
the earlier TLE performance data. But, this historical data seemed to indicate that
aggressive driving arrests had peaked in 1987 at 7,955, or 15 arrests per FOB line
trooper, and had fallen consistently to 4,368 (-45%), or 6 arrests (- 60%) per FOB
line trooper, the year the AD AT was formed.
Speed. Historically, speed contacts have been a major focus of WSP TLE
activities. Once again, decades of WSP training had focused troopers' attention on
the fact that speeding drivers require more distance to slow or stop their vehicle
ahead of any serious roadway hazard. In other words, speeding drivers become
involved in more collisions and their collisions tended to be more serious than those
drivers who obeyed the speed and following distance laws. (Baker, 1981, 1985,
1986, 2002)
The 20-year performance data indicates statewide speed citations peaked with
399,800 citations or 870 citations per FOB trooper in 1986, and 380,692 (-4.7%)
citations or 740 (-14.9%) citations per FOB trooper in 1987. Annual speed citations
then plummeted to 192,961 (-49.3%) citations or 368 (-50.2%) per FOB trooper in
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1988, and 180,335 (-6.5%) citations or 343 (6.7%) per FOB trooper in 1989. Speed
citations increased marginally from 1990 to 1992, to a high of 211,530, with a
commensurate increase in field force troopers. Unfortunately, speed citations then
fell off dramatically for the next six years to a low of 142,465, despite the continued
growth of the field force. In 2000, when the first SAF was introduced, statewide
speed citations amounted to just 159,572 citations or 235 per FOB trooper, which
increased to 165,723 (3.8%) citations or 236 (0.4%) per FOB trooper in 2001.
Seatbelt infractions. Seatbelt usage has been widely recognized as one
means to improve occupant safety in the event of a motor vehicle collision, both to
reduce deaths and limit the seriousness of injury. Indeed, the proliferation of
national seatbelt laws, automobile safety standards, and roadway design
specifications have been credited with enhancing the safety of the increasingly
mobile, motoring public.
In 1986, Washington State enacted a mandatory seatbelt law, as a secondary
offense. (Doane & Thurston, 2007; Salzberg & Moffat, 2003) This meant that after
a law enforcement officer initiated a lawful stop based on some other traffic
violation, they could take secondary enforcement on those occupants who failed to
wear their restraints. That year, troopers cited 14, 866 occupants for their failure to
use their restraints, which equated to 30 citations for every FOB line trooper. These
numbers grew fairly steadily over the next seven years to a high of 55,463 citations
or 91 citations per FOB line trooper in 1993. Over the next six years, the number of
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citations then fell off to a low of 33,587 or 51 citations per FOB line trooper in 1999.
In 2000, seatbelt citations increased to 43,977 (30%) or 65 citations per FOB line
trooper, but fell back to

42,546 (-3%) or 61 citations per FOB line trooper in

2001.
Collisions. Washington State's fatality rate moved steadily downward from
1986 to 2001, which mirrored the national trend. In 1986, Washington's fatality rate
on interstate and state highways equated to 1.75 deaths per 100 million miles
traveled, which grew to 1.91 deaths (9.1%) in 1987. However, by the late 1980s, the
fatality rate had descended near 1.8 deaths (-5.7%), and by 1991, the rate had
plummeted to 1.45 deaths (-19.4%) per 100 million miles traveled. Remarkably, the
state highway fatality rate has remained below this benchmark ever since, and fell to
1.10 deaths (-24.1%) per 100 million miles traveled in 2001.
Injury collisions investigated by the WSP have taken on a similar trend over
the course of the last ten years. In 1996, the WSP investigated 16,046 injury
collisions, but over the next four years injury collisions fell every year to 11,909
(-25.8%) in 2000. The number increased to 12,711 injury collisions (6.7%) in 2001.
Taken together, this historical, core, TLE data suggests Washington State
fatality and injury collision rates were improving, especially in light of the
demographic pressures discussed above. However, significant numbers of

automobile passengers were still being killed and seriously injured by criminally
reckless, negligent, and speeding drivers on the state's roadways. Despite these
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realities, the WSP executive leadership had struggled to motivate its FOB field force
to increase its core TLE activities over time, despite reasonably stable and
accelerating FOB staffing levels. While it's true such work categories reflect only
some aspects of all TLE work, arguably these core activities represent some of the
most risky, dangerous, and preventable driving behaviors. Therefore, the data seems
to imply FOB personnel had lost sight of their core TLE responsibilities, with respect
to TLE aimed at the DUI, aggressive driving, speed, and seatbelt laws.
Meanwhile, the WSP had begun to compare its work against a variety of
external benchmarks and also hired some governmental consultants to examine many
of its practices. Consequently, these published reviews provided several baselines to
compare later TLE efforts, so let us pause to consider some of their earlier findings.
Washington State University
The WSP first began working with Washington State University (WSU)
Division of Governmental Studies and Services (DGSS) in the early 1990s as a
means to solicit citizen survey feedback about its daily operations. These citizen
surveys and other empirical studies designed to analyze TLE data for indications of
biased policing continue to present day. (Loverich, Gaffhey, & Albright, 2003, p. 4)
WSU citizen surveys. The WSU DGSS began publishing citizen views about
WSP operations in 1992, and then completed additional reviews in 1993, 1994-1995,
1995-1996, 1998, and 1999-2000. (Loverich, Gaffney, & Albright, 2003, p. 4) These
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studies included standardized questions, which now reveal some valuable trend
analyses, which included:
A. The 11 year response rates reflect decreasing interest over time: 199253%; 1993- 56%; 1994/5- 42%; 1995/6- 56%; 1998- 44%; and 1999/035% (38% general, 30% contacts), (p. 5/6)
B. The respondents who strongly agreed "the WSP does a good job
performing its mission" ranged from 64% to 68%, while those who
agreed ranged from 19% to 23%, over the course of first 5 studies, (p. 8)
C. Similarly, the responses relating to whether "WSP Troopers were judged
to have treated citizens courteously" reflected like trends, which included:
Those who strongly agreed ranged from 58% to 63%, while those who
agreed ranged from 19% to 26%. (p. 9)
D. The responses related to the perceptions that the "WSP treats citizens the
same regardless of their ethnic background" were fairly constant and
ranged from 42% to 49% for those who strongly agreed and 10% to 14%
for those who agreed, (p. 10)
E. The respondents who strongly agreed they were "quite satisfied with the
services provided by the WSP with which they were familiar" ranged
from 53% to 67%, while those who agreed ranged from 11% to 20%.
(p. 11)
F. The respondents who felt the WSP was "doing a good job removing
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drunk drivers from state highways" ranged from 50% to 66%, while those
who agreed ranged from 12% to 19%. (p. 12)
G. Finally, the percentage of respondents who had received a citation from
the WSP and felt they had been treated fairly ranged from 74% to 79%.
(p. 13)
In general, it is clear the WSP enjoyed broad historical support from
Washington citizens. However, there were growing national concerns about
differential treatment of citizens during this time frame, whether these practices were
called racial profiling or biased policing. So, were Washington's citizens being
treated differentially?
Biased Policing
In 2000, the Washington State Legislature passed a law that required the
WSP collect and report detailed information about the individuals they have
contacted during their TLE duties at least semi-annually. The WSP, in partnership
with the Criminal Justice Training Commission, released its first report to the
legislature on traffic stop data in January 2001. The report provided a useful
baseline, as it included analysis of all traffic stop data between May 1, 2000, and
October 31,2000. It concluded: "Based on analysis to date, it appears reasonable to
conclude that, on a statewide basis, State Patrol officers are not engaged in any
practice or pattern of initiating traffic stops based on the race of drivers" (p. 13).
In 2003, WSU's DGSS reported on its first analysis of WSP traffic stop data
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from May 2000 to October 2002, which contained about 2 million cases, and
established a statistical baseline for later research. (Lovrich, Gaffney, Mosher,
Pickerill, & Smith, 2003) Although the analyses crossed over into the first ten
months of ADL implementation, the researchers' findings offered three general
conclusions, which established a useful baseline regarding FOB traffic stop
practices. These included:
"To conclude this section, comparisons of stop rates to census data, to WSP
records of involvement in accidents, and to daylight versus non-daylight
stops indicate that the Washington State Patrol is not engaged in racial
profiling at the level of whom they contact... This type of disproportionate
enforcement is simply not occurring with the Washington State Patrol"
(p. 47)... "To conclude this section on enforcement outcomes, it is important
to note that when differences in the number of traffic safety violations
across racial/ethnic groups are taken into account, the initial effects of
race/ethnicity on the probability of receiving a citation and the number
of citations received are attenuated and reduced to non-statistical
significance in most APAs [autonomous patrol areas] for Blacks, NativeAmericans, and Hispanics" (p. 87)... "With respect to apparently
disparate rates of citation and search, the seriousness of the violation and
the number of violations observed represent particularly critical
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contextual factors that either eliminate or greatly reduce the effect of
race or ethnicity of driver on the traffic stop outcome" (p. 3).
The WSU research data seemed to suggest the WSP was not engaged in
widespread biased policing practices. But, how did WSP operations compare to
other accepted law enforcement practices?
The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA).
The WSP has been a fully accredited state law enforcement agency since 1992. The
current CALEA standards include 445 benchmarks related to every facet of daily law
enforcement administration, management, and operations. (WSP InsideOut, 2007)
Many of these standards promulgate data collection, analysis, and utilization ideals
related to agency goals, objectives, crime analysis, and personnel allocation.
Therefore, the WSP's continuing accreditation ensured compliance with some basic
performance metric acumen, at least in fulfillment of nationally accepted standards.
Overall then, the WSU research data and CALEA findings seemed to suggest
the WSP was a highly respected law enforcement agency. The WSU citizen surveys
reflected a high degree of public confidence, despite the fact many TLE contacts end
with negative consequences. And, just as important, the WSU data indicated the
WSP does not engage in systemic biased policing. Finally, the WSP's continuing
CALEA accreditation suggested its professional standards, regulations, and practices

reflected the current best practices within the national law enforcement community.
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Let us now return to our earlier discussion related to Chief Serpas'
introduction to the WSP. It remains unclear how much of this information
influenced Chief Serpas' decisions about how to transform the WSP. However, it is
important readers have this better understanding of historical WSP TLE trends and
external review results in order to better appreciate the internal climate in the agency
as ADL was implemented.
Additional Concerns
Chief Serpas also attended several SAFs in the fall of 2001, which had been
described as ComStat-type forums. Later, he remembered his frustration with the
performance reviews, their format using pre-exposed questions, and their near total
unfamiliarity with CompStat, as he had come to know it through his experiences in
New Orleans:
"The SAFs scheduled for the fall of 2001 (the third iteration) were presented
as planned. The SAF was informative but not timely, as the data reported
was up to six months old, and was incomplete. The SAF did not focus
attention on effective tactics or rapid deployment. For example, one SAF
presenter discussed efforts to reduce DUI and speed related collisions, but
there was no clear link made in the data or presentation about the efforts of
the work unit to assess, compare, or enhance DUI or speed enforcement to
achieve the desired outcome. The last principle of relentless follow up was
not met, as the SAF meeting was scheduled on a semi-annual basis.
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Another limitation of the SAF was that the Commanders knew what specific
areas would be covered prior to the SAF. The SAF was limited to these preplanned areas. In other words, at one of the SAFs in the fall of 2001, a
Commander outlined that the presentation would cover three of the agency's
strategic goals for that unit (the total goals were many more than three).
When queried as to other fundamental elements of the unit's performance,
the Commander commented that those items would require follow-up, as that
topic was not listed on the items to be covered at the SAF presentation"
(Serpas, 2003, p. 6-7).
Chief Serpas also became aware of the tensions that existed between sworn
and civilian personnel, which he later characterized as "almost a chasm." (Serpas,
2007) His discussions with executive leadership led him to discover what he
believed to be serious inequities related to budgetary expectations between the two
groups.
"What the Patrol would do is they would force the non-sworn commanders to
tow the line on budget, not send people to training, cobble up money, save
money, etc... Because at the end of the biennium, biennial budget, when
they needed to bail out the patrol unit that had routinely overspent, with no
appreciable signs of any differences made by that overspending, they would
just take that money and transfer it over. So what you had, was you had
divisions, civilians equivalents to captains and deputy chiefs, watching

Washington State Patrol Change

76

themselves as a non-sworn person being held to the exacting standards on
budgeting and then they watched the uniform side, which had no standards on
budgeting whatsoever" (p.6).
Finally, some of Chief Serpas' own personal observations caused him great
concern. As an example, he recounted an early ride along with a trooper who had
just graduated from the WSP Academy and who had been working in the Puget
Sound Region. To his near total amazement at the time, the trooper did not seem to
know the Fire Marshal's Office and the toxicology labs were integrated within the
WSP. In other words, Chief Serpas feared the trooper had been improperly
socialized into the agency, as they did not even know what public safety services the
agency provided.
In sum, Chief Serpas and his executive leadership found its largest
organizational bureau reasonably well staffed by historical standards, yet the core
TLE data clearly indicated it was struggling to produce TLE activities comparable to
their past achievement levels. These performance results combined with his early
observations led Chief Serpas to believe he had to act quickly in order to reverse
these undesirable trends.
Early Changes
Within the first 90 days of his appointment, Chief Serpas completed
interviews with all the captains and lieutenants and their civilian equivalents in order
to get their sense of the current issues within the department. He also eliminated the
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vacant assistant chief position, established the Management Services Bureau
directorship, and appointed the necessary deputy chiefs, captains, and commanders
to fill all the existing leadership vacancies. His changes divided the WSP's public
safety mission across the six organizational bureaus and included the districts,
divisions, and activities below:
A.

The Field Operations Bureau included headquarters staff and TLE
personnel assigned to eight different patrol districts statewide. The
latter were primarily responsible for traffic law enforcement on the
state's 17,524 miles of interstate and state highways in an effort to
provide motorist assistance, reduce the number of injury and fatality
collisions, and to apprehend criminals using the highways to facilitate
their crimes.

B.

The Investigative Services Bureau conducted statewide criminal,
narcotics, criminal intelligence, missing children, computer forensic,
and internal investigations as well as commercial vehicle enforcement.

C.

The Forensic Laboratory Services Bureau provided crime laboratory,
breath alcohol testing, and toxicology analyses.

D.

The Fire Protection Bureau was responsible for training fire department
and district personnel at the state fire academy; ensuring fire code

compliance at child-care, nursing, group, and boarding home facilities;
and emergency preparedness planning, training, and mobilization for
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natural disasters, hazardous materials releases, wild land fires, and
terrorist attacks.
E.

The Technical Services Bureau managed emergency communications,
electronic systems services, information technology support, employee
training and development, criminal history access, and latent fingerprint
screening services.

F.

The Management Services Bureau oversaw all services related to
human resources, property management, and financial activities,
budgetary preparations, and grant funding. (Serpas, 2003, 2004)

During this period, the WSP employed approximately 2,300 employees, split
nearly evenly between sworn and civilian ranks. (Serpas, 2004) The sworn
personnel possessed full police powers and worked primarily in traffic law
enforcement, commercial vehicle regulation, and criminal investigations. The
civilian personnel served primarily in the forensic and toxicology laboratories,
communication services, fire protection, and management liaison roles. Meanwhile,
the approximate, departmental, biennial budget was $338 million dollars. (Serpas,
2003)
Chief Serpas' previous experiences and executive interviews led him to
initiate additional changes to the WSP. The implementation of Accountability
Driven Leadership (ADL) and the redesign of the Strategic Advancement Forums
(SAFs) proved to be two of the most critical and will be examined further below.
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Accountability Driven Leadership
Chief Serpas' early conversations with both external and internal
stakeholders reinforced his desire to reinvigorate the WSP purpose beyond his
organizational leadership changes. As a result, he began to speak with the bureau
chiefs and commanders about the need to create a new executive leadership vision in
the fall of 2001. His intent was to re-focus the WSP on its strategic goals, objectives,
and performance. In turn, he asked each bureau to clearly define work priorities in
each of their functional units through the implementation of performance measures
designed to create greater effectiveness and efficiency. In other words, Chief Serpas
was interested in ensuring that each workgroup was using a set of performance
measures that attempted to ensure they were working on both the right work and
doing so in the most economical fashion. Chief Serpas' discussions and his belief in
moving beyond police-centered thinking, combined with his previous experiences
with CompStat implementation, led to his creation of ADL. (Serpas, 2007)
In January 2002, Chief Serpas implemented ADL throughout the entire
public safety agency. The change initiative stressed four CompStat management
tenets: the use of accurate, timely performance data; effective tactics; rapid
deployment of personnel and resources; and relentless follow-up. (Bratton, 1996;
Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Dodenhoff, 1996; Dussault, 1999; Guilianni & Kurson,
2002; McDonald, 2004; McDonald et al, 2002; O'Connell, 2001; Thibault et al.,
2001; Serpas, 2003, 2004; Shane, 2004a, 2004b; Stephens, 2005) Chief Serpas
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added an emphasis on decentralized decision-making and efficiency and
effectiveness performance measures across the entire WSP organization. He later
commented on ADL's approach:
"This more comprehensive approach to public safety and general
management is meant to address problems that lay outside a narrow
understanding of law enforcement, such as the failure of some facilities
housing children and senior citizens to comply with fire safety codes;
budgetary practices that historically resulted in overspending, inefficiencies,
and underachievement in such functions as accounting, fleet and property
management, human resources, and information technology; and forensic
laboratories' struggles to provide timely services to law enforcement and
coroners statewide while ensuring quality and correctness" (Serpas, 2004,
p. 1).
ADL appeared to provide the following organizational advantages:
A. ADL enhanced CompStat's core management principles by adding a
renewed emphasis on decentralized decision-making as well as
comprehensive public safety efficiency and effectiveness performance
measures. (Serpas, 2004)
B. Its comprehensive management tenets were applied successively across a
wide variety of statewide law enforcement services, undertaken by sworn
and civilian employees. (Perry, 2005; Porter, 2005)
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C. ADL utilized strategic planning principles that integrated intermediateterm planning goals with shorter-term performance metrics, designed to
assess, monitor, and evaluate productivity.
D. The change initiative stressed the linkages between shorter-term
performance indicators and longer-term public safety outcomes across a
wide array of organizational performance measures. (Porter, 2005)
E. The continuous scrutiny of individual, workgroup, and divisional
performance provided improved decision-making opportunities using
quantitative data, problem-oriented policing principles, and management
intuition. (Porter, 2005)
F. The inclusion of financial measures aligned budgetary priorities with
strategic goals, objectives, and action, while concurrently decentralizing
budgetary management to district and division commanders. (Serpas,
2003, 2004)
The New Strategic Advancement Forums
Chief Serpas' implementation of ADL throughout the WSP included an
expectation of regular performance reviews. During a 2007 interview, he noted he
chose to maintain the SAF namesake as a means to maintain some WSP cultural
history and familiarity. At the same time, his one-on-one interviews with the
executive leadership of the WSP led him to conclude the earlier SAFs were not
respected because of the perception that they "derided" presenters, rather than
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"building" them up.
The new SAFs assembled the entire executive staff every week for the bureau
presentations, reviews, and assessments. Each week a different bureau or
combination of bureaus was featured and its district and division commanders were
required to present the performance data for their respective area of responsibility.
These presentations became known for their intense questioning, frank assessments,
and candid feedback in a public venue, which oftentimes included: divisional and
district middle managers, supervisors and employees; supporting agency personnel;
media representatives; interested citizens; other governmental executives; and an
occasional elected official. In essence, the SAFs stressed: ADL tenets;
effectiveness and efficiency measures; decentralized decision-making; and greater
organizational cooperation and collaboration.
These meetings required these upper-middle managers to present their
divisional performance data to the entire executive staff in a public forum. (Serpas,
2003, 2004) The SAFs appeared to offer several benefits to the WSP:
A. Standardized monthly bureau, division, and district reports to the entire
executive staff explicated strategic progress, resource allocation, and
challenges, as all agency workgroups took turns presenting every month.
B. Executive staff participation focused bureaucratic expertise, resources,
and partnerships on creative problem solving and transcended the
traditional organizational boundaries that have historically arisen between
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sworn and civilian employees. (Porter, 2005)
C. Complete SAF organizational integration, widespread employee
attendance, and participative forums enhanced collaborative problem
solving across functionality and technically disparate workgroups,
divisions, and bureaus.
D. "The sharing of successful strategies is critical to raising the bar of
performance of all agency leaders... Moreover, one leader's success can,
and should be, replicated in other areas of the department" (Serpas, 2004,
p. 3).
E. Public meetings maintained middle-management accountability, while
simultaneously providing a venue to present employee achievements,
teamwork successes, and departmental awards. (Perry, 2005; Porter,
2005)
Retired Chief Porter (2005) suggested the S AFs were meant to encourage
positive law enforcement performance in each geographical region of the state and
every division in the agency. Essentially, the forums compared current performance
data to previous individual, workgroup, and divisional efforts. This singular focus
allowed leaders, supervisors, and employees to compete against their earlier efforts,
not against other regions and divisions that may face different challenges. Serpas
(2004) summarized: "The overarching purpose of the public component of peer
performance during SAF should be critiquing results, strategies, and decisions, not
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criticizing... In a room of professionals, a latent pressure exists to be seen as
competent and knowledgeable" (p. 5).
Chief Serpas hoped the more intensive presentation schedule and in-person
appearances would foster more cordial relationships between and among district and
division commanders- sworn and civilian. In a 2007 interview, he noted,
"... I believe that one of the most important things about SAF is that you're
in the room with people, that you're standing together during the breaks- that
you're drinking coffee together during the breaks- that you're going to lunch
afterwards to meet with your friends... I know that logistically there
might've been some easier ways to pull it off... But, I never wanted to lose
the opportunity for all those captains, all those civilian equivalents to be
sitting together and feeling each other, talking to each other, drinking coffee
together, you see what I'm talking about? That's the soft-touchy side of this
thing" (p. 22-23).
In his opinion, the ability of leadership to meet in person and to invest in
these relationships helped establish trust and common concerns. It was his hope this
would extend person to person, position to position, and across bureaus and
classifications in a manner that could positively influence the historical challenges
experienced by the sworn and civilian personnel. (Serpas, 2007)
Chief Serpas identified other areas in the WSP he believed were ripe for
change as well. One involved the loss of productivity associated with protracted
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meetings with little operational impact, while a second involved difficulties with the
internal discipline system. Both will be described in greater detail below.
"Two Meetings and a Product"
Chief Serpas was interested in trying to move the agency into a mindset that
when people are prepared properly for their meetings, they ought to be able to
conduct two meetings and proceed with an agreed upon direction. One supporter
saw his idea as an expectation to make something happen. Another suggested the
initiative was an attempt to maintain momentum through rapid decision making and
risk taking, without all the usual protracted study, "endless chains of email," and
related correspondence. The skeptics were a bit more dubious. One described it as a
bit unrealistic and noted their belief that the true genesis for the initiative had been
Chief Serpas' impatient personality. The participant pointed to the proposed move to
the new headquarters building scheduled during this time period and noted there was
simply no way such planning could get completed in two meetings. (IP, 8, 10, 11)
Internal Disciplinary Changes
Two of Chief Serpas' other change initiatives related to internal disciplinary
processes. One created a process called a "non-investigated matter," (NIM), while a
second created a "settlement agreement." (Jones, 2001; Serpas, Olson, & Jones,
2003) The NIM process allowed minor complaints meeting any one of five criteria
to be settled faster using summary documentation and an abbreviated counseling
meeting with the involved employee(s) if needed. These included:
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"Accused employee acted in accordance with a departmental regulation,
order, procedure, policy, etc. All available means to identify the employee
have been exhausted with negative results. The legality of a complainant's
arrest/citation/notice of infraction; warrant obtained/served; evidence seized
must be adjudicated by the court. The complainant requested that no formal
administrative investigation be initiated. The complainant supported
supervisory intervention/action (counseling, discussion of complainant's
concerns with the accused employee, and/or remedial training) in lieu of
formal investigation" (Jones, 2001, p. 1).
If three NIMS were received reflecting similar activities, a formal
investigation was initiated. In essence, this process maintained the integrity of the
disciplinary system, while reserving precious investigative resources for more
serious misconduct allegations.
The second change involved a settlement process for more complex
administrative investigations. This process allowed an accused employee and the
agency to settle their differences more expeditiously. If the employee was willing to
accept responsibility for their wrongdoing, the agency would trade this acquiescence
for a slightly milder sanction, a faster case disposition, and an employee's "ability to
get back to work." The agency benefited by saving its limited investigative
resources for more serious matters and by frequently receiving better buy-in from the
involved employee. Meanwhile, the employee benefited through an expedited case
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resolution and an "ability to move on their career and life." Both initiatives enjoyed
widespread acceptance as they were introduced and their terms negotiated with the
relevant labor unions.
Abrupt Resignation
Chief Serpas resigned suddenly in January 2004, after he was chosen to lead
the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department. During his WSP tenure, he had
written an article attempting to summarize many of the organizational changes,
including his introduction of ADL and the modification of the SAF process. Both
the preliminary article and its final manuscript offer important insights about what
Serpas thought his leadership legacy would be. In short, both efforts highlighted the
perceived turnaround of ineffective WSP practices and the production of tangible
performance improvements.
Chief Serpas' premature departure called into question whether the shortterm performance changes, which had become the hallmarks of his administration,
could be connected to longer-term transformative efforts in the WSP. Indeed, these
pressures would become both the leadership challenge and the executive opportunity
for the next chief.
Chief Lowell Porter
Washington Governor Gary Locke appointed Field Operations Bureau
Deputy Chief Lowell Porter as the twentieth chief of the WSP in January 2004.
Chief Porter had risen through the ranks of the WSP to lead its largest organizational
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bureau during ADL implementation. As chief, he continued nearly all of Chief
Serpas' personal style, ADL, and SAF changes, until newly elected Governor
Christine Gregoire chose to replace him in February 2005.
Chief Porter possessed a genuine passion for the earlier course set by Chief
Serpas and articulated his perceived need to keep the WSP committed to ADL
principles and the SAF processes. He felt a personal responsibility to maintain what
he felt was the productive tension that had been created by both initiatives. In other
words, he recognized the tension and stress associated with the recent agency
changes had productive value, but he felt they needed to be managed correctly. In
part, he believed this could be achieved through the SAF questioning processes,
which he thought led to dynamic leadership engagement for both the current
presenter and those who would present in the near future. In his view, the current
presenter learned to scrutinize their current operations more carefully based on this
methodical questioning, while leaders in attendance would learn what was important
and why. Also, the latter group naturally sought to obtain any missing performance
data for their areas of responsibility before they presented. (Porter, 2007)
During a 2007 interview, Porter made it clear he felt it was critical he set the
leadership example. He spoke about his frequent 75 hour work weeks and his TLE
activities on his way to and from his residence as opportunities to demonstrate his
commitment to the agency direction and to send clear messages to the troopers in the
respective patrol zones about his personal dedication. He also recognized a need to
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hold commanders accountable for the productivity of their entire staffs. In
particular, he was insistent they deal with those personnel who were not contributing
to the workgroup success and were actively resistant. In this way, he wanted to
ensure the good work and morale of the hard working employees would not be
undermined by a select, unproductive few.
Chief Porter believed it was the executive leadership's responsibility to select
the right outputs, which he felt drove outcomes. In his view, the SAFs became a
means to focus on the right number of outputs and direct the right activity to the right
places at the right time. He highlighted several successes to help reinforce his
observations about the link between outputs and outcomes. One such example
involved the Fire Marshal's Office, where resources were provided and outputs
defined. In doing so, the average number of days Washington State care facilities
was out of fire code compliance after a deficient inspection was cut to nearly nonexistent over time.
Another example involved Budget and Fiscal Services (BFS) and their
continual accrual of overtime near paydays. Through a series of SAF discussions a
trend was discovered that involved a significant number of employees (about 400)
who were not getting their pay documents submitted until the last possible moment.
(BFS SAF Data, 2002-2004) These late time card entries involved issues related to
supervisors failing to approve time cards in a timely manner, inadequate leave
balance manipulations, and holding overtime worked until the last minute. On the
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commissioned side, this forced BFS staff to cut separate overtime checks,
presumably to be routed to an individual's office and provide them "extra money,"
outside the purview of their directly deposited salaries. By discerning the
organizational trends driving the BFS overtime, the executive staff worked together
to ensure all pay documents were turned in on a timely basis. In turn, this
dramatically reduced the superfluous BFS workload around pay periods, eliminated
the overtime, and allowed the staff to return to regular work hours and other
important projects.
Third, SAF-type performance reviews worked their ways back into several
districts and divisions in the WSP. Essentially, these reviews allowed district and
division commanders to meet with their middle managers and frontline sergeants to
review recent performance data and to make the necessary work activity corrections
immediately. In FOB, at least two geographical districts began to experiment with
weekly district SAFs as a means to drive productivity very early in the Serpas
administration, but by the Porter administration they had become increasingly more
prevalent in other geographical areas and other parts of the WSP as well. At the
same time, they had been credited with driving knowledge about performance
values, core activity preferences, and outcome linkages down to the lowest levels of
the WSP. (Ewing et al., 2004)
Finally, Chief Porter also recognized the value of proactive media contacts
and strove to ensure initiatives begun by Chief Serpas to propagate these messages
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were continued in force. In his view, these proactive contacts allowed the WSP to
work with the media, instead of against them, to get its message out. At the same
time, these positive media stories helped convince the legislature and the public that
the WSP held itself accountable to its mandates, roles, and responsibilities and the
WSP, its personnel, and programs added critical public safety value.
Chief Porter's tenure had its challenges as well. Most notably, some of the
executive leadership and the district and division commanders were growing
discontented with the SAF intensity, processes, and routines. Most agreed the
forums added value, but they also recognized the process was becoming stale, as the
presentations required a lot of preparation time and were repetitive in nature. A
growing number began calling for SAFs to be re-designed so they could evolve to
the next level, whatever that might entail.
Chief Porter responded by appointing a work group to revitalize the SAF. Its
charge was to identify the lessons learned in the last two and a half years and
maintain the SAFs' usefulness while reducing its workload. The workgroup
identified small procedural changes that could be made, some of which were
implemented, although the SAF process changed little over time, including its
requisite preparation time and intensity. As we shall see, there were many views
about whether these changes were sufficient.
Meanwhile, an external review compared the performance and outcomes
measures in the WSP to those of five other state law enforcement agencies: Arizona,
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Missouri, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. Its tremendously positive performance results
made it even more difficult to modify current SAF strategies:
"All of the states have some level of strategic plan and some broad agency
goals. Where they differ with the WSP is the extent to which WSP analyzes
and uses the performance measures in making management decisions.
Clearly WSP is considered by the other states as the benchmark in the use of
performance measures" (Ewing et al., 2004, p. 10).
A tangential challenge occurred as many district and division commanders
began to recognize the capacity limits of their current staffing levels and started to
speak more candidly about these realities in public. The 20-year performance data
offer a glimpse into these leadership concerns, as these results offer clear evidence
that during the previous 3 years: FOB line staffing levels had held fairly steady
despite many regional demographic surges; core TLE productivity had been at or
very near record levels; and injury and fatality collisions had dropped significantly.
Meanwhile, troopers' base salaries had remained largely unchanged, their health
benefit premium costs had increased, sick leave usage was up, and some troopers had
begun to leave the WSP to pursue career opportunities elsewhere.
Despite these difficulties, these public discussions oftentimes drew Chief
Porter's ire, as he became fond of saying he did not want to hear about what leaders
could not do, but rather what they could do. He explained further in a 2007
interview:
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"I don't wanna hear about what you can't do. If you physically can't get
from point A to point B- great, we got it, but what can you do? Because
everybody in this room has people, time, and money; there's a whole lot of
smart people in here- figure it out. You're in a position of leadership and
you're responsible for this, leading these people and all you can say is what
you can't do it; give me something else to hang my hat on."
With so much emotion involved on both sides of this growing organizational
debate, a more tenable dialogue began to emerge on both sides. The district and
division commanders began to articulate their performance limitations with caveats
about their marginal needs and their expected gains if these additional resources
could be targeted toward the problem under discussion. Then, Chief Porter would
clarify their analyses, resource needs and expected performance gains, and attempt to
secure their additional resources. Finally, he would expect the commander to able to
speak specifically about their additional progress or goal achievement by the next
SAF (within 30 days).
Another challenge related to an ability to apply short and intermediate
productivity gains to the longer-term needs of the agency. On the one hand, Chief
Porter believed ADL and the SAFs had enhanced the future managerial acumen in
the agency in ways that would make it "self-perpetuating, sustaining, and fulfilling."

In his view, this would change the organizational culture and make these
expectations the norm, so they could be passed down to the next generations of
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leadership. On the other hand, Chief Porter had difficulty articulating any
performance standards that had been implemented to help ensure the inculcation of
performance accountability was passed on beyond anything other than informal
processes.
Overall, Chief Porter felt ADL and the SAFs had produced organizational
successes between 2002 and 2004, which demonstrated their ability to produce
valuable performance outcomes in every area of the agency. He believed these
principles could be used to manage successively in any organizational environment.
Beyond these broader successes, Retired Chief Porter (2005) reflected on the
internal success of ADL and the value of the SAF process. He noted that after three
administrations the WSP had moved from scrutinizing organizational performance
on a semi-annual and quarterly basis, to every thirty days, and finally to weekly in
many areas of the organization. He likened such managerial scrutiny of the
workgroup, division, and district performances to avoid later reengineering upheaval
to the work of a sailboat skipper who adjusts his sail, speed, and course in order to
avoid missing their destination altogether. However, his comments failed to
acknowledge that too many course corrections by the same proverbial skipper could
eliminate a broader view of additional nautical challenges, disrupt an otherwise
smooth journey, and also lengthen the trip.
During a 2007 interview, Porter reminisced about other people's comments,
all of whom were familiar with the WSP's recent performance struggles and
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achievements:
"In fact, I can't tell you.. .how many times as deputy chief and as chief and
even after leaving the department people said... we needed to get back to
holding ourselves accountable, producing, taking pride in what we do,
demonstrating our, our contribution to the state of Washington and we
needed that badly...".
Finally, he also reflected on his own leadership performance, first as part of
the Serpas administration and later as chief:
A lot of people thought that Serpas and I pushed too hard, too fast. Okay,
that's... an opinion, but you know I'm responsible for the organization, the
whole thing... and I'm figuring I'm trying to strike that balance. I didn't get
it right every time, but I think I got it more right more often as I moved
through time.
Statement of the Research Problem
Chiefs Serpas and Porter's leadership, ADL initiative, and SAF processes
have enjoyed mixed organizational reviews. Supporters have argued their change
initiatives were responsible for the dramatic strategic advancements during their
respective administrations. Critics have countered that an integrated set of
leadership and management strategies were the true catalysts of the productivity

gains. This research project investigates these clearly divergent perspectives.
This case study investigates how these change initiatives were initiated in the
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WSP. Its central research question is: What organizational leadership and
management strategies were utilized by WSP executives during the implementation
of ADL between January 2002 and December 2004?

CHAPTER FOUR
Case Study Context, Research Design, and Methodology
The case study context, design, and methodology used in the research project
are outlined in this chapter. The first section introduces the case study context by
summarizing the preliminary organizational change model, which was examined
throughout the project. The second section explains the research design, including
the utility of the case study. It also describes the research assumptions, including its
epistemological nature, qualitative approach, inductive reasoning, and historical
perspective. The final section explicates the data collection processes, which
includes discussion of the document reviews and key informant interviews, interview
guide, and thematic analyses.
The Preliminary Organizational Change Model
The change model advanced in this project so far, suggests agency change
results from the confluence of several organizational factors. These factors include:
executive leadership, organizational culture, employee motivation, and strategic
management.
As the literature review revealed, varying levels of empirical evidence exist
regarding these organizational factors' ability to produce organizational change.
However, very little organizational research has attempted to study the influence of

these elements within one organizational context. Indeed, the failure to consider
computer statistics (CompStat) or similar initiatives in such a light means that any
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one or combination of these factors may have been the true catalyst(s) for these
organizational changes, which have heretofore gone undocumented.
This project attempts to correct this gap in the literature, as it will examine
the Washington State Patrol's (WSP) attempt to implement the Accountability
Driven Leadership (ADL) initiative, which was based on CompStat principles. The
project will examine the leadership and management factors that may have
contributed to the WSP organizational changes between January 2002 and December
2004.
Research Design
The following section describes the case study. It outlines the research
assumptions, including their epistemological nature, qualitative approach, inductive
reasoning, and historical perspective.
Case Study
Yin (2003) advocated a case study research design was optimal for
contemporary research questions, with an explanatory nature, whose behavioral
components could not be manipulated by a researcher, (cf, McNabb, 2002; Patton,
1987, 2002; Polit & Beck, 2004) Polit and Beck (2004) felt case studies were
distinguished by their depth of inquiry. Finally, McNabb (2002) classified case
studies based on their overriding intent: an intrinsic case study interested its
researcher/ author, while an instrumental case study sought to create greater
understanding of a specific issue.
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This single case study will examine the leadership and management strategies
that may have influenced change in the WSP. (Babbie, 1999; Creswell, 2003;
McNabb, 2002; Patton, 1987, 2002; Polit & Beck, 2004; Singleton & Straits, 1999;
Yin, 2003) I was motivated by my intrinsic desire to understand the process of
organizational change in the WSP and his desire to create instrumental knowledge
about the role of performance measures in state law enforcement. The case study's
nature is outlined below.
Assumptions
The case study assumptions can be characterized by their epistemological
perspective, which are based on constructivist and pragmatic knowledge claims.
(Creswell, 2003) Additionally, they can be classified further by their qualitative
approach, inductive reasoning, and historical perspective. All these characteristics
will be described in greater detail below.
Constructivist perspective. Crotty (1998) identified several constructivist
assumptions, which Creswell (2003) summarized:
"Meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world
they are interpreting... Humans engage with their world and make sense of it
based on their historical and social perspective... The basic generation of
meaning is always social, arising in and out of interaction with a human
community..." (p. 9) (cf., Babbie, 1999; Patton, 2002; Polit & Beck, 2004;
Rossi, Freeman, & Lipsey, 1999)
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Golembiewski (1990) summarized this view in relation to organizational
development. "Conceptually, the basic metaphor is a visual one... Since change can
be reasonably thought of as occurring on "behavioral surfaces," the contours of those
surfaces deserve description and analysis" (p. 242). This project will be guided by
each of these research perspectives.
Pragmatistperspective. Creswell (2003), noting Murphy (1990) and
Cherryholmes (1992), identified several pragmatic assumptions, some of which are
relevant to this project and its methodological approach.
"Pragmatists do not see the world as an absolute unity... Truth is what works
at the time... Pragmatists agree that research always occurs in social,
historical, political, and other contexts... Individual researchers.. .are "free"
to choose the methods, techniques, and procedures of research that best meet
their needs and purposes" (Creswell, p. 12). (cf., Patton, 2002)
Bass and Avolio (1993) described a pragmatic leadership approach to
creating organizational change.
"Leaders who are concerned about organizational renewal will seek to foster
organizational cultures that are hospitable and conducive to creativity,
problem solving, risk taking, and experimentation. First, there is an
articulation of the changes that are desired. Next, the necessary changes in
structure, processes, and practices are made and are widely communicated
throughout the organization. Finally, new role and behavioral models are
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established and reinforced that become symbols of the "new" culture"
(p. 115).
Ewing and Associates' (2004) performance audit described a pragmatic view
of the performance measures in the WSP. The consultants suggested the WSP
strategic plan and the SAF process had been operationalized using a series of
progressive leadership steps: initializing- Chief Sandberg's administration;
focusing- Chief Serpas' administration; and refining- Chief Porter's administration.
This case study will utilize a pragmatic focus throughout the course of the project.
Qualitative design. This research project will utilize a qualitative design.
Burns and Grove (2001) noted that qualitative research is based on a "holistic world
view," which included the following beliefs:
"There is no single reality. Reality, based on perceptions, is different for
each person and changes over time. What we know has meaning only within
a given situation or context"

(p. 61).

Burns and Grove (2001) added: "Within a holistic framework, qualitative
research is a means of exploring the depth, richness, and complexity inherent in
phenomena" (p. 61). Babbie (1999) noted, "In addition to greater detail, qualitative
data seem richer in meaning than quantified data" (p. 24). Bryman and Stephens
(1996) summarized by noting that qualitative research allows for deeper exploration
of those subtleties related to organizational contexts.
Bryman and Stephens (1996) categorized qualitative leadership research into
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four types. The first three involved single and multiple case studies and studies of
leadership activities using leader surveys. "Finally, there is a design which invites
people to describe in detail specific leaders or leadership practices in general"
(p. 19). This qualitative case study will rely heavily on this last approach.
Golembiewski (1990) believed alpha change involved ".. .relatively stable
dimensions of reality that are defined in terms of discrete and constant intervals"
(p. 217). He felt beta change was difficult for organizational development (OD)
scholars to measure. "That is to say, OD efforts indeed change the very measuring
instrument being used to estimate the change. This complicates interpreting T2 and
Ti findings, of course" (p. 218). Finally, Golembiewski characterized gamma
change.
"Measuring gamma change is extraordinarily difficult since the preintervention response is not off the scale; it is on a different scale... Since
gamma change may be thought of as reflecting fundamental changes in
conceptualizations or expectations, or as a basic redefinition of the content of
the referents tapped by measures of organization and individual processes, it
severely complicates the interpretation of the results of OD efforts" (p. 221222).
As noted earlier, similar quantum organizational changes have occurred as
agencies have shifted from simpler activity, process, and output measures to more
complex accountability, efficiency, and outcome measures, especially as utilized in
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CompStat. (Alpert & Moore, 1993; Bayley, 1996; Behn, 1995, 2001, 2003; Bratton,
1996; Bratton & Andrews, 1999; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Giuliani & Kurson,
2002; Humphrey & Stokes, 2000; McDonald, 2004; McDonald et al., 2002; Moore,
2002; Moore & Braga, 2003a, 2003b; O'Connell, 2001; Serpas, 2003, 2004; Shane,
2004a, 2004b; Theurer, 1998; Walters, 1998) Finally, Golembiewski suggested:
"Overall, the search for gamma effects will employ factor-analytical
techniques... Factor analysis essentially seeks to isolate the major
dimensions of reality necessary to economically account for the variance in
scores on some large set of variables" (p. 225).
These qualitative perspectives will shape the exploration of the complex set
of the WSP leadership and management factors in an effort to learn about their
influence on WSP productivity. The organizational elements will include: executive
leadership, organizational culture, employee motivation, strategic management, and
performance measures.
Inductive reasoning. Polit and Beck's (2004) explanation of the inductive
reasoning typifies many researchers' description of these processes.
"Inductive reasoning is the process of developing generalizations from
specific observations" (p. 12). "The participants' input is the starting point
from which the researcher begins to conceptualize, seeking patterns,
commonalities, and relationships emerging from the researcher- participant
interactions" (p. 29). (cf, Babbie, 1999; Burns & Grove, 2001; Creswell,
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2003; Patton, 1987, 2002; Polit & Beck, 2004; Singleton & Straits, 1999)
This project will rely on inductive reasoning. In other words, it will translate
the literature and document reviews as well as the key informant interview themes
into organizational generalizations.
Most scholars recognize several qualitative research approaches. (Babbie,
1999; Burns & Grove, 2001; Creswell, 2003; Patton, 1987,2002; Polit & Beck,
2004; Singleton & Straits, 1999) This project focuses on one- historical research.
Historical research. This case study will examine change in the WSP
between January 2002 and December 2004. Therefore, by its very nature the project
utilizes an historical perspective.
Burns and Grove (2001), discussing Heller (1982), identified three
developmental schema found in philosophies of history:
"History reflects a progression-the development from "lower" to "higher" stages.
History has a tendency to regress-development is from "higher" stages to "lower"
stages; movement is toward a decrease in freedom and the self-destruction of our
species. History shows a repetition of developmental sequences in which patterns
of progression can be seen" (2001, p. 71).
Greiner (1972) suggested organizations appeared to alternate between
evolutionary periods of steady growth and revolutionary periods of turbulent
upheaval. These observations led him to reflect on the importance of organizational
history.
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"Historical forces do indeed shape the future growth of organizations. Yet
management, in its haste to grow, often overlooks such critical
developmental questions as: Where has our organization been? Where is it
now? And what do the answers to these questions mean for where we are
going?... My position... is that the future of an organization may be less
determined by outside forces than it is by the organization's history" (p. 38).
Bass and Avolio (1993) concurred. The two scholars described how leaders
can construct organizational change while remaining attentive to cultural principles.
"When trying to promote cultural changes in an organization, leaders should
first understand and respect the past, returning to it for inspiration,
instruction, and identification of past objectives, principles, and strategies
that still must be maintained.. .changes should develop by providing
reinforcement for innovative efforts that are attempted and successful, which
fit with the new mission or vision for the organization" (p. 115).
In sum, this case study will be shaped by these constructivist, pragmatic,
qualitative, inductive, and historical perspectives. Additionally, the project will be
shaped by its "participant observer" nature, which will be further explained next.
Participant Observer
The participant observer literature discusses the relationships between
research participants and observers. These writings indicate that social scientists
who involve themselves in the social phenomena they later attempt to describe, do so
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with some unique advantages and serious liabilities. (Creswell, 2002; Patton, 1987,
2002; Polit & Beck, 2004; Singleton & Straits, 1999; Sylvia, Sylvia, & Gunn, 1997;
Yin, 2003) Polit and Beck (2004) cautioned readers a participant observer may not
provide the most advantageous means of research just like being an actor may not
afford the best perspective of a performance.
Despite these difficulties, I believe my extensive experience, reputation, and
relationships within the WSP assisted me throughout my research project. Therefore,
I will briefly outline my experiences in the interest of full disclosure.
My experiences. I was hired by the WSP in 1990, and commissioned in
1991. I was promoted to the rank of sergeant in 1999, in time to experience Chief
Sandberg, Serpas, and Porter's leadership styles, change management initiatives, and
SAFs, while managing two detachments of troopers assigned to traffic law
enforcement duties.
I was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in 2004. My commensurate
responsibilities since have included oversight of: regional traffic safety enforcement
activities; ferry vessel and terminal security; training academy curricula, facilities
modernization, and culinary affairs; and field operations as headquarters staff. I will
have completed nearly three-quarters of my career, by the conclusion of this project.
My perspective. My operational, supervisory, and managerial experiences
with the WSP have helped inform my opinions related to the WSP, some of which
are relevant to this research project:
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A. Gubernatorial vision, legislative mandate, budgetary allocations, and
societal expectations have provided the external catalysts for change in
the WSP. All recent WSP chiefs have managed these pressures by
leading internal change initiatives, using a variety of expertise,
experience, and skill levels.
B. WSP employees, workgroups, and unions possess high expectations for
their executive leadership. They aggressively utilize civil service
protections, union contracts, and administrative legal actions to assert
their individual, group, and collective vision, beliefs, and rights.
C. The most successful chiefs balance external pressures for change with the
internal human resources challenges, while pursuing short, intermediate,
and long-term public safety success.
D. Chief Serpas, ADL, and the SAFs helped focus WSP performance on
public safety effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability.
E. Chief Serpas' departure and Chief Porter's direction called into question
whether the WSP's short-term gains could be connected to: longer-term,
external, stakeholder support; budgetary appropriation increases; and
sustainable internal change.
I have also continued to pursue my academic education. In 2001,1 earned
my master's degree in Public Administration from the University of Washington. In
2004,1 completed my doctoral coursework in Public Administration and Policy at
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Portland State University. This research project fulfilled the remaining
requirements of my doctoral curriculum.
My academic achievements and vocational experiences have helped inform
my views of organizational research. Those relevant to this project include:
A.

Meaningful organizational research connects academic theory to
vocational practice and vice versa. This circular influence inevitably
improves the quality, value, and utility of both endeavors.

B.

Organizational leadership, management, and accountability are
complex, contextual, and integrated phenomena. Therefore,
organizational alignment is best achieved by developing a thorough
understanding of the factors that can create change and proactively
managing their influence.

C.

Inductive inquiry, using qualitative methods, allows researchers to gain
a better understanding of a wide array of subjects, range of responses,
and depth of information that leverages participants' knowledge,
experience, and understanding.

D.

Deductive inquiry, using quantitative methods, dramatically narrows
the scope of this understanding through the use of focused questions,
colloquial vocabulary, and narrow categorical responses.

E.

A thoughtful combination of research methods allows researchers to
capitalize on their respective methodological strengths, while
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simultaneously limiting their downsides.
I believe my qualitative research design will expand the breadth of my case
study. It is, admittedly, susceptible to researcher bias given my vocational
experiences, participation in the change initiative, and my academic study.
However, I think greater research control can be achieved through rigorous
adherence to my research methodology, which will be presented below.
The Case Study Methodology
This section describes the case study methodology. It does so by explaining
the data collection procedures, measurement, analysis processes, and project validity.
Data Collection
This case study relied on several types of data. These included: historical
documents, published reviews, personal observations, and key informant interviews.
Each type of data will be explained below.
Historical documents. A cursory review of the WSP's three-year
performance results (January 2002- December 2004) appeared to highlight many
sustained statewide public safety achievements throughout its six organizational
bureaus and their major divisions. Many of these successes were highlighted in
monthly strategic advancement forums (SAFs), which produced at least four
excellent data sources for content analyses. These included: previous SAF
presentation data from each of the agency bureaus, divisions, and localities; archived
press interviews, publications, and clippings; and supporting activity summary
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reports, budget analyses, project notes, briefings, and miscellaneous reports. Finally,
these achievements were featured quite frequently in WSP quarterly and annual
legislative reports.
Published reviews. The WSP change efforts were analyzed in a variety of
external reviews. For example, readers will likely remember the WSP's unique
partnership with Washington State University Division of Governmental Studies and
Services (WSU DGSS) and their commensurate reports related to Washington
citizen surveys and biased policing traffic stop analyses.
Another external review of WSP outcome measures found, "WSP's
management processes are sound and focused" (Ewing et al., 2004, p. 14). The
review noted the SAF process: aligned agency and bureau goals; allowed for
communication across bureaus; created immediate problem solving; and stressed
executive management performance goals.
Finally, when Governor Christine Gregoire was elected in 2004, she created
her Government Management Accountability and Performance (GMAP) initiative as
a means to manage state government. Her initiative and resulting performance
review forums were based on CompStat principles and statewide ADL and SAF
execution. (Gregoire, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c)
Personal observations. Throughout my nearly eighteen year tenure with the
Washington State Patrol, I have witnessed a variety of executive leadership
approaches. In 1999,1 was promoted to a first line supervisory position. As a result,
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I experienced Chief Sandberg, Serpas, and Porter's leadership styles, change
management initiatives, and SAFs, while managing two different detachments of
troopers assigned to traffic law enforcement duties.
I have since been promoted to the rank of lieutenant. My commensurate
middle management responsibilities helped broaden my perspectives related to these
earlier initiatives. My continuing experiences during a different era of executive
leadership have provided a series of valuable observations with which to compare
and contrast these earlier changes.
Key informant interviews. Chiefs Serpas and Porter utilized ADL and the
SAFs to re-focus the entire WSP on the agency's strategic goals, objectives, and
outcomes in ways rarely seen with recent agency change initiatives. As noted
previously, Chief Serpas had initiated these changes first with his executive staff and
later with his district and division commanders for implementation within their
respective areas of responsibility. Consequently, I decided to re-trace this
approximate evolution by beginning his interviews atop the organizational hierarchy
and cascading them down the organizational structure to the district commanders and
across to the division managers.
During this study period, the sworn executive leadership possessed full police
powers, and served as the agency chief executives and bureau chiefs in traffic law
enforcement, criminal investigations, and technical services. The civilian executive
leadership served as bureau commanders in the forensic and toxicology laboratories,
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Fire Marshal's office, and management services. Generally speaking, the sworn and
civilian district and division commanders were responsible for the geographically
decentralized areas of command within these larger bureaus.
The semi-structured, key informant interviews sought to measure the
organization theory examined in the literature review (executive leadership,
organizational culture, motivation theory, strategic management, and performance
measures). Specifically, interviews solicited respondents' own views, words, and
reflections about how these organizational factors may have shaped WSP success.
They prompted participants to describe their experiences with such organizational
elements, whether positive or negative. Finally, each major interview section left
participants ample latitude to discuss other concepts that were missed by the
principal researcher. A complete questionnaire has been included in Appendix B.
Pre-survey. Sworn personnel are required to complete yearly in-service
training at the WSP Academy in order to maintain their technical expertise,
proficiency, and certification. In the late fall of 2006 and of spring 2007, a myriad of
sworn and civilian operational specialty classes were offered at the WSP Academy
and frequent executive management meetings held in and around Olympia,
Washington. Six volunteers were recruited by convenience from these groups to
help evaluate, test, and validate the interview guide language, question strategy, and

specific content. These interview discussions and analyses revealed the guide was
very sound. The final interview guide was designed to be completed within an hour.
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Participants. The key informants included 28 senior executive, executives,
and middle-managers chosen primarily by their desire to participate. They included
sworn and civilian executive members of the agency, who served as executive staff
members, captains, and division managers. Lieutenants and assistant managers were
interviewed sparingly.
I felt the key informants possessed an understanding of ADL principles,
SAFs, and related concepts explored throughout the question guide. I had no direct
supervisory or subordinate relationship with any of the participants that could have
hindered their ability to decline participation. He maintained his research
impartiality throughout the project and he believes the responses gathered, analyzed,
and presented for this project will not inhibit his future job performance or that of
any of its participants.
Mintzberg (1979) described five organizational parts: strategic apexexecutives; middle line-middle management; operating core; technostructureanalysts; and support staff. "To understand how the Professional Bureaucracy
functions in its operating core, it is helpful to think of it as a repertoire of standard
programs- in effect, the set of skills the professionals stand ready to use-which are
applied to predetermined situations, called contingencies, also standardized"(p. 352).
In essence, the WSP executive-level interviews attempted to describe the
bureaucratic skills that propelled organizational change in the WSP.
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Agency Approval. The principal researcher met with current WSP Chief
John Batiste on December 22, 2005. The meeting was designed to familiarize Chief
Batiste with the research project and its intent to further understanding about the
leadership and management strategies that impacted change in a state law
enforcement agency.

The presentation, discussion, and approval process were

critical to ensuring compliance with WSP organizational ethics, rules, regulations,
and policies.
Chief Batiste completely endorsed the dissertation research, as reflected in
his correspondence included in Appendix C. His support clearly facilitated the
completion of the project in several important ways.
First, chief executive support allowed the principal researcher to access all
pertinent agency publications, including electronic archives. These documents were
drawn from at least three data sources: previous SAF presentation data from each of
the agency bureaus, divisions, and localities; supporting project notes, briefings, and
reports; and archived annual reports, legislative briefings, and other performance
related publications.
Second, the chief executive endorsement permitted access to the agency
intranet. This electronic resource served as a means to retrieve many archived data
sources. It also served as a means of organizational communication throughout the
entire research project, most often through electronic mail.
Finally, chief executive support helped facilitate key informant participation.
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In short, these retirees and employees' interviews formed the basis for the project's
most valuable research findings, themes, and conclusions.
Recruitment. All key informant participants were recruited using an
electronic personal invitation, personal invitation, or telephone call. The electronic
confirmations always included several attachments. These included: A) a copy of a
letter containing the current chiefs endorsement, B) the intended survey questions
(Appendix C), and C) an adult informed consent form (Appendix D).
These transparent recruiting methods helped interested readers easily discern
the nature of the project, its scope of inquiry, and its goals, so they could make a fair
judgment about whether to participate. A closely related goal was to provide
participants enough information to help them to better focus their later responses in a
manner that respected their time and that of the principal researcher. Overall, it is
believed this transparency served as the basis for very valuable information
exchanges to the survey responses.
Only four individuals chose not to participate, either through their nonresponse or failure to arrange an interview date during the entire project. Of these,
three were invited to participate in the research interviews and one was asked to help
with the pre-survey interviews. Three were civilians and one was commissioned,
although none of them worked in the same agency district or division and they did
not share any other relevant characteristics.
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Logistics. The 28 research interviews began in July 2007, and were
completed by the end of February 2008. They occurred at locations of mutual
agreement between the principal researcher and the individual participant. The
interview guide was designed to be completed in an hour, although in practice the
duration of the interviews ranged from 30 to 90 minutes, with the average interview
lasting approximately 60 minutes.
Generally, the interview process began with a quick review of the research
scope and an overview of the interview protocols. All participants were asked if they
had any questions about the adult informed consent form or any other questions
related to the interview protocols before the interviews began. The interviews were
tape recorded with participant consent for later data transcription and analysis.
Human Subjects Research Review. Portland State University (PSU) requires
all doctoral projects to be reviewed by the Human Subjects Research Review
Committee (HSRRC). This committee is responsible for ensuring that all research
proposals strictly adhere to proper ethical, academic, research, and professional
etiquette. Consequently, their review scrutinizes all aspects of academic committee
oversight, proposal construction, organizational support, and participant protections,
including confidentiality protocols.
I prepared an HSRRC application in support of this case study, according to

standard university protocol, which was approved. I actively, diligently, and
aggressively ensured the confidentiality of all research participants throughout the
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entire project by maintaining strict control over all project and interview materials. I
also ensured the adult informed consent clearly explained the participation in the
interviews was voluntary and could be stopped at any time and its content was
acknowledged by each participant before any interviews were begun. I also
maintained secure controls over all interview materials. Finally, I consulted my
dissertation advisor anytime questions arose about how to best balance participant
privacy with scholarly presentation.
Data Measurement
Chapter two described the preliminary organizational change model, which
was examined throughout the project. In essence, it provided a theoretical
framework which argued the organizational changes associated with CompStat really
resulted from the confluence of executive leadership, organizational culture,
employee motivation, and strategic management. This section further describes how
each of these concepts was measured throughout the project.
Executive leadership. The study of leadership contingency theory, or the
interaction between leader and follower, began in the 1970s and continues today.
The resulting law enforcement leadership survey research revealed, characterized,
and categorized a variety of leadership styles. These included situational,
transactional, transformational, and path-goal leadership. (Bruns & Shuman, 1988;
Castro, 1998; Deluga & Souza, 1991; Girodo, 1998; Hersey et al., 1979; Judge &
Piccolo, 2004; Kuykendall & Unsinger, 1982; Morreale, 2002; Willis, 1998)
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Additionally, CompStat has been associated with engaged executive leadership.
(Bratton, 1996; Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Dodenhoff, 1996; Guilianni & Kurson,
2002; McDonald, 2004; McDonald, et al., 2002; O'Connell, 2001; Serpas, 2003,
2004; Shane, 2004a, 2004b) However, virtually no empirical research has examined
how these leadership activities influence CompStat implementation.
This project assessed WSP executive leadership during ADL implementation
using a broader view. It asked these senior state law enforcement leaders to reflect
on their own experiences and to use their own words to describe the significant
leadership activities during these change initiatives.
Organizational Culture. Early law enforcement scholarship described
organizational culture by its homogenous nature. For example, it focused on the
profession's coercive authority (Bittner, 1970, 1974, 1983) and discretionary power
(Brown, 1988; Davis, 1969; Goldsmith, 1990). More recent law enforcement
scholarship has described organizational cultures by their heterogeneous nature,
oftentimes through the elucidation of their subcultures. (Bayley & Shearing, 2001;
Britz, 1997; Harrison, 1998; Herbert, 1998; Hunt, 1997; Maguire, 2003; Paoline
2000; Paoline et al. 2000; Reuss-Ianni 1983; Schmalleger, 2003; Simon, 1999) I
could find no empirical research which examined the role of law enforcement culture
within the context of a CompStat initiative.

This project measured WSP culture during ADL implementation using a
different strategy. First, it prompted respondents to describe the WSP culture before
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ADL and then sought to learn how the change initiative may have changed the
culture. This approach most closely reflected the explorative research project that
examined the culture of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment over
time. (Maynard-Moody, Stull, & Mitchell, 1986) The current project questionnaire
subsumed the work completed in similar survey efforts aimed at discerning shifts in
organizational culture favored by Cameron and Quinn (1999).
Employee motivation. The study of motivation in law enforcement has
produced survey evidence of varying motivational levels within these organizations.
(Chusmir, 1984; Morris, et al., 1999; Reiter, 1999; Sheppard et al., 1974; Simon,
1999; Van Maanen, 1975; Winegar, 2003) At the same time, there seems to be little
doubt that a leader's ability to motivate employees can positively affect work
outcomes. (Aragon, 1993; Brewer, et al., 2000; Daft, 1999; Natemeyer &
McMahon, 2001; Perry, 1996; Prince, Halstead, and Hesser, 2005; Rainey, 2003;
Robbins & Coulter, 1996; Schermerhorn et al, 1997)
This project explored WSP employee motivation and its influence on
organizational productivity through the reflections of the agency's leadership. In
doing so, it sought to discern how the organizational leadership worked to motivate
employees during this time period and whether ADL worked to motivate or demotivate employees.
Strategic management. Little empirical research has been conducted on
strategic management in law enforcement beyond that seeking to evaluate individual

Washington State Patrol Change 120
CompStat initiatives. However, this research has remained singly focused on
assessing the impact of CompStat principles on organizational productivity.
Meanwhile, the strategic management literature clearly highlights the importance of
the integration of the strategic planning, measurement, and assessment processes.
(Bryson, 2004; Dilulio, 1993; Dobbs & Field, 1993; Jansen, 1999; Kaplan & Norton,
1996, 2004; Mendofik, 1994; Niven, 2005; Niven & Kaplan, 2002; Niven & Mann,
2003; Robbins & Coulter, 1996; Shafritz & Russell, 2003)
This project assessed the role of WSP strategic management and performance
measures on organizational productivity using a broad view. In addition to
considering each of the organizational factors outlined above, the project asked
respondents to discuss the management strategies that assisted with ADL
implementation and to evaluate the overall success of the ADL initiative. Similarly,
it asked respondents to discuss their performance measures in use and their
respective link to workgroup, bureau, and organizational work quality.
Data Analyses
Yin (2003) believed rigorous case study analysis should seek to include all
relevant evidence, address all major rival interpretations, utilize rigorous analytical
skills, and capitalize on the expertise of the researcher(s). This project attempted to
remain attentive to each of these goals while it presented its results in an aggregated
format. Additionally, it used his two favored strategies for analyzing case study
data. In other words, these stressed reliance on theoretical propositions and careful
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thought about rival explanations, (cf., Babbie, 1999; Lofland & Lofland, 1995;
McNabb, 2002)
Theoretical propositions. Throughout my analyses, I remained attentive to
all relevant organizational change explanations throughout his theory review and
research conceptualization. My inquiry led him to develop a preliminary
organizational change model that sought to explain these organizational changes in a
rudimentary manner, which was then examined throughout the project. Essentially,
the model argued organizational change in the WSP resulted from several
organizational factors that include: executive leadership, organizational culture,
employee motivation, and strategic management. Its rationale suggested executive
leadership influenced organizational culture, employee motivation, CompStat
implementation, and strategic management controls in any successful law
enforcement change initiative. However, employee motivation and organizational
culture also shaped the leadership principles in use. Finally, the confluence of these
organizational factors shaped organizational change.
This project examined the WSP's implementation of its ADL initiative,
which was based on CompStat principles. In other words, it utilized its proposed
organizational change model to examine the leadership and management factors that
may have contributed to the WSP organizational changes between January 2002 and
December 2004.
Rival explanations. I believe my professional law enforcement experiences
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with the WSP and my academic knowledge proved invaluable as I reviewed the
organizational theory and built my conceptual framework. I felt these same
competencies remained valuable as I culled, evaluated, analyzed, and summarized
the case data. At the same time, these experiences also provided me the advantage of
identifying significant case gaps, oversights, clarifying questions, or additional
explanatory factors.
Historical documents, published review, personal observations. Yin (2003)
also proposed four analytical techniques: pattern-matching (comparing an
empirically based model to a predicted explanation), explanation building, time
series analysis, and logic models.
This project's support data sources easily lent themselves to such analytical
techniques. For example, the project's underlying theoretical principles and
explanatory change model were evaluated using the data collected, analyzed, and
summarized throughout the study. Similarly, the temporal nature of this data
allowed these examinations to occur multiple times throughout the project.
Beyond these general recommendations, the case study data was analyzed
using a variety of more detailed techniques. This was especially true with regards to
original data collected in the form of key informant interviews.
Key informant interviews. Polit and Beck (2004) introduced the interview

analysis process. "The participants' input is the starting point from which the
researcher begins to conceptualize, seeking patterns, commonalities, and
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relationships emerging from the researcher- participant interactions" (p. 29).
Lofland and Lofland (1995) specified eight patterns they believed could result from
such analyses. These included assertions related to: "type, frequencies, magnitudes,
structures, processes, causes, consequences, and agency" (p. 182-183).
The proposed organizational change model shaped the interview guide,
which measured each of its constitutive organizational factors (executive leadership,
organizational culture, motivation theory, strategic management, and performance
measures). Specifically, the interviews solicited respondents' own views, words, and
reflections about how these organizational factors may have shaped WSP success.
Therefore, the participants' responses contained information related to the each of
the earlier patterns, so it could be analyzed thoroughly in pursuit of these
propositions.
Open Coding. Lofland and Lofland (1995) believed qualitative coding
should begin with initial coding, which Strauss and Corbin (1998) identified as open
coding. Polit and Beck (2004) outlined the general process: "In qualitative coding,
researchers develop coding categories that represent important themes in the data"
(p. 33). (cf., Creswell, 2003, McNabb, 2002; Patton, 2002) Strauss and Corbin
suggested the analysis could proceed by line, sentence, paragraph, or document.
The interview guide provided structure to the open coding process across
interviews by organizing analyses around both the broader organizational factors and
the narrower question content. In addition, I found the interviews produced
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corollary, supplemental, and new categories, especially when these analyses began
broad and progressed to the lowest levels of analysis.
Axial coding. "In axial coding, categories are related to their subcategories to
form more precise and complete explanations about phenomena" (Strauss & Corbin,
1998, p. 124). The authors delineated the analysis steps in greater detail:
"Laying out the properties of a category and their dimensions, a task that
begins during open coding; identifying the variety of conditions,
actions/interactions, and consequences associated with a phenomenon;
relating a category to its subcategories through statements denoting how they
are related to each other; and looking for cues in the data that denote how
major categories might relate to each other" (p. 126).
The specific interview question content offered some natural subcategories.
For example, readers may recall strong meta-analytical support exists, including law
enforcement studies, that transformational leaders enjoy widespread organizational
approval. They may also recall that transformational leadership has been described
as involving charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individualized
consideration. (Bass, 1990a) Consequently, the interview analyses sought to
connect response details back to each of these behavioral components as they related
to ADL. Additionally, I found that more detailed analyses using the above steps
produced additional subcategories, as anticipated with the open coding processes
described above.
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Selective coding. Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggested, "Selective coding is
the process of integrating and refining categories" (p. 143). Lofland and Lofland
(1995) felt this focused coding naturally led to: "memoing," during which a
researcher began to assemble themes; diagramming, which involved "typologizing,"
matrix making, concept charting, and flow charting; and thinking creatively about
the findings.
The current project included selective coding as it sought to aggregate
specific questionnaire content, at the chief executive, executive staff, and leadership
levels. In later chapters, it also allowed me to step back from this more specific
content to consider both broader practical implications and theoretical insights.
Analysis summary. An important project goal was to analyze the research
data according to these coding standards. In doing so, I sought to maximize the
theoretical contributions and vocational utility of the project. Therefore, the project
analyses involved multiple types of interview coding. I have illustrated my eight
step process below.

Washington State Patrol Change 126
1. Open and axial coded preliminary interviews

2. Open and axial coded Chief Serpas and Porter's interviews

3. Selectively coded chief interviews for inclusion in organizational context chapter

4. Open and axial coded executive staff interviews

5. Open and axial coded executive leadership interviews

6. Selectively coded all interview materials using questionnaire framework

7. Selectively coded all project findings to identify practical principles

8. Selectively coded all project findings to define the complex organizational change
model theory
Figure 3. The Data Analysis Summary
Validity
Yin (2003) asserted that four tests are utilized routinely to judge the quality
of empirical social research, including case studies. These are:
"Construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the
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concepts being studied
Internal validity (for explanatory or causal studies only, and not for
descriptive or exploratory studies): establishing a causal relationship,
whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as
distinguished from spurious relationships
External validity: establishing the domain to which a study's findings can be
generalized
Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study- such as the data
collection procedures- can be repeated, with the same results" (p. 35)
Construct validity. "Construct validity is based on the logical relationships
among variables" (Babbie, 1999, p. 113). Yin (2003) suggested:
"To meet the test of construct validity, an investigator must be sure to cover
two steps: select the specific types of changes that are to be studied (and
relate them to the original objectives of the study); and demonstrate that the
selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific types of
change that have been selected" (p. 35).
Yin (2003) believed case study construct validity could be improved
dramatically through: using multiple evidentiary sources, maintaining careful
documented control over data collected, and asking key informants to review draft
versions of the final results. Similarly, other scholars have stressed the importance
of data triangulation, which stresses many of these same themes. (McNabb, 2002;
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Patton, 1987, 2002; Polit & Beck, 2004; Rossi et al, 1999; Singleton & Straits,
1999)
This project utilized these strategies as a means to increase construct validity.
Its review of multiple theoretical and organizational sources shaped its theoretical
and conceptual frameworks as well as its organizational theory review. Together,
these resources established rigorous scholarly arguments about the leadership and
management strategies that were examined throughout the project. Additionally, the
empirical studies offered further justifications for the operational concepts to be
discussed during the key informant interviews. Similarly, the interview guide was
reviewed with six volunteers as a means to evaluate, test, and validate the interview
guide language, question strategy, and specific content. Finally, key informants were
asked to review draft versions of the final case study in an effort to double-check its
accuracy, quality, and results.
Internal validity. Yin (2003) felt case study internal validity could be
undermined by an inability to demonstrate causal relationships. He thought this
resulted from a general tendency to over-infer specific events from documentary or
interview evidence. He suggested case study internal validity could be improved
during data analysis through pattern-matching, explanation building, and addressing
rival explanations.

The change model advanced in this project was shaped by a rigorous
organizational theory review. The model suggested state law enforcement agency
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change results from the confluence of the organizational factors outlined above. The
remaining data sources were examined using this framework and multiple levels of
analysis. The interview guide also probed these organizational factors and offered
respondents the opportunity to offer rival explanations as the interview proceeded.
External validity. Yin (2003) observed that case studies have been criticized
widely for their inability to generalize beyond their narrow focus. He responded:
"However, such critics are implicitly contrasting the situation to survey
research, in which a sample (if selected correctly) readily generalizes to a
larger universe. This analogy to samples and universes is incorrect when
dealing with case studies. Survey research relies on statistical
generalization, whereas case studies (as with experiments) rely on analytical
generalization. In analytical generalization, the investigator is striving to
generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory..." (p. 37)
Yin (2003) believed case study external validity could be improved by
utilizing theory as a means to ground the findings of any one study. As noted, this
project utilized organizational theory as a means to conceptualize its proposed
change model. It used theory in a similar manner to focus its analytical findings.
Reliability. Research reliability has become virtually synonymous with
replication. (Babbie, 1999; Patton, 2002; Polit & Beck, 2004; Rossi et al., 1999;
Singleton & Straits, 1999; Yin, 2003) Yin (2003) suggested a closely related
scientific goal should be to reduce the researcher biases introduced into any project.
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He felt the use of a case study protocol that outlined the project's research
procedures would enhance the final report's reliability, as it would serve as a means
to audit or replicate the case study, (cf., Patton, 1987, 2002)
Research protocol summary. The Mark O. Hatfield School of Government at
PSU requires all doctoral projects to be reviewed by a dissertation committee with a
broad base of academic knowledge and experience. This academic committee was
chosen by my dissertation committee chair and me for their multi-disciplinary social
science expertise. The committee ensured all research proposals strictly adhere to
proper ethical, academic, research, and professional rigor, using a graduated
approach.
Their initial proposal review and my public presentation of its content offered
the committee their first in a series of research oversight reviews. This dialectical
review meant the entire project, research design, and research protocols were vetted
fully before any data collection and analysis was undertaken. I complied with both of
these requirements in November of 2006.
Two separate reviews were conducted as described earlier, one by the
independent PSU HSRRC and the second by several WSP key informants who
expressed an interest in reading the completed case study. I received full PSU
HSRRC approval in May 2007, and circulated my draft findings to several WSP key
informant reviews in April 2008.
Finally, the second set of committee reviews occurred when members
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reviewed the final first draft of the dissertation, attended the public defense, and
proofread the final dissertation ahead of signature. This final academic committee
review allowed members to offer their critiques, suggestions, and evaluations of the
entire research project, including its: construction, design, methodology, analyses,
and final presentation. I complied with each of these requirements, first by
circulating my first draft to the committee members in early May 2008, next by
conducting my defense in late-May 2008, and finally through submitting my final,
signed dissertation in early-June 2008.
In summary, this chapter summarized the preliminary organizational change
model, as a means to present the research design, including its assumptions,
epistemological nature, qualitative approach, inductive reasoning, and historical
perspective. The chapter also described the data collection processes, which
included discussion of the key informant interviews, interview guide, and thematic
analyses. Let us shift our focus to examine these interview themes in light of the
earlier organizational setting and their links to the organizational factors examined at
the beginning of the project.

CHAPTER FIVE
Accountability Driven Leadership and the Key Informant Interviews and Analyses
The research findings associated with the key informant interviews, personal
observations, and some published reviews are presented in this chapter. The key
informant interviews solicited respondents' own reflections, words, and views about
Accountability Driven Leadership (ADL) implementation in the Washington State
Patrol (WSP) between 2002 and 2004. The interview guide prompted participants to
describe their experiences, whether positive or negative. (Appendix B) Overall, the
interview participants were conversant about ADL implementation and their
perceptions of its impacts within the WSP. Consequently, the themes related to the
interview questionnaire will be explored in detail below.1 In turn, these interview
analyses will help define the projects practical and theoretical findings contained in
later chapters.
Stories of ADL Implementation
Interestingly, several participants reflected on the emergence of ADL
implementation in the WSP as a continuation of change initiatives first introduced by
Chief Annette Sandberg. These introductory remarks will serve as a means to
introduce several additional themes related to both Chiefs Sandberg and Serpas.
Chief Annette

Sandberg

At least twelve interview participants credited Chief Sandberg for starting the
1

The interview participants (IP) will be referred to by number, which has been scrambled, placed in
ascending order, and grouped where possible to protect their anonymity.
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WSP on an accountability track. Some suggested she also had the foresight to send
several executive team members to New York City to learn about computer statistics
(CompStat) in the late 1990s. These participants credited this attempt to learn about
best practices with the impetus for introducing the Strategic Advancement Forums
(SAFs) in the WSP. (Interview Participants (IPs), 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20,
24,28, 30, 31) Interestingly, an external consulting team also credited Chief
Sandberg with "initializing" the SAF process. They noted she: "started the SAF
process; implemented goals/data oriented measurements; [and] held semi-annual
SAF meetings; little discussion" (Ewing et al., 2004, p. 15).
Several participants reminisced about these early SAFs. One suggested the
early SAFs were the "first step" in creating a process designed to "monitor progress
on different initiatives" over time. Two noted the administration's transition to
speaking about performance outputs and outcomes. Others reflected on the early
challenges, by noting the steep learning curve associated with their beginnings and
the integration of Problem Oriented Policing (POP) principles. Another felt the early
SAFs were not as "formalized," as they became later on because there had never
been an executive forum that kept track of performance levels and identified
deficiencies. (IPs, 5, 8, 10, 19)
One captain described the contemporaneous traffic law enforcement (TLE)
mindset in more detail:
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".. .the message that the troopers received or [they] interpreted was- really it
doesn't matter how many cars I stop or what I do out there, if I can find a
way to you know reduce collisions. And, if that's you know talking to
citizens over coffee at the Denny's Restaurant about safe driving, if that saves
collisions, then that's my job. You know I don't necessarily have to go out
and work very hard and write lots of tickets." (IP, 14)
Some senior executives took the opportunity to reflect back on these early
SAFs as a means to critique their formats. Their greatest concerns related to the
biannual presentation schedule, structured format using pre-exposed question guides,
and the lack of continuity. Some described these early SAFs as: "a very warm and
fuzzy dog and pony show," a "showcase," "fairly narrow in scope," "incremental,"
and like taking "baby steps." One added the biannual schedule really removed the
SAFs "life blood" and took away the presentations' sense of urgency. Still another
summarized: "We were looking at it [data] more holistically, not as much hands-on
and usually not [from a] data-driven [standpoint]. We were looking at.. .you know if
things weren't falling apart, things were going okay." (IPs, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15)
The executive interviews manifested similar themes. Two spoke about the
early strategic plans. One described the emphasis on the planning process and,
despite the accountability links, felt there was little real staff accountability. They
added the plans had been updated frequently, but felt many areas of the agency
rarely, if ever, provided updates about their progress. Another suggested that in
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practical terms this meant a lot of useful data was not being collected in many areas
of the agency and key decisions were made oftentimes without critical data. Finally,
these observations led another leader to suggest the longer average tenure of the
district and division commanders in those days made it much more difficult to create
change in the early days, as the processes were just not embraced. (IPs, 5, 13, 23)
Taken together, several participants acknowledged the WSP had been making
important contributions to statewide public safety, but others felt the agency
leadership had lost track of its ability to demonstrate convincing public value. In any
case, several observed it had been difficult to garner the gubernatorial and legislative
support necessary to secure additional, critical resources to fully complete the
statewide public safety mission. (IPs, 6, 8, 10, 18, 19, 20, 21)
Chief Ronal Serpas
The interview participants made it clear that Chief Serpas attempted to learn
about the WSP issues and take stock of the departmental talent by interviewing every
commander and assistant commander using a set of pre-exposed questions.
Reportedly, he then passed his notes along to the Office of Government and Media
Relations (OGMR) as a means to describe how he intended to change the WSP. The
idea was the OGMR would help communicate the direction internally and externally.
(IPs, 8, 14, 16, 17)
At least thirteen interview participants spoke about Chief Serpas' creation of
the ADL philosophy and its implementation in the WSP. Eighteen noted clear ties
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between ADL and CompStat. Ten remembered ADL's earlier roots in the New York
Police Department (NYPD), and two spoke about its link to CompStat tenets. Ten
also tied ADL to earlier WSPSAFs. (IPs, 2, 3, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,20,
21,23,24,25,29,31,32,33,34)
Interestingly, many participants added to these broader themes by suggesting
the changes were needed. Two suggested it was critical Chief Serpas was an
external change agent, with a no nonsense attitude. In one's view, his adaptation of a
proven management tool like the CompStat allowed him to circumvent one of the
common WSP cultural handicaps of "needing to create our own program," instead of
using a proven commodity. At least two felt some of the changes should have been
implemented far before Chief Serpas elected to do so, while three suggested there
were questions about what the agency was doing during this time frame. Three
others agreed, but quickly noted the change initiatives did not really change the focus
from traditional TLE activities all that much, but instead they re-prioritized troopers'
workdays. Several felt the only difference had been placing greater accountability on
commanders, but that was needed since performance standards had been so
subjective before then. One thought greater commander accountability occurred
through budgeting expectations, deploying personnel using data, responding quickly
to the data, and rewarding good employees. (IPs, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 29, 31, 34)
To summarize, one captain noted the similarities and differences between
Chief Sandberg and Serpas' approaches and found examples of each mindset in two
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detachments working side by side in one geographic area. They remembered Chief
Sandberg wanted to reduce highway deaths, especially in certain target areas, but
worried less about how troopers might achieve that goal. This allowed troopers to
use TLE, community outreach, and media contacts. The detachment embracing this
philosophy felt obligated to patrol the entire beat and focused on quality TLE
activities, especially in historically high collision target areas. Not surprisingly,
these were primarily the state routes and often pulled them away from the population
centers, so many of their outputs were lower.
The captain noted Chief Serpas had the same goal, but steadfastly focused
troopers' attention on TLE activities and allowed other traffic safety coalition
partners and local public information officers to undertake many of the other traffic
safety initiatives within communities. The detachment engaged in this law
enforcement mindset sought to increase their outputs and felt the best way to remove
DUIs and apprehend seatbelt violators was in and around the population centers.
They undertook these activities even though it meant deviating from strict state route
patrol.
As might be expected, each TLE approach was criticized sharply by the
opposite detachment, which increased conflict and reduced overall teamwork. The
interview participant remembered working through these issues during their first full
leadership year, by meeting with each group and providing a leadership focus and
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direction. Looking back, they felt this limited the conflict and provided the direction
necessary for each work group to produce better results. (IP, 19)
Initial Reactions. Several participants tied Chief Serpas' selection to his
earlier successes in New Orleans. Another added they felt his practices were
consistent with Governor Locke's accountability initiatives and his efforts to
introduce greater performance measures into budgeting decisions. (IPs, 10, 12,29)
The bureau leadership interviews also acknowledged Chief Serpas' vision,
strategy, and drive. Many participants expressed their optimism about his arrival as
an external candidate and what they perceived as a new direction. They were
complimentary of his intention to shift the WSP performance discussions away from
simpler output and process measures toward more complex outcome and impact
measures. Another recognized their need, as a leader, to rise to the level of his
challenges, so the WSP, their areas of responsibility, and their workgroups could
maximize their success. Another senior leader recognized Chief Serpas' ability to
read strengths and weaknesses in people. They suggested his selections for his
executive team included individuals who were very enthusiastic about his intended
direction, while another noted these appointees would champion his ideas. A third
recognized his innate ability to motivate a group to want to follow him. (IPs, 8, 10,
11, 12, 15)
Two other participants complimented Chief Serpas' management style, as it
appeared Serpas took an active interest in meeting with people, learning about their
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jobs, and seeking their input. They added that they felt such interactions allowed
him to get a very broad based, accurate depiction of all the agency's responsibilities
and to help motivate employees who rarely saw the chief. (IPs, 12, 22)
The leadership interviews revealed similar themes, and reflected
overwhelmingly positive initial reactions, as most recognized changes were badly
needed. At least four understood the need for an external change agent to jumpstart
productivity, and another felt he created a badly needed cultural shift. One noted
Serpas' charisma and good ideas, while a second admired his coming into the WSP
all by himself. A third was appreciative of Chief Serpas' unequivocal support of
their desire to hold troopers accountable. Finally, one leader remembered their
initial curiosity about the new changes and added they thought additional
performance data would help with communication, project issues, and idea sharing.
(IPs, 4, 5, 14, 17, 18, 19,20,21)
Many took time to reflect back on some of the earliest SAFs Chief Serpas
attended when they were presented using the earlier format. In particular, at least
four leaders described an early SAF. Some executives had attended or sent
management representatives to these forums as a preemptive move to learn more
about the Chief and his style. Several other participants described the forum as
presented very professionally using the available data sources at the time and the
commensurate explanations about the current district work activities, results, and
limitations. Apparently, Chief Serpas had not been interested in what he perceived
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as excuses related to poor performance and wanted the ability to discuss activity
levels down to the individual contribution, something that was not done routinely by
agency presenters at these forums. Interestingly, one leader acknowledged the
trooper activity had been less than stellar in those days, but chalked that difficulty up
to the larger lack of overall direction in the department at the time. Another
observed they had little idea what types of TLE activities their troopers were
undertaking at the time. (IPs, 14, 17, 19, 20, 25)
The reviews of Chief Serpas' interactions with the presenter were extremely
critical, as, by most accounts, Chief Serpas chose to humiliate him in public in front
of a packed conference room. The presenter was a highly respected and experienced
member of the command staff. Some participants recognized that he became visibly
shaken during the presentation, as everyone in the room could see Chief Serpas
strongly disliked what he was seeing. Meanwhile, the tension in the room became
almost unbearable. Undoubtedly, these perceived injustices were reflected in many
of the participants' remarks about the events that day. They candidly suggested the
presenter "got hammered and bloodied up" and "ripped into like he just went through
a shredder." Another was more forgiving as they suggested Chief Serpas had to pick
a time and place to let everyone know "there was a new sheriff in town," and that
had obviously been it. (IPs, 14, 17, 20, 25)
At least one other forum was conducted in a similar manner. The presenter, a
revered captain, had prepared according to the scripted questions offered by the
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earlier administration. When they were forced to admit they were not prepared to
answer several of Chief Serpas' questions, the response was deemed unacceptable.
Interestingly, the participant recalled becoming extremely defensive about their
command, their district's employees, and their TLE efforts. Several leaders
suggested they learned a lot from these early forums and the related conflict.
Reportedly, their observations combined with the demands for increased TLE
activities at the next Field Operations Bureau (FOB) Captains' meeting helped them
begin to make the necessary adjustments in their respective areas of responsibility
and to avoid similar fates. Reportedly, it was not until about a year later that several
participants began to understand their roles within the broader re-engineering efforts
and became very conversant with their respective areas of responsibility. (IPs, 10,
14, 15, 17, 20, 25)
At least four executives suggested ADL implementation had not been
especially difficult within their areas of responsibility. Each noted operational
statistics had been integrated into their work areas ahead of Chief Serpas' arrival,
which made the transition much easier. One thought it was just "business as usual,"
since they had the operating statistics in place within their culture, so they did not see
it as a big change even with the new performance measurement charts. (IPs, 22, 26,
32, 33)
As readers will recall, Chief Serpas' two most important change initiatives
were the implementation of ADL and the recreation of the SAFs. The interview
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participants spoke extensively about the successes and challenges associated with
both initiatives. So, let us consider their general themes in greater detail now.
ADL Implementation. Chief Serpas apparently articulated his intentions to
implement ADL and restructure the SAFs during his executive staff meetings in the
fall of 2001. Reportedly, he explained his general philosophy by asking such
question as:
"We have all these initiatives, how do we know if they are working? What
are our goals? How are we doing today? Are we doing better than we did
yesterday? Are we doing better than we did last year?" (IP, 12)
He also discussed his intentions to enhance the SAFs, using the same
principles and earlier groundwork, but by conducting the sessions more often using a
more demanding context, so it would become the driving force behind the bureaus'
core activities. One senior executive suggested it marked the "first time we had been
asked to quantify what we were doing, both to substantiate that we were headed in
the right direction and to show we were improving our level of services." Another
executive staff member succinctly outlined the problem: "... we all had to figure out
how to make Accountability Driven Leadership work in our bureaus." (IPs, 10, 11,
12,13)
Recreated SAF Forums. Several participants believed Chief Serpas'
universal implementation of ADL principles and SAF processes in the WSP worked
toward equal treatment throughout the WSP. In other words, by implementing the
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standards in both the commissioned and civilian ranks of the agency, the initiatives
worked to overcome the differences that often exist between these two groups in a
police agency. (IPs, 15,16,28)
Another senior executive described how many of the SAF data charts were
created for the presentations. Essentially, the data charts captured and displayed
performance measures using methods similar to those being used in the Forensic
Laboratory Services Bureau at the time. The interviews revealed the system had
been created as a means to display graphically the quantitative progress workgroups
were making with their case processing. It depicted several performance measure
changes: month to month comparisons for shorter-term management decisions; year
to date compared to the prior year to date comparisons in order to help even out any
seasonal effects, and last 12 months to the prior 12 months comparisons, which were
useful in considering if your backlogs were accumulating or subsiding. (IP, 12)
The senior executives indicated that these charts provided a good start for
most districts and divisions. However, some workgroups required additional
performance graphics. At least four challenges were highlighted during these
supplementary creative processes: trying to figure out what Chief Serpas wanted to
see depicted; a tradition of looking fairly "superficially at our business," due to a
feeling that things were moving along fairly smoothly; immense challenges with data

collection; and a general lack of proficiency with "in-depth data collection and
analysis," especially to demonstrate strategic success, effectiveness, or efficiency.
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One suggested he wanted the performance measurement system to be a positive
force for change and the SAFs to demonstrate the effectiveness of the executive staff
through their ability to make decisions, apply resources, and solve organizational
problems. They also thought the SAFs were designed as learning forums, so the
executive staff and commanders could learn about agency issues. (IPs, 10, 15)
Many executives spoke about some of the positive aspects related to the new
SAFs. One felt the reviews would allow them to go into any situation and set an
overall direction and make at least a positive short-term impact. A second thought
the forums were very valuable and dynamic, as performance information was
presented, problems identified, and solutions agreed upon immediately. In their
view, this often highlighted organizational interdependencies and reinforced
common goals. A third felt the reviews opened up communication on both sides,
which benefited the executive staff and the division. A fourth noted the SAFs
promoted "professional excellence," while a fifth recounted the measurable progress
toward important goals. A sixth understood the SAFs were important, but called
attention to the pressure involved an inability to gather data, compare, evaluate, and
make adjustments to operations. Finally, a seventh participant suggested SAFs
created an expectation for follow-up, which kept pressure on staff to complete
projects that otherwise may have never been completed. (IPs, 18, 23, 28, 29, 30, 32)
One senior executive summarized. They felt ADL used leadership principles
and management of personnel to accomplish organizational goals, through a "highly
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intense" exercise designed to "keep things moving forward in a dynamic manner."
An executive simply stated ADL allowed them autonomy, control, and authority. (IP,
10, 16)
Change Initiatives Reactions. The senior executive interviews highlighted a
diverse set of initial reactions to ADL implementation and the SAF recreations.
Several confessed to possessing little understanding and significant confusion about
Chief Serpas' intentions, especially in the beginning, and felt they had struggled to
meet his expectations. Others recognized some of these same anxieties in their
peers. Another thought his intentions were admirable and "consistent with a
paramilitary organization." Still others were concerned about tight deadlines, and the
tremendous organizational stressors the changes created. Two participants
summarized by noting these changes would take nothing less than a total
commitment to achieve and would require a lot of hard work. (IPs, 8, 9, 10, 11, 34)
Some executive leaders commented about their peers' reactions to Chief
Serpas' changes. One reported their perceptions that their peers were "a bit weary at
first," and they worried about a new surge in workload, intensity, extra preparatory
time, and sense of urgency. One added their belief that their peers had difficulties
adjusting because they had become too accustomed to the old, biannual, presentation
processes. Finally, another observed a tendency in their peers to insist they could not
quantify the work activities in their bureau without seriously undermining the quality
of that work. (IPs, 8, 12, 15)
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Several interview participants reported some broader understanding of Chief
Serpas' direction. One was very enthusiastic and suggested "I could see exactly
where he was going," "I welcomed it," and "I felt challenged." A second said they
thought this was the way SAFs were going to be run from the beginning. A third
relished the thought of establishing greater accountability in their area of
responsibility, but felt passionately the tradeoff ought to be the commensurate
autonomy in their area without extensive executive staff meddling. A fourth
recognized Chief Serpas' attention to mission and purpose and came to understand
that without these critical elements employees were always less productive. A final
participant said they immediately recognized the initiatives' value in helping to tell
their bureau story to legislators, who could help them secure additional resources.
Interestingly, another respondent described this last leader as "the most fired up
about it." In their view, this leader championed the whole performance measure
system as a means to dramatically improve their bureau funding. (IPs, 8, 11, 12, 13,
17, 34)
Finally, a few participants suggested the change initiatives represented a very
intense process to ensure all the bureaus and divisions were reporting meaningful
data and it was a real learning process for about a year. Two others suggested
approximately a year to a year and a half later they felt they could really "tell the

story of the bureau." An executive also highlighted the ability to use SAF data to
make presentations to a wide variety of external stakeholders. (IPs, 10, 14, 15, 23)
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The executive interviews also reflected a wide range of views about these
changes. One leader remembered the early correspondence and related training,
which they suggested really helped clarify the process. Two others remembered the
documentation and broad direction, with little real substantive discussion, and
lamented the lack of training in their areas of responsibility. One added the resources
dedicated to strategic planning were woefully inadequate during this time period.
(IPs, 20, 21, 23)
Many leaders were generally skeptical at first and provided clarifying
explanations. One was "causpicious," meaning they saw the need for greater
accountability, but they wanted to maintain their autonomy and authority to make
decisions. Another admitted being a "bit anxious," like they tended to be for any new
changes. A third confessed they did not believe crime reduction tactics in New York
and elsewhere could be translated to the work of a statewide law enforcement
agency. A fourth did not care for the initiatives because they saw the associated
intensity and could see the pressure to perform. Two others felt the new initiatives
"sounded like a lot of work," as they could see it would necessitate completely
recreating their measures and educating people about why their division existed. A
seventh admitted being stunned, as it was like nothing they had ever seen before.
Generally speaking, these viewpoints were overcome as the SAFs began to reveal

significant performance successes. (IPs, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34)
Another described Serpas' intent to have every district commander to use
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similar language to present similar information so comparisons could be drawn
across districts, especially stressing outputs. One simply suggested ADL gathered
information, which allowed analyses related to at least three types objectives:
explaining mandated activities; developing greater efficiencies; and allocating
resources to accomplish common goals. Still another summarized by saying ADL
was an attempt to start measuring performance, and reporting back on the
measurements regularly, using quantitative measures that would be tracked over
time, to measure differences in impact. (IPs, 18, 19, 21)
One highlighted the significant difference in mindset between problem
oriented policing (POP) and ADL in a TLE environment. The former was viewed as
a problem-solving mindset meant to tackle specific issues in a specific area, while
the latter was focused on an enforcement orientation. Some of the descriptions of
these changes included: a "paradigm shift" and a "huge change" for the WSP; and a
huge cultural shift. Another suggested Chief Serpas was very interested in having
troopers write citations in high collision areas as a means to help drive down injury
and fatality collisions. (IPs, 2, 14, 16, 18, 31)
Public Presentations
Several senior executive reflected on the public nature of the SAF forums and
the vulnerability and transparency it brought the WSP. On the one hand, one felt
these processes seemed to make the agency more nimble and reflective of
contemporaneous management principles. On the other, they thought this direction
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represented a significant departure from the more private management processes that
occurred previously in the WSP. Two acknowledged the utility of the SAFs, but
questioned some of its side effects. One remembered the first SAFs as tension-filled
events full of anxiety. A second agreed and reflected on the intense pressures the
SAF processes placed on all attendees- presenters and executive staff members alike.
They marveled at the personalities that continually rose to the challenge of
undertaking these presentations. In their view, the public venues and evidence-based
presentations often resulted in tough questioning, which left presenters vulnerable to
incomplete data and imperfect answers. This participant described exemplary
leaders as those who loved the stage and dedicated countless hours of preparation
working with their staffs and their quantitative results. (IPs, 8, 10)
Another senior leader suggested the opportunity to assemble the agency
senior management every month "to account for their programs, progress, activities,
challenges, and to answer tough questions" was invaluable. They felt this added
freshness, excitement, and productive tension to the meetings in a way that "kept
people on their toes." Another described the SAF forums and their scrutiny of
performance data as working to create a sense of "fluidity," "continuity," and
"urgency." Finally, one recognized the evolution in SAFs over time as the presenters
became more familiar with their role and the likely questions. They reflected on
some real district and division commander camaraderie and friendly competitions
that emerged during the process. (IPs, 8, 10, 12)
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Several senior executives spoke of the accountability links the SAF process
created in the WSP. One observed the SAFs drove performance and advanced the
strategic plan objectives, so alignment between the two concepts was critical. Two
recognized the executive staffs ability to hold commanders accountable for their
results next month if positive results were missing from their current presentations,
promised during their briefings, or discussed during the forum. Another suggested
the process assembled very diverse groups of bright of people in an interactive and
collaborative forum to examine current statewide management issues. They felt the
idea was to get them to apply resources immediately to solve problems in ways that
often cut through a lot of traditional bureaucratic red tape. One remembered, Chief
Serpas was quick to highlight achievements as a means to motivate the other
commanders present to duplicate the initiatives within their respective areas of
command. (IPs, 10, 11, 15) Such observations led an external team of consultants to
suggest: "The SAF process is used to 'get things done' at [the] WSP" (Ewing et al.,
2004, p. 14).
The executive interviews highlighted similar themes. Many leaders reflected
on the value in the SAFs. One thought they allowed agency personnel to "track
progress with strategic plan objectives" and to "keep the plan moving." One saw the
relationships it created, as different parts of the agency began to speak to one
another, while others felt it opened up regular access to the executive staff. At least
five others learned a great deal about the WSP operations across the state. Several
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others saw it improved ability to shift resources to address emergent workgroup
problems and better address customer needs, while a second recognized the new
system rewarded good budgeters. Another felt the processes would eventually
evolve, so its most useful aspects would be retained and its unhelpful practices
would be discarded. Others suggested ADL did not introduce all that much change,
as they had been collecting performance data for some time. In fact, ADL simply
changed some of their collection, analysis, and presentation. (IPs, 5, 22, 24, 25, 26,
27,28 29,31,32,33,34)
The leaders also reflected the accountability ADL engendered. One noted the
agency had come from an era where there was little TLE accountability, the
leadership message had stressed quality over quantity, and troopers often used that
excuse when asked about their low production. In other words, quantity had gotten a
bad name. Several others concurred, one suggested ADL implementation was a
"fairly sudden, abrupt, and significant change," while another felt it required a
massive cultural shift. One noted the expectations established throughout the
agency, which others suggested it held all district commanders, lieutenants, and
sergeants accountable for TLE work results. Another suggested the message was sent
loud and clear that lieutenants were to know what was going on in their areas of
responsibility and in the district as a whole. And, several others thought the ultimate
goal was to "drive down" the organizational performance expectations to the
individual employee's level, especially in the four core TLE areas, and to hold them
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in parity with their peers. Two other leaders recognized a shift in the methods used to
track investigations from individual case management and prosecutorial success
toward more focus on the volume of cases, the types of investigations, and the
quality of final work product. (IPs, 2, 3, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 24, 27)
Agency Change
Beyond the preliminary logistics, the senior executive interviews also
highlighted concerns about wholesale agency change. In general, they recognized
that change would be difficult to implement agency-wide and to drive down the
agency, due to the fear of the unknown, anxiety, dissention, skeptics, and saboteurs it
often creates. At the same time, they knew Chief Serpas' initiatives required
changes in technology, shifts in data collection typologies (simple activity measures
versus effectiveness, efficiency, and outcome measures), and compressed timelines.
Lastly, the interview analyses revealed some districts and divisions became reliant
on work completed in other sections of the WSP for their data collection,
aggregation, and preliminary assembly. The most frequent example of this
relationship involved the FOB patrol districts and Budget and Fiscal Services, as the
latter was responsible for assembling fairly extensive performance and budgetary
data for every patrol district, workgroup, and trooper in the state. In the beginning,
such interactions were not perfect, so friction rose oftentimes between the two
groups. This most often resulted from imprecise data requests on the one side and an
inability to produce timely, precise data on the other. (IPs, 8, 11, 13, 14)
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The command interviews revealed many creative attempts to sell the changes
associated with ADL implementation. One remembered asking troopers to produce
more and to work in specific areas, both of which were tough sells, especially when
trooper oftentimes amassed TLE activity where it was easy to do so, rather than
where it might reduce collisions. In the beginning, they remembered these
discussions sometimes involving numerical targets, which some union
representatives seized upon as proof quotas were in place. A senior executive also
spoke about these conflicts, as they described several episodes where employees in
the agency communicated with the press about their perceived loss of their
professional discretion during violator stops, due to never ending performance
objectives. Interestingly, the senior leader felt such conflicts were not so much an
indictment of those involved as they were suggestions that agency leadership had
more work to do in order to convince its own employees and the public that the
agency direction was important and worthwhile. Reportedly, most of these problems
worked themselves out or were side-stepped over time when both sides agreed to say
simply that some employees' work was "not enough." One leader suggested this was
a bit disingenuous and noted: "I think there is value in telling the employee what
you want." Similar issues were highlighted by several other leaders. One simply
suggested they knew it was their responsibility to "sell it to their people." Others

recognized many of their troopers just wanted their command staff to "tell me what
you want me to do." Another added, the only other thing most troopers want to know
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is whether their sergeant is happy. (IPs, 8, 14, 17, 27)
Other leaders highlighted similar challenges selling a message stressing
increased productivity they felt workers would understand, embrace, and respond to
over time. One suggested troopers felt there was a new level of scrutiny on their
activity that they really disliked, when in fact the participant noted no one was asking
them to do anything different than what they should have been doing all along. This
observation led them to re-craft their leadership message to explain: the enhanced
accountability standards; the positive performance measures; their purpose in helping
the agency make a difference in the communities they serve; and their linkages to a
trooper's daily TLE work. Others used similar techniques. These explanations
became especially important when the leaders tried to point to some tangible benefit
in the way of extra resources for all the additional work the S AFs demanded from the
staff. One leader summarized succinctly, ".. .honestly in the beginning I don't think
we had a whole lot of help or guidance in that and so I think everybody was kinda
doing it in a little different way." (IPs, 2, 3, 17, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 34)
Beyond these initial reactions the entire leadership of the WSP understood
successful change required the employees' recognition of their value. Of course, the
exact percentages of those resistant to these agency changes were unknown at the
time. Regardless, the entire leadership understood very early on how important it
was to discuss accomplishments as a means to reinforce successful work efforts and
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to stave back the dissenters among the ranks (IPs, 2, 7, 8, 9, 11, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25,
26, 28)
Early Action. The senior leaders discussed actions they undertook to
overcome their initial reactions and imperfect knowledge. Several described their
regular meetings with Chief Serpas, during which they learned more about his
experiences and thinking. Ultimately, these meetings became the means to close the
gap between their initial reactions and later responses. Reportedly, these meetings
clarified his intended direction, goal setting, SAF expectations, and rewarding of
good performance. There was also considerable discussion about special problems,
such as: working better with the Troopers' Association; compensating the underpaid
captains with a 2% raise, using existing resources; and holding SAF presenters
accountable by treating them respectfully, but, at the same time, asking them difficult
questions. The meetings also created a forum to negotiate feedback mechanisms,
which took form in more conversations and email check-ins. In other words, these
actions helped the executive staff build greater mutual respect. (IPs, 10, 11, 15)
Finally, another senior leader described how they worked through the early
performance metric ambiguity and the mindset shift necessary to succeed:
"So, we had discussions about it- you know what's the value of counting raw
numbers versus how do you assess quality and that meant more discussionsmore about outcomes... I think they were very focused on how.. .many of
this- how many of that... We weren't so focused on what's gonna sell what
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we do, so I think that was a change in mindset that was an early challenge in
the process." (IP, 12)
Early Successes. The executive staff interview participants reflected on a
number of general ADL implementation achievements. Several broadly described
these as involving: executive leadership setting the tone; creating knowledgeable
leaders; highlighting excellence by all staff; building teams through collaboration;
facilitating honest dialogue; solving problems immediately; creating positive risk
takers; and dealing with mixed reactions. (Serpas, 2003) One added they knew about
the entire agency due to SAF and the positive dialogue, teambuilding, and risk taking
it created among the agency leadership. One was complimentary about the
relationships that were built across districts, divisions, and bureaus, while a second
highlighted its contributions to better service provision. Another recognized the
commanders began to define what excellent performance looked like, based on the
data they produced. They also saw the value of immediate problem solving that
occurred through the iterative SAF process, as commanders raised issues, solutions
were identified, and implementation decisions were made on the spot. Both
successes regularly influenced the entire state in positive ways, as other district and
division commanders looked on, took notes, and made the necessary adjustments
within their own respective areas of responsibility. Finally, one participant assessed
the overall value of the SAF and one of its outcomes: "It's absolutely critical and, as
a result, I can talk with some level of depth about any division in the agency or
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any... district in the agency." Another asserted simply: "Chief Serpas gave the
accountability changes in the WSP traction." (IPs, 4, 11, 12, 15)
Stories ofADL Implementation Summary
Several noteworthy practical and theoretical themes arose from these initial
interview discussions. For example, the interviews highlighted the evolution of the
WSP as its agency leadership and personnel began to grapple with creating greater
public accountability. In turn, this transformation influenced the implementation of
ADL and the new SAFs throughout the agency. The interview participants were also
candid about some of the benefits and early limitations of ADL implementation in
the WSP. The latter included difficulties some participants had understanding what
was important and why, which caused them to exercise significant skepticism about
the changes, especially with respect to the utility of public presentations. These key
findings will help inform the project's practical principles discussed in greater detail
in later chapters.
These initial discussions also called attention to the critical need for a broader
leadership approach than the independent theories examined in the literature review.
The interview participants' own words, thoughts, and reflections about the
challenges surrounding this organizational change initiative offer important insights
about the interactions between WSP chief executives and agency personnel, the WSP
culture, employee motivation, and the contemporaneous management controls.
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Again, these observations will become especially important later on, when these
interview findings are used to create a more complex organizational change model.
ADL Implementation Strategies
The key informants were asked about ADL implementation strategies within
their own areas of responsibilities as well. Their responses are summarized below.
Successes
Each bureau commander and director was responsible for ADL
implementation strategies within their areas of responsibility. Two participants
believed each of their peers had made real attempts to sell the ideas to the next level
and beyond. However, one felt it became more difficult to sell the ideas all the way
to the front lines, because they thought some employees did not understand the
initiatives' intent, nor could they see any real benefit for themselves. (IPs, 4, 12)
The executive interview analyses reflected these attempts to implement ADL
throughout their districts and divisions, using carefully crafted leadership messages.
At least twelve leaders reflected on their exemplary employees within their areas of
responsibility. Several noted most employees just wanted to be told what their
command staff expected of them. One clarified by noting at the end of a workday,
most troopers wanted to know they did a good job and their sergeant was happy,
while another simply said most employees just wanted to please the boss. Another
felt most employees want to keep it simple and attempted to reinforce this
observation with a simple request: "I want you to stop cars with your discretionary
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time." They added those who want to learn more about ADL and SAFs may be the
ones to mentor for future leadership positions. In other words, the analyses were
done by the command staff, while the daily work contributions were asked of the
troopers. (IPs, 4, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 31, 32)
Several leaders stressed the importance of greater communication, within the
broader parameters of ADL implementation. One captain tried sending this message
of enhanced enforcement through the use of a visual analogy, by likening
enforcement blitz' to that of a beehive. In other words, they wanted motorists to take
notice and become more cautious around such activity, and for those that did not get
the message, they would get stung. Another tried to use teamwork as a means to
increase both the sense of fun and the friendly competition. Another utilized the data
to deploy troopers to problem areas and then to educate them about how their work
contributed to the larger success of the department. They felt this was invaluable in
creating useful solutions, ownership, accountability, responsibility, and future
leaders. Two others spoke about how the WTSC overtime funds allowed them to
target traffic safety emphasis patrols in areas with problems. Lastly, one leader began
to align desirable rewards, like the ability to help teach at the academy, with
performance. (IPs, 3, 4, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31)
Most leaders reinforced the change initiatives by discussing ADL

implementation with their personnel, leading supervisory meetings, attending
detachment meetings, and using awards. One reinforced these motivational

Washington State Patrol Change 160
discussions using simple truisms meant to keep the employees focused, such as:
"Just do something," reflecting the need to return to work in TLE (2002); "No
trooper left behind," calling attention to the fact that all troopers need to contribute to
district success (2003); "Sergeants are God," reflecting issues that arose within the
chain of command (2004). Another used similar meetings, but they felt obligated to
stress the entire job of a trooper: the core four, collision investigation, motorist
assistance, criminal interdiction, and terrorist apprehension. One executive realized
ADL implementation caused great stress at all levels of the organization, and it was
the discovery of these stressors in their own area that led to communicate relentlessly
about their performance expectations. Reportedly, this made a great difference, as
employees began to better understand what was expected, rather than simply acting
on rumor and speculation. Another suggested most troopers' activities improved,
which made it very easy to focus on those that did not rise to the challenge through
the use of job performance improvement plans. (IPs, 3, 14, 17, 19)
One executive spoke about the value in being able to demonstrate to
employees the differences they were making, as most were motivated to do the work
they had chosen, especially if they could see the value in it. Another leader felt SAFs
helped instill trust in their area of responsibility that translated into significant
political success with IT projects, building projects, and new employees. (IPs, 22,
26)
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Divisional SAFs
Later in his tenure, Chief Serpas insisted the bureaus incorporate divisional
SAFs into their leadership activities, which two senior executives reflected back on
during their interviews. One began a gradual introduction of bureau data into their
monthly manager meetings. At the same time, they began to ask the managers to
come prepared to discuss their own workgroup, section, and division work results.
The participant felt these lower level SAFs became far more interesting because the
presenters were the "ones who could make the changes" to affect overall
productivity. These presentations, discussions, and decisions were credited with
identifying backlogs and re-adjusting resources to help alleviate them. They saw
their role as reminding the managers to act by reinforcing the fact they had the ability
to manage, adjust, and control their resources, as issues began to emerge, in order to
better shape outcomes. Another viewed the use of such forums by their commanders
as a good indication of their involvement in the broader agency change initiatives.
They noted those who seemed to embrace the larger ADL tenets and SAF processes
ran very good local SAFs, while the contrarians had a tendency to refrain from
utilizing this local tool or they would run much poorer local SAFs. (IPs, 12, 13)
A third introduced more formal divisional SAFs, but recognized similar
positive benefits, as they felt the venues became opportunities for intensive

management interactions clear down to the supervisory level. They also added
individual executive meetings after the divisional SAFs, and began to see these
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sessions as intensive leadership opportunities. In their view, the freshness of the
performance data, the related discussions, and their follow-up notes helped guide
planning for future divisional directions and the SAF follow-up items for the
upcoming month. Interestingly, the participant concluded: "Had it not been
for.. .forced participation and that SAF process, it probably would not have
happened. It would have been very intermittent... I just found it extremely valuable."
Another participant highlighted a fundamental challenge with SAF, in that
sometimes monthly improvements proved elusive and felt such difficulties reflected
a disappointing loss of momentum. In response, they prompted leaders by asking
how they intended to frame their accomplishments and needs during the SAFs. In
doing so, the senior leader was trying to point the presenters back to their divisional
priorities, the strategic mission of the agency, and to public value. (IPs, 11, 15)
The executive interviews also highlighted the introduction of local SAFs.
One recalled then Deputy Chief Porter's insistence the districts implement local
SAFs as a means to drive the understanding down to the lieutenants, sergeants, and
troopers. Another felt the local weekly SAFs "took it to the next level," meaning
they became opportunities for the captain and lieutenant to meet weekly with district
sergeants to scrutinize weekly and monthly patrol area and detachment productivity.
Reportedly, the overriding question became: "Were troopers supporting the cause or
were we having continual performance issues?" If difficulties were identified, the
meetings provided a means to place "sergeants on notice." There was also great
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focus placed on collision (outcome) data. Special scrutiny was given to mid-month
and end of the month work contributions. Apparently, the former provided
opportunities to correct the deficiencies identified, while the latter allowed the
command staff to take the notes necessary for the upcoming SAF presentation in
Olympia. In this participant's view, the captain's expectations were made clear
during such meetings, regardless of a person's rank even if a poor performing
employee needed to be singled out. (IPs, 2, 14)
Another leader who participated in weekly SAFs in their district observed
greater communication between and among sergeants with performance measures.
They felt this opened communication about scheduling issues and detachment
relationships. Interestingly, they thought this improved communication underscored
the need for the command staff to spend more time with the troopers and sergeants
selling their message of total traffic law enforcement, so others' rumors could be
discredited. They responded by inviting more personnel to the local SAFs to help
improve communication, undercut intra-district rumors, and target TLE emphasis
funding. Several other leaders found similar results as they began meeting monthly
with their sergeants. At least three remembered circulating the SAF data among
their sergeants and asking them to share the district results with their troopers. They
hoped such measures would help build support for the performance measurement

system and cultivate a common culture of TLE service to the citizens. (IPs, 16, 19,
20, 25, 27)
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A later consultancy report summarized the efforts to establish local SAFs in
FOB:
"The Strategic Advancement Forum (SAF) process has been deployed in all
eight districts statewide with varying frequency. Two districts are conducting
them weekly, five are conducting them semi-monthly, and one is on a
monthly schedule due to geographic constraints. The data is rolled up from
the detachment and individual trooper level, thus providing a public forum
for accountability. Using the data, district commanders are able to focus
resources in a timely manner on areas where problems are occurring. They
also make decisions on what type of violations troopers should focus on. For
example, District 7 identified an increase in driving under the influence
violators and has focused trooper attention on recognizing and arresting
violators in that district" (Ewing et al., 2004, p. 21)
Other leaders also saw the utility in divisional SAFs. At least two used their
meetings as a means to help educate their employees on the difference they were
making and as a means to get them to buy into the process, especially in light of their
questions about why they ought to work harder. Another preferred workgroup SAFs,
so local employee issues and allocation problems could be addressed using existing
bureau resources. A fourth used these monthly meetings as a means to analyze data,
adjust resources, and alleviate production problems. Others utilized managers and
supervisors, but nearly all these leaders used these divisional presentations to create
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the bureau SAF presentation. A final leader consulted their operational specialists
about possible SAF topics and then sought their help to feature the agreed upon areas
of interest. (IPs, 21, 22, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33)
Another leader invited their statewide workforces to view their supervisors
presenting their divisional SAFs. They felt these opportunities highlighted divisional
direction and helped reinforce key expectations related to work quantity, quality, and
external scrutiny. (IP, 24)
Performance Measures
Attributes. The senior executive interviews clearly underscored the
importance of the performance measures and their ability to create changes. One
suggested their value in criminal investigations by noting that there would be no way
to highlight all the division's hard work without an ability to discuss case cycle times
and arrest rates. They noted, "You couldn't spin a story no matter how hard you
tried without the actual positive performance in those areas." Another spoke about
the backlogs in other parts of the agency and the ability to identify them, shift
resources, solve problems when possible, and justify additional personnel when
needed. A third suggested the performance measures functioned as the "pulse of
their customers," so by monitoring the former they were sure they were serving the
latter. A fourth felt the measures could become a "glass ceiling." They added their
insistence that the relentless follow-up had been the real key to avoiding these
artificial caps and their squelching of future productivity gains. (IPs, 8, 10, 11, 12)
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The district and division commanders reinforced many of these same themes.
Eight leaders spoke about the broad senior executive direction they were given as a
means to utilize their own executive discretion in creating their own performance
measures and influence discussion about their SAF presentations. At least six felt it
was critical to solicit input from first line supervisors about useful performance
measures in their areas of expertise. One asked supervisors how they would
showcase the good work their employees do on a daily basis. They found these
discussions often involved useful discussions about the measures, their purposes, and
why some were better than others. Their remarks led them to suggest it was about
acceptance, but it was also about ownership and they noted there is a key difference
there. Another spoke to their staff about possible presentation topics and then asked
their staff to help create those decided on. One other invited their statewide staffs to
participate in planning exercises as a means to enhance their strategic plan and
increase the utility of the performance measures. Finally, another found the metrics
were critical to their ability to understand their customer base, identify their
problems, and implement solutions to overcome these difficulties. (IPs, 4, 5, 13, 21,
23, 28, 29, 30, 33)
The leadership interviews also highlighted the relationship between
performance metrics and change. One used the metrics as a means to begin
important discussions about their leadership expectations and performance goal
setting within their areas of responsibility. A second suggested the performance
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measures in use provided a means for continuous process improvement. A third
preferred to steer clear of performance discussions, instead letting the lieutenants and
sergeants drive the measures in their operational areas. Another leader compared
performance measures in government to a consumer wanting to ensure they had
received something valuable for their purchase. They pointed to performance
measures as one means to convince taxpayers their area of responsibility had been
responsive with the taxpayer funds they had been given. Two added that the
information age allowed citizens instant access to their governmental representatives
and agencies, so it was critical to be able to instantly demonstrate accountability.
(IPs, 3, 4, 17, 25, 26)
One thought the TLE performance measures "changed the whole thing," as
they noted the transformation from the major focus on POP to its relegation as a
minor consideration within a much broader enforcement context. They added, "...
there was a clear correlation between what was expected of you under Serpas and
Porter- that those outputs were what we were going to use to measure our outcomes,
and it was a total commitment." The enduring focus these efforts engendered was
remembered by many participants. Two others suggested this mindset represented a
major cultural shift for the agency and its employees from concerns strictly focused
on quality toward work aimed at producing more desirable public safety outcomes.

(IPs, 2, 3, 16, 18,25,31)
One leader thoughtfully linked ADL implementation with accreditation
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standards. They noted:
"Well as it turns out Accountability Driven Leadership does the same thing;
in other words... the two seem like they're separate but when you look at it
in sort of a holistic way the fact that you maintain accreditation standards
puts you right into the arena of accountability and the fact that you have
accountability helps you maintain your accreditation standard, so you see it's
like.. .a two-way street... once you're met a standard, you have some
accountability there for maintaining that standard and if you maintain that
standard.. .you're gonna be transferring that notion of accountability to your
day to day operations... there's an accreditation standard that talks about the
delivery of services and are those services delivered in an appropriate manner
and part of that appropriate manner is doing the right things, but are you
doing enough of the right things? So, there's, a real synergy between
Accountability Driven Leadership and the accreditation programs that the
agency maintains and I think that's another reason why we're gonna see
ADL, continue to be a good management model for the foreseeable future.
(IP, 26)
One leader summarized: "If you don't know what your goals are, it's hard to
get there.. .We know where we want to go... but, if you don't have the numbers to

show you where you are, how do you know you're heading in the right direction."
(IP, 22)

Washington State Patrol Change 169
Challenges. Several leaders expressed great difficulty translating their broad
senior executive direction into a useable set of performance measures in their areas
of responsibility. At least four suggested it was very frustrating in the beginning
trying to figure out what to measure and how to track what was needed, especially
when there was not a lot benchmarks. One felt the direction had been very top down,
without much input from the operational staff. At least two called attention to the
fact performance measures and SAF presentations were not the only issues they had
to manage in their area of responsibility. (IPs, 5, 6, 21, 27, 28, 30)
Other leaders spoke about some of the challenges associated performance
measures. At least two cautioned care must be taken when deciding on performance
measures, as it can become easy to lose track of the broader vision. Another
observed it was easy to become overwhelmed in the beginning by wanting to
measure everything, rather than settling on a small number of the best performance
measures and their respective outcome indicators. A third felt some employees
adapted their work habits for their own gain and sometimes compromised quality
standards in relationship to the performance measures in use. Still others spoke
about the difficulties associated with statewide comparisons, especially related to
TLE standards. In other words, variances in population densities, traffic volumes,
and community expectations made rural and metropolitan work comparisons

impossible. Another agreed and suggested it was a bit unrealistic to make monthly
comparisons because there were so many variables in play. Several others spoke
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about using some flexibility, so initial measures could be adjusted if they proved to
be not all that useful. Others spoke about the need to rotate performance measures as
projects were completed and the need to enhance presentations to help educate others
about the division work responsibilities. (IPs, 16, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31,32,33,34)
At least four leaders called attention to the criticality of including qualitative
data with their SAFs, so their significant cases and projects could be explained in
further detail, including specific employee contributions. Others spoke about the
need to ensure quality standards were maintained, including work efforts aimed at
working with all stakeholders. At least two called attention to significant
interdependencies that made it difficult to take full credit or blame for certain
performance issues. Lastly, several others incorporated such information to call
attention to critical staffing shortages. (IPs, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34)
One leader felt many of these early performance measures represented the
"low hanging fruit," rather than using the data to ask more complex questions.
Another simply wondered if they did not just reflect the agency's ability to measure
more activities or to take credit for more work they had previously not recorded or
recorded poorly. (IPs, 18, 24)
Two leaders lamented the fact that many performance measures were

retrospective by nature. One added there was a great need to move toward predictive
analyses, where performance targets are identified, so the reviews can attempt to
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tease out what actions produced exemplary or poorer results. In short, this would
help improve their action planning and the commensurate organizational learning
related to these processes. (IPs, 13, 31)
Several interview participants recalled specific challenges related to
developing performance measures for criminal investigators. In fact, Chief Serpas,
by his own admission, had not made many inroads toward developing such metrics
in New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), nor did he believe NYPD had many
useful measures. Other leaders called attention to the fact investigative work
demanded quality case outcomes be balanced against case quantity. One participant
outlined a specific example related to narcotics investigations to illustrate some of
these concerns. Essentially, they mused about how to define appropriate
performance measures in light of some real performance realities: Team A, which
had produced a lot of lower-level drug dealer arrests; or Team B, which produced a
few mid- to higher-level drug suppliers. Others suggested there were continuing
leadership challenges defining case typologies priorities (simpler versus
complicated) and how best to measure critical teamwork activities. Reportedly,
success was finally achieved by involving the investigative sergeants in a dialogue
about meaningful performance metrics. From these discussions, average case cycle
time (the average time between a crime report and case filing) and prosecution rates

(the percentage of cases accepted by the prosecutor) were defined, implemented, and
monitored. (IPs, 7, 10, 13, 15, 21, 23, 24)
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Challenges
Several participants acknowledged their own discomfort with all the agency
change initiatives in the beginning and recognized that it took them about a year to
get comfortable with them. Many also recognized these same transitions in their
peers. For example, one executive came to understand the scrutiny of the data,
setting of performance measures, and outcome improvements were essential to the
success of the work divisions in their area of responsibility. Others reflected on
similar themes. In short, the changes moved them away from simple activity
measures and implemented measures designed to ensure they were improving both
their processes and outcomes. A second remembered adjusting their work activities
to compensate for these realities, they began to see the value in the processes.
Several other leaders spoke about similar transitions from early uncertainty to later
recognition this was the right path. (IPs, 2, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 34)
Beyond these personal difficulties, many of the executive interviews
identified significant leadership challenges within their areas of responsibility.
Several felt there had been significant failures in communication throughout the
agency as the change initiatives were undertaken. One suggested this may have
resulted from Chief Serpas' inability to spread his personal message regularly
throughout the expansive geographical area the WSP served. An executive realized
their monthly SAF attendance had helped clarify many of these issues in their own
mind, but they also recognized their staff had not had these opportunities. This
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realization led them on a personal quest to engage their employees through more
education about the agency goals and to involve their employees in goal setting. In
short, they understood any lasting performance gains would require employee buyin. Another leader recognized the need to communicate continually about the district
direction, ensure accountability standards were fair and uniformly applied, and
budgets maintained. The latter led them to decentralize uniform budgets to the
detachments, where they observed creativity took over with any equipment
expenditures savings. One tried to have two workgroups work together to help
improve the performance of one group, but it was not well received. (IPs, 2, 16, 17,
21,22)
Interestingly, several executives were critical of the District of the Quarter
Award. Many recognized its friendly intent in the beginning, but they were quick to
note the practical difficulties with comparing disparate districts. These discussions
often led them to speak further about distinctive demographics, seasonal population
changes, and daily traffic flows. Another felt it increased leadership cliques and
noted the challenge should not have been district against district, it should have been
to save lives. (IPs 16, 20, 25, 27, 34)
Another challenge mentioned by some participants concerned the regular
absences of executive staff members or key leadership personnel at SAFs.
Invariably, these personnel criticized these absences because there was an inability to
provide valuable information to these attendees or they were viewed as key decision
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makers for the briefing at hand. (IPs, 23, 29, 33)
Resistance
One senior executive reflected on the change process. They suggested wide
scale change in any large organization naturally involves supporters (about 20% of
employees), undecided employees (about 70%), and the change adverse (10% of
employees). An executive observed these same groups and respectively described
them as: people who "saw the future and saw it was the right thing to do; "fence
sitters" or those "mildly in opposition;" and those who were "set in their ways" and
whose "attitudes weren't gonna change, and retired." Both leaders thought the
contemporaneous challenge was to stop the change adverse from affecting the
undecided. (IPs, 8, 13)
Many interview participants also discussed how the tremendous changes in
TLE expectations played themselves throughout the agency. One senior executive
felt the FOB core mission was met with considerable resistance because it was
perceived to be drawing away from a more historical perception of a public service
agency. One executive likened ADL to trying to start a long train because there is a
lot of resistance in the beginning, but over time the initiative returned some
consideration of a fair day's work for a day's pay. Another leader thought the root
cause of the employee resistance to change was the result of years of very different,
unrealistically low, and unclear TLE performance standards in a lot of cases. One
other suggested the initiatives were resisted in the beginning because most troopers
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thought it was a "sprint to get the short-term activity up," and they could not see the
benefits. Interestingly, in retrospect, the participant believed there were widespread
failures by the district leadership to communicate the importance of positive outcome
measures as clearly to the operational level as was probably necessary to create the
necessary performance changes. (IPs 2, 11, 17)
Similar themes related to agency and local leadership communication failures
were posited by other leaders as well. Likewise, they identified these same
challenges at every leadership level- captain, lieutenant, and sergeant- as, in their
view, everyone was struggling both to understand the changes and to keep those they
were responsible for focused on the positive. One added that it was their belief that
this hyper-change created some real morale problems, some of which still plagued
the agency years later. In their view, the sergeants were key to the ultimate success
of the initiative because as time passed they were able to return the fun to the job by
using the new measures to create other desirable employee changes like schedule
changes. (IPs, 2, 3, 14, 17, 20, 28, 30)
At least eight spoke about the resistance in their employees. One suggested
50% of their troopers worked very hard and 50% were "wild west troopers," but the
leader was quick to link many poor troopers to the historically poor leadership they
had received from many supervisors and lieutenants. One heard many inaccurate
rumors about the process, which led them to manage through greater education about
the measures, information sharing, and the budgeting process. This process was
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endorsed by others as well. Another attempted to explain the difference the
employees were making and their involvement in the SAF process. At least three
suggested their personal meetings with employees in their areas of responsibility
helped sell the agency outcome goals, district leadership performance targets, and
reduced employee anxiety. One felt there were significant differences between the
official SAF messages and those spoken about by employees. Another tried to reallocate resources as a means to solve unique problems within their workgroups and
help breakdown some of the negative cultural elements that sometimes pitted one
workgroup against another. Finally, two suggested this resistance to organizational
change may be reflective of some of the difference in generational workers,
especially with the younger workers who seemed to favor more work-life balance
than their peers. (IPs, 3, 16, 17, 21, 22,24, 25,26, 28)
Once again, the entire leadership understood very early on how important it
was to discuss accomplishments as a means to reinforce successful work efforts and
to stave back the dissenters among the ranks. Time and again, leadership identified
TLE successes as the single greatest contravening force against employee resistance.
Similarly, when leaders took time to explain these successes, they became real
motivators and it built trust in the local leadership. Similar trends were discussed by
other participants as they identified successes with their respective staffs. (IPs, 2, 7,
8,9,11,17,18,20,22,25,26,28)
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Implementation Strategies Summary
The interview themes underscored the dedication each bureau, division, and
district commander had for implementing ADL within their respective areas of
responsibility. In doing so, it identified some of the practical vision, tools, and
challenges associated with this work. Once again, these themes highlighted both
practical lessons and theoretical concepts that will be important to revisit in later
chapters.
The Most Memorable Aspects of ADL Implementation
Additionally, the key informants were asked about the most memorable
aspects of ADL implementation in their areas of responsibility. Some of
participants' responses are summarized below.
Every key informant spoke about significant successes associated with ADL
implementation during this time period. Indeed, the executive staff interviews made
clear these executives understood the value associated with these changes very early
on, especially as the tangible results began to become apparent. In turn, every FOB
representative said productivity had increased in each patrol region within their
district and many spoke about the reduction in fatality and injury collisions. But,
much more will be said about these assertions in the next chapter.
SAF Successes

One senior executive called the new SAFs the "ideal leadership forum for the
executive staff." In their view, it offered the chief a perfect venue to help the bureau
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commanders communicate, direct, and guide the executive vision directly to the
district and division commanders. They then provided several examples of the
leadership styles they had witnessed: "pace-setting," involving both the delineation
of performance standards and commensurate deadlines; "coaching or affiliate style,"
stressing collaborative means to shape problem solving work with two bureaus;
"democratic style," while discussing a challenge; and "mentoring," emphasizing
executive vision to build greater camaraderie. Interestingly, the participant observed
what he described as purposeful behavior from both Chief Serpas and Porter. In
their view, both were trying to create productive tension, so the executive leadership
would not become complacent and unnecessarily jeopardize the safety of their
personnel or that of the public. As a result, the SAFs helped increase communication
and stave off "chief executive officer disease," or the lack of operational knowledge
that often occurs as individuals promote upwardly in an organization. Another added
the SAFs became a "powerful means to regain the cross-pollination of ideas"
between and among traditionally distinct work bureaus, divisions, and workgroups.
Still another felt they allowed for some expedient and "meaningful policy changes in
fiscal realignment or personnel issues." One senior executive staff member suggested
they could see both the executive team and their own bureau growing as a result of
the process. Lastly, another suggested the SAFs allowed good performance news to
be celebrated and lessons to be learned in ways that they would prevent them from
being repeated elsewhere. (IPs, 8, 10)
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At least two interview participants provided an example when they spoke
about all the written paycheck warrants BFS produced on a monthly basis, despite
the Office of Financial Management (OFM) request that financial sections attempt to
pay these warrants with electronic fund transfers (EFTs) instead. Unfortunately, the
WSP had never been able to solve the hand payment problem much beyond casual
conversations with BFS management and promises to try to do better. The
contemporaneous SAF data appears to reinforce these observations as the amount of
EFTs ranged between 20 -30% in late 2001 and 2002. Interestingly, the participants
credited ADL principles and the SAF process with improving EFT payments to 97%
once the causal factors were identified, targeted, and fixed over a series of months.
Reportedly, Chief Serpas also helped motivate the entire accounts payable staff by
providing each of them a chiefs coin.2 The net result was a commensurate reduction
in BFS personnel stress and overtime. The longer-term impact was an ability to readjust work assignments so other tasks did not fall behind, especially the prompt
payment of other vendors. (IPs, 11, 33)
However, several significant problems were discussed throughout the key
informant interviews. These included: employee impacts; public conflict; data
collection, analysis, and presentation; level of analysis; and unproductive employees.
Each will be discussed below.

2

A chiefs coin is a commemorative coin provided to an employee for their dedicated service beyond
their job description. It is accompanied by a short letter of personal thanks from the chief.
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Employee Impacts
One of the most recurrent interview themes concerned how ADL
implementation and the SAF processes impacted WSP employees. One senior
executive highlighted several concerns people vocalized in their chain of command:
Leaders were concerned on a regular basis that they were being pushed too hard, too
fast, and that people would be burned out. The participant remembered a lot of
pushback from what they described as "good people." Another recognized some
general loss of leadership perspective in the agency, as some worked to quantify all
work without the required level of leadership feeling or thought. Still another used a
similar observation as an introspective moment, during which time they suggested
that the executive team did not always do the best job balancing accountability with
personal recognition as they pushed for more and more productivity. They offered
an example of Chief Serpas visiting a geographical area to recognize its workgroups
for breaking a driving while under the influence (DUI) arrest record, but during his
remarks he asked the group how many more DUIs they intended to arrest next year.
Another interview participant suggested this occurred in 2003, and Chief Serpas had
in fact requested a 70% increase in the number of DUI arrests the next year. In the
view of both interview participants, Chief Serpas meant to challenge the workgroups
present at the award ceremony, but the message the employees received was one of
the chief never being satisfied. A third leader, who reflected on similar messaging
challenges, suggested both chiefs were attempting to challenge employees to do
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better. But, their remarks were not intended as a criticism of employees who had
done their best or what they had produced individually or collectively. A senior
executive summarized the earlier award ceremony events by suggesting employees
felt the reward had been reduced from a true "milestone," to just being a "marker."
(IPs, 8, 10, 12, 17, 19)
The principal researcher witnessed a similar response in another area of the
state, when the state's top performing trooper in DUI arrests was recognized. During
Chief Serpas' comments, he asked all the other trooper attendees in front of their
families at the holiday gathering what they had all been doing, if this one trooper
could arrest so many DUIs. Many of the troopers in attendance were personally
offended by such remarks, as most had worked collaboratively to support the efforts
of the trooper being recognized. In many ways, the honoree may have been the most
embarrassed, as he understood his "personal best performance" could not have been
achieved without the overwhelming support of his team members.
By all accounts the captains involved in both episodes were left to handle the
re-messaging. Reportedly, the ensuing employee dissatisfaction forced the executive
leadership to re-craft their message. So, they began to more cogently describe A, B,
and C troopers and focused on encouraging the poorer groups to improve their
performance as a means to improve their reputations and move into a better
performing group. (IPs, 17, 19, 34)
The leadership interviews echoed many of these themes. Two observed
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most employees wanted to the rise to the level of the leadership challenges, while
one recognized many in their area of responsibility became demoralized due to a lack
of clear executive direction. Several recognized their peers worried about increased
workloads, especially related to securing the resources necessary to allow them to
better assist other parts of the agency. (IPs, 21, 24, 27, 28, 30)
One leader recognized the increased focus on performance measures led
employees to perceive they had been de-valued. Another observed widespread worry
that employees were turning into machines where the primary concern was for
numbers and there was little or no care for people. One leader cogently suggested
the agency asked employees to do more and more and suggested it will never be
enough, so the employees began to feel the management was not concerned about
their stress levels. Another suggested the possible outcome was running the risk of
turning the employees against the management and alienating them so they did not
participate as fully as they could. (IPs, 19, 22, 24)
Several leaders reflected on these increased productivity expectations in light
of accelerating technologies and the need to continue to maintain staff proficiencies.
Others saw the availability of overtime did not necessarily help with these issues, as
employees began to over-work themselves and sacrifice their quality of lives as well.
Another remembered their employees conducting their own time commitment
survey, which was helpful in identifying all their clerical needs. (IPs, 22, 26, 28, 30)
At least two internal data sources may offer some insights about employee
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impacts during this time frame. These include the commissioned sick leave usage
data and employee exit interview data. Both will be considered briefly below.
Sick leave usage. The reported employee sick leave usage (medical
appointments, employee illness, family illness, and job injury) reveals mixed trends
before, during, and after the project's time frame, as depicted in Table 1.
Table 1
Washington State Patrol Sick Leave Usage Comparison 2002-20043
Position
Classification

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Commissioned
Personnel Leave

47,952

49,060

57,333

54,895

28,799

Civil Service
Personnel Leave

75,957

82,877

82,482

77,977

42,957

Total

123,909

131,937

139,815

132,872

71,756

As Table 1 depicts, commissioned personnel sick leave usage increased very
minimally during the first two years of ADL implementation and actually fell
marginally during the third year. The civilian leave increased somewhat in the first
year then leveled out during the second and also fell in the final year. (WSP Budget
and Fiscal Sick Leave Usage Report, 2008) As readers might imagine, some caution
is in order when reviewing these results because a variety of environmental factors
can influence their usage that extend well beyond the organizational climate.

3

Sick Leave totals rounded to nearest hour. Commercial Vehicle Division commissioned personnel
were not figured in the commissioned leave totals, due to computer programming limitations.
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However, the data does not seem to suggest there were major, immediate sick leave
usage impacts during this time frame.
WSP exit interviews. WSP employee exit interview data compiled by the
Human Resources Division (HRD) during this time period seems to suggest the
workplace demands may have taken their tolls on some employees. Although the
surveys utilize broad categorizations, the top two dislikes among those leaving the
agency, as reported in their exit interviews were: command staff and
schedule/impact on the family (11/37 (32%)- each reason, commissioned personnel)
and lack of leadership and inequality (7/45 (15%)- each reason, civil service
personnel). Some significant caution is in order when considering these HRD
findings for several reasons. First, the survey data extends beyond the study time
frame in order to produce large enough numbers for some distinctive analyses. It
should be noted that a radically different leadership philosophy has been in effect in
the WSP since 2005, so an inability to segregate these responses by year of departure
is very problematic. Second, WSP exit interviews involve all employees leaving the
agency, which is still a small sample size, and includes some who were or might
have been terminated. Third, this data says nothing about why employees choose to
stay employed with the agency. (WSP Exit Interviews data, 2008)
Public Conflict

A tangentially related theme, recurring across all interview participants, was
the widespread displeasure with the practice of chastising S AF presenters in a public
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forum. These conflicts underscored key differences between the executive
leaderships' intent and the commanders' perceptions.
The senior executive interviews repeatedly described Chief Serpas' strong
personality through such observations. One asserted that in the beginning it was not
easy for the executive leadership to discern exact expectations and a few presenters
did attempt to bluff their way through sometimes. Somewhat astonishingly, another
participant often felt presenters were being held highly accountable for results which
they "didn't have a lot of control." (IPs, 12, 15)
Meanwhile, another participant noted Chief Serpas' leadership style was
quite different from previous chiefs, as he was "very direct," "blunt," and unafraid to
"confront captains in a public, in front of their peers, especially when they did not
know their topic or have the correct data." In their view, Chief Serpas "wanted these
confrontations" as a means to get people on their games, so they knew their data, and
their presentations were thorough. In other words, the participants presented their
material confidently, rather than glossing over data hoping the Chief would not ask.
One noted:
"He was a very, very data driven guy and he could pick out those anomalies
that would indicate poor performance in your division, so that got our
captains thinking like the Chief... Well what's that doing? That's teaching
them to be the kinda leader that he was, as far as being able to look at data
and being able to immediately pick out an area of concern, where as before

Washington State Patrol Change 186
we just weren't that tuned in to what was going on in our divisions... Now
we're looking continually to improve performance and improve outcomes
because that was where the data was taking us. The Chief demanded that we
have performance measures that meant something, rather than just you know
counting things because they're easy to be counted" (IP, 15)
Another participant summarized Chief Serpas' general intentions: "He
believed very strongly that if you don't hold people accountable- if you don't define
your mission and then hold people accountable to their part of that mission- he really
believed that the mission wouldn't get accomplished. It was as simple as that." At
least one other participant made a similar connection. (IPs 11, 34)
Perhaps this organizational dissonance was the motivation for several senior
leaders' expressions of real concerns about the level of SAF conflict. One suggested,
"... people really were put on the spot and it wasn't comfortable a lot of the
time... Chief Serpas didn't always do a great job of.. .push[ing] people and
sometimes he pushed them a little too far I think..., rather than just
encouraging them to do better and pointing things out without embarrassing.
But, I think that somewhat tarnished the reputation of the process and made
people more weary of the process." (IP, 12)
Another asserted candidly: Chief Serpas could be "mean," an observation

they then used to suggest that such unfortunate incidents were "the other side" of all
the positive aspects of his change initiatives. Others highlighted his impatience as a
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frequent obstacle to greater progress over the longer-term. Another senior executive
acknowledged that occasionally a presenter "got bit," but such episodes helped the
chief "set the tone" and convinced others "they did not want to go there." In doing
so, they called attention to their belief "you educate your staff by what you tolerate."
For example, they remembered an acting captain who was allowing TLE outputs to
decline and outcomes to suffer, so the executive leader felt it was their responsibility
to use the forum as a training opportunity. (IPs, 6, 11, 13)
The executive interviews contained similar observations. One noted, Chief
Serpas did not really care if others liked what he was doing or not, and, as a result,
some of the early SAFs "turned a little volatile." Another suggested they saw
someone "lambasted" for failing to see a problem as an opportunity. In some
participants' view, these tactics were needed in the beginning to motivate some of
the older commanders to accept the changes. Another remembered a whole
confrontation about motorcycle troopers who were failing to produce. This led them
to observe the fear this sent through the remainder of presenters or other presenters
who may have been visiting. One succinctly summarized: "Ron Serpas-1 loved the
guy, but he left impression with all of us- you don't have your shit together, stand by,
you're not gonna like it." (IPs, 13, 14, 22, 23, 25)
Leadership reaction. Most participants said or strongly implied they did not
care to see their peers criticized in public. Several spoke about the stress involved
with: waiting to present; watching peers criticized, thinking you could be next; and
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beginning the roller coaster all over again for next month. Others reflected on the
differential treatment that occurred, especially when criticisms started and other
executive leaders "piled on," grandstanding occurred, or political posturing occurred.
(IPs, 14, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34) These observations led one
to comment: ".. .if you're close to the king, if he swings a sword, you've [got] less
chance of getting hit and I think a lot of that was going on." (IP, 31)
One suggested these conflicts occurred because commanders had been given
historical free rein to run their area of responsibility and presentation skills were not
stressed. One frequent attendee suggested the conflicts occurred as many as a couple
dozen times, and may have been a valuable tactic about four times. Several
suggested these conflicts were problematic, especially when these criticisms
occurred in front of the leader's staff and their peers. Another noted it became
tougher and tougher to go back in the face of such criticism, as sometimes it would
go horribly and other times alright leaving them thinking it was like a "Jekyll and
Hyde thing." Another felt these confrontations were "not conducive to our
organizational culture," and, as a result, needed to be tempered for the WSP. (IPs, 4,
18, 20, 21, 23, 28, 33) These observations led another to suggest:
"Well it's hard when you have a culture... that's been embraced for years and
years and years, and all of a sudden having somebody invade your country
and say the laws of your land are no longer valid here. These are the new
laws and if you don't obey these laws, you're life will be miserable or you'll
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begone." (IP, 25)
Personal toll. One participant suggested it was like a "gut wrench," waiting
for the level of questioning that occurred in the SAFs. Another likened these public
confrontations to putting the "leadership on trial," which they observed was not a
good leadership strategy considering the executive staff then needed these same
leaders' help to continue to create change within the agency at the end of the forum.
Still another said everyone "wanted to see who was going to get beat up today," or
their "head lopped off today." And, another suggested their peers began to lose
respect for their chief executives and executive staff after such confrontations.
Overall, they saw their workgroup become very frustrated as it seemed unclear what
the executive leadership really wanted to see in their presentation, which was a
theme echoed by at least five other participants. Another noted the executive staff
appeared to show little effort to listen to the leaderships' feedback about such things
like the speed of implementation, leadership suggestions, change proposals, or
frequency of presentations. Similar comments regularly called attention to the toll
such absolutist directions took on many relationships within the agency and the
unnecessary personal stress it caused. One observed simply the SAFs placed
"tremendous pressures on individuals," and sometimes they were unable to "rise to
the level of intensity and accountability" needed to be successful. (IPs, 10, 2 1 , 24,

25,27,29,30,31,34)
In reality, several commanders retired abruptly and at least one commander
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was demoted during these organizational changes. Referring to the latter, one senior
leader recognized the lack of understanding on the commander's part and the
miscommunication that existed between the commander and Chief Serpas. Another
senior leader observed the commander appeared unsure how to proceed and required
guidance beyond what other leaders required in a manner that negatively affected the
commander's ability to take appropriate risks. In their view, the commander's
replacement was able to make the necessary adjustments in these areas in order to
succeed. Regardless of perspective, these abrupt retirements and demotion sent fear
waves through the WSP, and, as readers have seen, several senior leaders worried
about their ability to fulfill Chief Serpas' expectations. (IPs, 10, 11)
The leadership interviews explicitly or implicitly addressed many concerns
related to this organizational climate of fear characterized by significant stress. Two
candidly stated a fear of the unknown was present from the beginning, exacerbated
by the lack of knowledge and understanding about the process, and fueled by a lack
of communication about expectations. In their view, all these feelings became much
worse when some of the "unplanned personnel moves" were made, and others began
to worry they may be next. Several other participants agreed by admitting candidly
they worried often what would happen to them if their personnel failed to produce
the desired productivity levels. Another suggested you had to be careful before you
spoke because when one person "gets their head bit off," the next one naturally
becomes reluctant to raise their hand. (IPs, 17, 21, 25, 27)
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Looking back, many executives blamed these pressures and how poorly they
were managed by all involved for needless amounts of stress at all levels. Another
felt the confrontation levels were unnecessary for creating change. At least two
suggested these rigid leadership styles led them to believe ADL's ultimate motivator
had been intimidation. Another suggested ADL implementation caused all kinds of
"fear, frustration, and anger." They did suggest the conflict subsided a bit over time.
In one's view, this was because the conflicts were criticized universally by agency
personnel. (IPs, 2, 3, 19, 21, 25, 31)
Professional response. Several leaders recognized some of their peers failing
to fully engage the SAF process over time. In their view, these presenters fulfilled
their presentation requirement, but they did not actively utilize the process or its
principles to actively identify, analyze, and solve issues in their areas of
responsibility. One suggested many commanders got tired of justifying their every
decision. In other words, these presenters tended "to go through the motions," or
dodge questions. Another noted their peer's enthusiastic support in public, but their
hatred of the process behind closed doors. (IPs, 18, 24, 31, 34)
Others suggested they could see this fear trickle down to supervisors within
their area of responsibility, as they often worried about being held accountable.
Another tried to mitigate some of the conflict by trying to pre-expose the executive
staff to some of the problems they intended to speak about during their SAF
presentation. They also understood they could manipulate the conflict in order to

Washington State Patrol Change 192
apply pressure to those employees, workgroups, and supervisors who were
performing poorly. (IPs, 21, 23, 25, 27)
Several others reported an opposite experience. They felt the leadership
within their greater area of responsibility had been patient, deliberate, very
participative, and had enlisted the help of the leadership during the transition,
utilized high levels of trust, but demanded accountability as well. In other words,
they thought the leader trusted their message would be reinforced and the appropriate
levels of productivity would be produced. Interestingly, one participant felt such
practices engendered greater buy-in throughout the work area and sustained longer
lasting results. (IPs, 2, 22, 26, 32, 33)
Data Collection
Beyond these personnel issues, ADL implementation and SAF recreations
were criticized by nearly all the interview participants because of all the difficulties
surrounding data collection, analysis, and presentation. Rene' Ewing and
Associates (2004) described the contemporaneous WSP data collection systems in
place.
"30% of the strategic plan performance measures are directly supported by IT
applications. 25% of the strategic plan performance measures are from
projects... 35% of strategic plan performance measures are supported with

manual processes. The WSP staff has done an excellent job of compiling
data through use of desktop tools like Excel and Access" (p. 13).
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The WSP project interview participants' concerns about data involved several
themes. At a minimum, these included issues related to comprehensiveness,
accuracy, data analysis, and automation.
Comprehensiveness. Some participants suggested it was difficult to know
exactly what data to collect in the beginning, as little guidance was provided and no
training given, but they knew there was a lot of workgroup data missing. Several felt
the lack of data was frustrating, especially when it was used to hold others
accountable. (IPs, 5, 6, 16, 21, 27, 29, 30, 31)
Meanwhile, others spoke about the tremendous staff time and teamwork
associated with preparing the monthly SAFs and understood the best preparation
rested in an ability to understand all the details. Almost without fail, these
participants spoke about the relentless pressures associated with producing accurate
and timely SAFs and the toll it took on their staffs, as there were many surrounding
issues such as: assembling the correct data, much of which required new processes
to accumulate or needed to be hand counted; answering all follow-up items; working
through issues that arose involving other areas of the agency; building a SAF
presentation, sometimes with very little guidance about presentation content;
preparing the presentation with its necessary background narrative; and finally
delivering the presentation. Many of these leaders remembered giving their
presentations and obtaining significant follow up requests, which led them return to
their offices and start working with their staffs to begin the whole process all over
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again. These responses made it clear this group of participants began to think about
SAF as "never more than 30 days away." At least two leaders lamented their
inability to capture the true essence of their projects, using existing data and/or
presentation formats. (IPs, 4, 14, 16, 17, 21, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34)
These observations led one to recognize the WSP was way behind collecting,
analyzing, and using data, and noted the agency had been using "historical
knowledge" instead. Two succinctly summarized several critical questions they kept
asking their staffs: Do we have the data? If not, how can we get it? How will we
keep it up? Over time, they saw processes become easier as front line staff was
invited to participate more and greater data collection, analysis, and presentation
responsibilities were devolved to frontline staff. Still, another felt better data
analyses were critical to allowing leaders to "paint a picture with the data" for the
operational staff. (IPs, 4, 5, 29)
Rene' Ewing and Associates (2004) were also concerned about these issues.
They noted significant manual data collection in FOB, the crime labs, and in criminal
investigations.
"Because much data is still being collected manually, the cost effectiveness
of the reporting requirements in terms of dollars and cents is uncertain.
There is no question, however, of the value added to the management
decision-making process provided by the current performance data and the
resulting efficiencies by having that data available in a timely manner" (p. 6).
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Accuracy. The interview participants were also concerned about data
accuracy. Others noted patrol districts hand counted items as a collection strategy or
as a means to double-check the data collected elsewhere. Finally, others spoke about
the roll the data played in reporting to the Legislature, where it was crucial to the
credibility of the agency. A specific example involved the analyses of traffic stop
data performed by Washington State University. During that work, the researchers
found that troopers were documenting searches of DUI defendants only 70% of their
arrests. When the results were released, it caused many on the executive staff to
wonder if the data were accurate. (IPs, 4, 8, 18, 24, 26, 27, 31, 34)
Taken together, these perspectives led Rene' Ewing and Associates to
suggest FOB: "Data integrity is highly dependent on trooper knowledge and
application of the correct codes." The team also noted this data becomes the
backbone of SAF and is provided to other federal agencies such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (crime statistics) and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) (traffic safety statistics) as well as state agencies like the
Washington State Department of Transportation and the Traffic Safety Commission
(collision data). These observations led the consultancy team to recommend:
".. .The Field Operations Bureau, needs to take a very proactive approach to
the TARs coding issue. Because of the agency's dependence on this data,
this issue needs to be given a high priority" (Ewing et al., 2004, p. 22/ 24).
Another suggested it was critical to ensure the accuracy of their statistics, and
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in doing so they sometimes found similar units counting work differently, which led
them to ensure training was consistent and everyone understood how to count similar
work alike. (IP, 22)
Data Analysis. Several executives suggested the most difficult challenge was
related to obtaining timely data. Many times this included financial information and
performance measures from Budget and Fiscal Services and their technical data
analysts that was delayed, especially in the beginning. (IPs, 13, 14, 21, 23, 27, 29,
34)
Others lamented the lack of true data analysts. Almost without fail, this
group suggested this was a skill base that was lacking in most parts of the agency.
Rene' Ewing and Associates (2004) also identified FOB data analysis capacity as
one difficulty with the SAF process in late 2004. (IPs, 4, 21, 23, 29) They noted:
"Data analysis appears to be done by headquarters staff while the data
collection is the responsibility of the field. As a result, data analysis skills
appear to be centered in Olympia. District managers also need to learn to use
these skills to manage more effectively using performance measures" (Rene
Ewing, 2004, p. 24)
Automation. Several leaders expressed concerns about data automation
limitations. A few suggested all FOB data should be generated automatically to

provide similar analyses, rather than compounding the collection and analysis
problems in every district. They noted there was only so much staff time, so if there
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was an expectation they spend time hand counting, tabulating, and re-checking data,
it removed more of their discretionary time for other activities. (IPs, 4, 16, 27, 29)
At least two others commented on the evolution of the data collection and
analysis that occurred. One remembered their use of collision pin maps in the
beginning and their redundant collection processes, so they could have faith in their
data presentation. All along they wanted better data they could trust more. Over
time, the quantity, quality, and volume of data surged almost like waves of data to
the point it became almost impossible to make sense of it all and to use it properly
toward the end. Another noted the initial SAF preparations were major executive
undertakings, especially in the absence of many performance data. But, over time,
the operational staff became more involved, which helped with data collection,
presentation, and institutionalizing the change processes. (IPs, 3, 5)
Another leader suggested the investigative measures suffered from a lack of
automation. They used an example of one unit tracking their cases using a
whiteboard. Meanwhile, efforts to establish a centralized case tracking system
stalled, which created serious concerns with SAF preparation and centralization,
access, and use of investigative information. (IP, 24)
The interview analyses clearly reflected frustrations felt by leaders whose
workgroups became the conduits for automated data collection. Reportedly, the
special report requests and technological enhancements came in furiously for about a
year or two after the initiation of ADL. Oftentimes, these special requests taxed
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these workgroups, current staffing models, and working relationships. (IPs, 6, 29, 30,
32, 33)
Renee Ewing and Associates (2004) concluded:
"WSP utilizes strong data-driven management practices. It is recognized as
one of the best in the nation. Without improvement in data collection and
data reporting processes, WSP will have difficulty retaining this leadership
position... The demand for better performance data creates an even greater
demand to allocate funding to meet the critical information technology needs
of the agency" (p. 13).
In sum, the interview participants described many, many, memorable aspects
of ADL implementation within their areas of responsibility. However, the
respondents also left little doubt about their very serious concerns related to some
significant problems caused by these change initiatives' impact on employee health,
public conflict, and data collection. Let us now shift focus to consider some of the
other memorable aspects of ADL implementation.
Level of Analysis
The SAF forums were criticized as some attendees pondered how much the
venues cost the taxpayers and how much time was invested each week by all
involved- presenters, reviewers, and visitors alike. Indeed, when an especially
accusatory call came in to the department's anonymous complaint line, it forced the
executive staff to reflect on their direction. One senior executive remembered Chief
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Serpas' steadfast insistence that this was the way to lead, despite the tremendous
amounts of time and resources involved. Another recalled their response as they
insisted this was the job of leadership and it was exactly the kind of meeting they
should be investing their time in and by extension the taxpayer's money in. Many
other participants were not quite as sure, as they wondered about the costs of these
endeavors (preparation, travel, and delivery) versus their perceived benefits. Others
questioned some of the presentation "evolutions," which seemed oftentimes to move
in a circular direction and end up right where they began. Still others recognized
attendance fell off dramatically at all the non-FOB SAFs and few commissioned
personnel were expected to attend these SAFs to learn about the other areas of the
agency. Another felt there had been little ADL or SAF had achieved in terms of
garnering additional resources for the agency, higher compensation for its
employees, or more care for its employees in their area of responsibility. Lastly, one
participant thought the SAFs introduced a definite morale problem because they
were a lot more work to assemble, but it was difficult to point to tangible gains for
all the effort. (IPs, 4, 11, 16, 23, 24, 29, 31, 33)
Time and again, many of executives expressed other serious concerns about
the SAFs as well. At least four equated the drive for fairly single-minded
performance measures as a tool to drive short-term productivity, while two others
observed the metrics proliferated over time, which they felt drew legitimate attention
away from more strategic thinking. Oftentimes, several noted this led them to focus
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on shorter-term issues without much regard for the broader vision, strategy, and
course. One worried this oversight could leave the agency unprepared for the longerterm challenges related to mission erosion, technology planning, budgetary cuts, and
radical cost cutting initiatives. In short, this group of participants questioned how
strategic the process had become and, instead, began to equate it with a means to
over- and micro-manage districts, divisions, workgroups, projects, and individuals.
Others were critical about the rigorous S AF preparation schedules and the
expectations significant organizational interdependencies could be made efficient
expeditiously. (IPs, 18, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 34)
At least two leaders suggested there were many factors that had reduced
traffic fatalities on Washington State highways, but they felt the agency tried to take
too much credit for a success that involved many more people. One suggested it was
important to look at the data in order to adjust agency tactics, rather than pursuing
the same activities and suggesting this data is driving a particular outcome. In sum,
their views led them to suggest a trooper's value far exceeded their production within
narrowly defined categories, such as the four core, so they were very conscientious
about trying to give some enthusiasm back to troopers who worked the complete job.
(IPs, 12,31)
Difficult/ Unproductive

Employees

Several executives spoke about how ADL implementation and the related
SAF processes allowed them to identify employees who failed to support the
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departmental mission. One observed ADL implementation required a huge cultural
shift, so they tried to do everything they could to communicate this within their area
of responsibility, in order to help cut problems off before they began. Another felt
closer scrutiny of district performance measures exposed those employees who
worked at the margins during their shifts and then worked a lot of overtime. (IPs, 16,
18)
Several executives used the existing organizational fear during this time to
motivate otherwise entrenched personnel within their work areas. Others noted some
troopers and workgroups worked steadfastly in geographical locations they did not
belong, increased their warning rates, and refused many times to comply with the
larger mission. They also recalled these employees failed to contribute to any new
work initiative undertaken by the remainder of the district. Other leaders spoke about
how ADL allowed them to identify some unproductive employees they may not have
otherwise been able to do. One felt this placed subtle peer pressure on poorer
performers, because nobody wanted to be embarrassed. (IPs, 2, 24, 25, 34)
These subcultures, difficult personalities, poor supervisors, and the union
entrenchment oftentimes called for more formal improvement measures such as job
performance improvement plans (JPIPs) and internal disciplinary investigations.
Another noted, a commander generally had 30 days to fix problems and demonstrate

progress. One captain spoke candidly about an employee placed on a JPIP, who just
barely fulfilled their work contract when their TLE plummeted the next month.
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They then met the trooper at the office, first thing on Thanksgiving Day, during
which time a candid exchange reportedly took place, in which the captain simply
asked the employee if they still wanted to be a trooper. When they responded
affirmatively, the captain directed them to improve their productivity immediately or
face further disciplinary action and likely termination. Another captain described
significant misconduct by employees who fought against greater performance
expectations and the ensuing problems with union entrenchment. (IPs, 2,16, 17, 25)
These vivid memories led some participants to speak about Chief Serpas'
leadership legacy in the WSP. Some of their views are reflected below.
Chief Serpas' Leadership Legacy
One senior executive offered their thoughts about Chief Serpas' legacy and
his desire to change the face of policing.
"Yeah, I think he had a deep desire to demonstrate that policing is more than
the reactive... heavy latent bureaucracy. I think he hated being associated
with [the] slow moving, reactive organization. So, I think... his legacy was
to be on the cutting edge of that [which] instills confidence in the public...
reacting to crime and collisions and so forth..." (IP, 10)
One executive offered their view of the change initiatives studied during the
project and their effectiveness, efficacy, and need:

"... I think what Serpas and Porter did had to be done. I think that for us to
accomplish what we needed to do and get people back to work they had to
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pitch the pendulum to the far extreme and really focus on that aspect of what
we wanted. I think it had to be done, but it's that tactic or philosophy if you
will, had a short shelf life and I think that, that tactic and philosophy may
have stuck around a little too long but in the beginning, but I absolutely think
it was the right thing to do." (IP, 13)
Others were far more critical. They suggested Chief Serpas' true motivation
had been to create massive change, essentially as a resume builder, with little regard
for the WSP employees involved. (IPs, 17, 21, 27, 31, 32)
The Most Memorable Aspects Summary
While the interview participants acknowledged some of ADL's successes,
many of them spoke in detail about several of the initiatives significant challenges,
including some serious negative employee impacts, the nature of public conflict, data
collection difficulties, and difficult and unproductive employees. Practically
speaking, many of these comments offer important clues for executive leaders about
how they must utilize change management tools, such as ADL and SAF, to influence
leaders, cultures, and individuals. At the same time, they offer poignant reminders
about the influence of such strategic management systems on the remaining
organizational factors explored throughout this project. With these observations in
mind, let us shift our focus to consider the longer-term impact of ADL
implementation in the WSP.
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The Longer-Term Impacts ofADL Implementation
Finally, the key informants were prompted to discuss the longer-term impacts
of ADL implementation. Their perspectives are presented below.
Successes
The interviews pointed out a number of successes described as having longerterm impacts. One participant suggested the executive staff had a better "mobile
picture" of the current activities of the organization. They also believed the
executive staff personalities worked well together, so they were at ease discussing
each bureau's performance and the managers involved in these activities. As a
result, they felt these discussions contributed to the overall success of the agency.
Others thought it was important for the leadership and agency to see their executive
staff on a regular, predictable basis. Two leaders felt the SAFs provided invaluable
opportunities to bring their divisional projects, challenges, and issues to the attention
of the executive staff, especially those with large costs and agency-wide impact.
Another spoke about some challenges within the Fleet Section, which was
responsible for managing the entire WSP fleet of vehicles, including their
acquisition, equipping, maintenance alternatives, fuel purchases, and rotation. Since
many of these activities were funded out of the same budgetary account, the senior
leader reflected on their use of the S AF to flesh out a model to illustrate how the
change in gas prices and increasing maintenance costs reduced the number of new
vehicles that could be purchased. This information and the subsequent discussions
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were then used to help create legislative requests aimed at improving the situation.
Finally, some of the respondents felt these opportunities helped them improve their
customer service. At the same time, it made them more aware of their productivity
and how they could benefit if they tracked this performance data. (IPs, 5, 11, 15, 24,
26, 27, 28, 30)
The district and division commander interviews also highlighted several
long-term successes. At least five suggested the change initiatives returned the focus
back to TLE and accountability, which was what the agency had always prided itself
on. Two added the changes focused troopers work efforts, while two others
suggested it established numerical expectations in patrol. Others highlighted better
partnerships with Department of Transportation and fire districts and the creation of
a perpetual focus on clearing roadways of collisions, debris, and emergency response
vehicles as quickly as possible. Some saw their local police chiefs asking more
questions about WSP management techniques and their more frequent visits to local
SAFs to observe the processes. Another highlighted many successes with other
traffic safety agencies like the Department of Licensing, Washington Traffic Safety
Commission. Still another saw the internal TLE accountability messages transitioned
into like messages for the public, in that the messages were sent loud and clear that
DUIs and aggressive drivers would be stopped and cited. (IPs, 1, 4, 14, 16, 17, 18,
20,31,34)
Another reflected on three clear successes: an increased ability to collect,
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analyze, and react to data; grooming of managers who understood how to use data;
and helping the agency understand overall mission in ways that allowed its
operations to grow, especially in fire protection, crime labs, and homeland security
initiatives. Two others saw additional employees become a budgeted reality. (IPs,
22, 26, 32)
Rene' Ewing and Associates credited Chief Serpas with "focusing" the SAF
process. They found he: "emphasized a total accountable management focus;
managers received strong questioning from Chief; moved to quarterly SAF meetings;
eventually to weekly; required data be collected and reported- no excuses; required
explanation of data; and initiated consistency of reporting" (p. 15).
Finally, Rene' Ewing and Associates credited Chief Porter with "refining"
the SAF process. They thought he: "fosters [a] culture where it is acceptable to take
risks; continues all of the above [Chief Sandberg/Serpas'] behaviors and values;
encourages interaction from peers and audience; and emphasizes this as the way
[the] WSP will be managed" (p. 15).
Leadership Development. Nearly all the senior executives believed the
change initiatives had improved the leadership competencies in the WSP, especially
at the district and division levels of the WSP. For example, one suggested they had
seen "dramatic improvements in the depth of knowledge of our captains and section
commanders and supervisors," and characterized such gains by "leaders knowing
their business and measuring their progress monthly in order to know if they were
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doing a good or bad job." Another felt the divisional SAFs invigorated personnel
right down to the line level in ways that allowed them to understand the process and
continue to improve, as they knew their performance would be scrutinized every
month. Still another described the SAF process as a "tremendous stage to succeed,"
as it forced leaders to take the initiative to get the job done and held them
accountable publically. "If you were on the top of your game, no better place to
be..." Two summed up by recognizing the SAF "iterations as an opportunity to help
cultivate leadership within the agency." One noted this would be critical in the
future to structure WSP services for an ever-increasingly educated and
knowledgeable citizenry. (IPs, 4, 8, 10, 15)
The executives also spoke about these leadership development gains. One
said the SAF process taught them to be prepared for the unexpected question, usually
about the performance details and oftentimes at the individual level. Additionally,
they often listened to SAF questions and thought about how they might answer a
particular question. Another suggested they tried to learn from senior leaders and
their mistakes. A third felt it taught WSP personnel to look for trends and patterns
and to respond accordingly. (IPs, 4, 16, 28)
In sum, one senior executive felt the ADL initiative was responsible for
transforming the agency from being "an average state police agency to being, if not
the best one, in the top three in the country." (IP, 15)
Evolution. The senior executives spoke about how the initiatives had
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changed over time. One senior executive observed that the "data collection and
presentation formats remained static," but they added the presentation content
changed over time because "there was too much data to cover in the allotted 20
minute time frame." They described the emphasis of the presentations as shifting
more toward detailed discussions of individual issues in the beginning, followed by
more generalized reviews with the remaining time allocation. Therefore, they sought
to improve their bureau performance by highlighting their: new projects, new
strategies, and the introduction of new technology. (IP, 12)
At least seven participants felt the SAFs changed over time as the presenters
better understood the process, expectations, and adjusted to presenting in such
environments. One felt a greater data "maturity level" was achieved, meaning
executives understood how to use data, identify success factors, and better manage
projects. Another described this as "data sophistication." One executive suggested
the initiatives did not change much during this time frame, but they saw some risk
taking increase. They also felt their creativity changed, so they were better able to
communicate with their employees and obtain the desired performance outcomes.
(IP, 16,19,20,24,28,29, 32, 33, 34)
One executive suggested the net result of the increased emphasis on TLE
efforts had been the raising of the performance bar in the agency, an inculcating of a

culture of performance, and the reinforcing of an expectation that troopers would
stop cars. Simply put, they suggested these changes had shifted the organizational
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culture in ways that were still producing greater productivity to this day and paying
dividends through reductions in fatalities and injury collisions as a result.
Additionally, they felt the newer troopers hired in recent years could not help but
raise the performance bar all that much higher. In their view, this would make the
agency results all that much greater over time, as the agency leveraged its earlier
successes. Others highlighted similar themes. (IPs, 2, 3, 17, 19, 20, 25)
Others were far more dubious. Three felt the initiatives had changed little
during the course of the project time frame. They also thought the agency leadership
was obligated to evolve the process in order to continue to build on its earlier
successes and to maximize its future utility. (IPs, 18, 24, 29)
Challenges
Two senior executives suggested the very integration of ADL with strategic
planning had been a fundamental challenge. One observed that oftentimes monthly
performance activities were adjusted to solve immediate problems, but that these
changes were difficult to relate back to larger strategic objectives and goals. They
suggested one means to improve this disconnection would be through the inclusion
of more qualitative measures as a means to supplement the quantitative performance
results. A second recognized district and division leaders were somewhat unwilling
to plan for the future and to update their plans. Consequently, they felt it was
necessary to have leaders review, refresh, and rewrite their plans on a more
predictable basis. Several leaders agreed wholeheartedly, as they saw a real
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disconnect between short-term measures and their division's inability to stop,
reassess, and think about where they were going in the long-term. In their view, it
was very concerning to over-focus on the short-term, with little or no scrutiny of the
longer-term. Another suggested this was proof the process was not collaborative, but
rather competitive. (IPs, 5, 6, 11, 12, 18, 29, 30, 31)
Agency change. Another executive staff member suggested the dynamic
nature of the world would create natural pressures to change SAF priorities over
time. Most others disagreed entirely and suggested this had become one of the most
difficult problems with the process. One thought the familiarity of the material made
it difficult to listen each month and to think as innovatively as they had at the
beginning of the process. Others suggested this lack of freshness was due to a lack
of movement in their measures or little discussion about a particular topic. Still
others felt the SAFs had become stale, so it was critical to keep the SAF fresh by reinvigorate the processes using "new, effective, and creative ways to champion the
cause." Lastly, another summarized by suggesting ADL had great value, but needed
to be analyzed from time to time to see if it had become destructive. They added:
"Sugar isn't a bad thing, but when you eat too much of it.. .bad things happen." (IPs,
8,10,11,12,15,20,29,34)
Momentum. Another senior executive cited momentum as being an issue,
especially as the average knowledge breath of the presenters increased so much. In
this view, there were not many useful questions left to ask. Such observations led
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the respondent to lament that the SAF process had not been on the leadership
calendar to discuss every six months, so continuous process improvements did not
occur. Closely related, two leaders suggested most of the easy problems had been
handled, leading them to observe the challenges would only become more difficult
from now on. Another observed that as performance levels rose, it became difficult
to sustain them year after year, while at least three others suggested this would
become even more difficult in the future. A final participant suggested sustainable
performance levels may be even harder to sustain given the increasing demand for
services and noted one time legislative fixes were not likely to work. (IPs, 2, 5, 11,
18, 20, 22, 26)
Four participants summarized. One suggested it would be difficult to
maintain the freshness and productive tension associated with the earliest SAFs over
time. Another felt it was difficult to design an exciting performance review system
that would inspire people all the time. A third simply stated, "Sustainability comes
down to keeping it fresh and changing it." Finally, the fourth prescribed updating
the performance review systems at least every two years, since the practices become
stale otherwise. (IPs, 11, 12, 13, 33)
Employee impacts. Several expressed concerns about employee impacts.
One felt troopers were put under increasing pressure to write tickets, which they felt
undermined the historical professionalism of the agency. In other words, quality
public contacts and compassion suffered, as discretion was minimized. Two others
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felt the struggle was to stress greater accountability without de-valuing employees,
which they believed would not allow the leader or the organization to be successful
in the long-term. Several felt more training would have been useful, especially at the
beginning, while another stressed the importance of two-way communication and
remaining positive. Another simply suggested they felt the whole initiative could
have been marketed much better through better descriptions of the plan, some
training, and its implementation goals. Another said they could not see how ADL or
SAF created any additional resources to the agency, greater compensation for
employees, or created more care for employees in their area of responsibility. One
was able to get additional positions, but had difficulties getting people hired, through
the requisite backgrounds, and trained according to a reasonable schedule. (IPs, 21,
22,24,26,27,28,31,34)
Technology. At least three participants suggested it was important to identify
the agency data needs and to put better systems in place ahead of these changes, so
WSP personnel weren't required to spend massive amounts of time hand-tabulating
information. Another reflected on the commonality of this dilemma, as they had
spoken to representatives from many other agencies who experienced the same angst
about their inability to collect their data easily, as they moved toward more
accountability. There were also concerns about what to measure and how to define
success. Finally, one other leader felt technological needs would continue to present
the greatest challenge moving forward. Also, they spoke about concerns related to
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the new workforce and their motivations. (IPs, 4, 15, 24, 27, 34)
Undoubtedly, many of these concerns were on the minds of Rene' Ewing and
Associates (2004) when they recommended: "The highly effective SAF process
involves a significant time commitment. It should continue to be reviewed regularly
to identify and implement improvements that increase its effectiveness and
efficiency" (p. 33).
Lessons Learned
As readers have seen, Chiefs Serpas and Porter credited ADL implementation
and the SAF recreations for the exemplary performance gains in the WSP between
2002 and 2004. The senior executive interviews reinforce these assertions as nearly
every participant was quick to suggest the processes had improved WSP
productivity.
Political environment. Several senior executives suggested the change
initiatives improved the WSP's public accountability. One felt the practices had
made the agency WSP more transparent and accountable. In turn, such changes
allowed the executive staff to demonstrate to legislators and key stakeholders that
they functioned well together and could make decisions to move the organization
forward. Another executive staff member suggested this was tantamount to basic
leadership, or the ability to demonstrate what was achieved for what was invested.
They suggested this was achieved through an ability to quantify work results in ways
that demonstrated improved, streamlined processes, and an ability to deploy
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resources effectively, efficiently, and accountably. In the end, SAF data was utilized
for many legislative reports, briefings, and special funding requests. (IPs, 10, 11)
The initiatives were credited with helping to instill confidence in the state's
legislators that the WSP was contributing public value and the agency was good
stewards of public funding investments. Indeed, several lawmakers attended the
forums and, reportedly, were "impressed with the level of questioning, the sense of
urgency, the results, and the professionalism of the district and division
commanders..." One reflected about how quickly communicating positive agency
news helped shape public, which in turn drove legislative action, especially funding.
Time and again, examples were cited about how agency performance data and the
SAF reviews were rolled up into legislative requests. These additional performance
measures were credited with greater political support, which was a point of view
echoed by many executives as well. (IPs, 4, 8, 11, 12, 14, 22, 26, 28, 32, 33)
Another senior executive spoke about then Attorney General Christine
Gregoire. Reportedly, she implemented a SAF process with the Attorney General's
office after watching a WSP SAF. Still others highlighted these early experiences as
the real motivations behind Governor Christine Gregoire's later implementation of
the GMAP across all state agencies after her election in 2004. (IPs, 4, 8, 15, 29, 32)
Rene' Ewing and Associates (2004) suggested another SAF success. "The
process [SAF] is receiving national attention from other state's law enforcement
agencies that have visited Olympia to observe the process" (p. 14). Other interview
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participants spoke about similar themes and called attention the national awards the
WSP had received in recent years. (IPs, 14, 15)
Change Process. One senior executive thought these change initiatives were
radical in nature and learning was restricted more or less to immediate application.
As such, the respondent saw the need to slow down long enough to emphasize more
teaching and learning, so followers could grown in their confidence with new
concepts and their application. Two others echoed these observations by suggesting
the need for much more mentorship during these significant organizational changes.
Finally, one felt such massive change initiatives have a useful life to re-orient the
agency and then they must be modified to re-focus personnel in a less intense way.
(IPs, 11, 13,21)
Other leaders reinforced these themes, as they offered ways they thought the
implementation could have been improved. One suggested most employees "strive
to do a really good job," but there is a natural learning curve with any agency
change, which must be overcome with greater communication, information, and
teaching. Several others concurred and prescribed much longer educational periods
at the beginning for all employees. Another felt looking back on this time period it
would have been important for everyone to relax a little more. Still another thought
the changes could have been marketed better. One concluded it was important that
leaders develop their institutional memory for about 5-6 biennia related to budget
documents, analyses, and organizational charts. They thought this provided adequate
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working knowledge to manage in the short-term, react to proposed changes, and plan
for the long-term. (IPs, 2, 3, 5, 21, 25, 26)
Performance measures. Several senior executives worried about the
proliferation of the "measurement mindset" fueled by the SAF process, or the
reasoning that if a little measurement was good, then more must be even better. One
felt such challenges could be held somewhat in check with two healthy doses of
questioning. The first focused on the questions narrowly related to how current
outputs and outcomes contributed to the divisional goals and the agency mission.
The second sought to discern the real difference a proposed measurement, data point,
or presentation would offer to public value. These "so what" questions were
designed to link all performance metrics to agency goals, in ways that maintained the
integrity of the performance measurement system and kept the SAFs meaningful,
manageable, and relevant. (IP, 11)
Two participants felt the trick was to create a good performance measure
system that improved service to the citizens of the state of Washington and to obtain
buy-in from the rank and file through training and greater communication. In other
words, both felt it was important the performance data be utilized to help educate
staff about their accomplishments. Another leader suggested the importance of
integrating performance expectations when purchasing new equipment. Perhaps the

best example was the new computer aided dispatch system procured during this time
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frame and placed into service. Its ability to gather, collate, and produce performance
data far surpassed its predecessor. (IPs, 4, 5, 21)
Employees. While several leaders acknowledged these agency gains, they
were also quick to highlight several difficulties associated with the change process,
as a means to suggest several important lessons learned. One leader suggested the
most important leadership initiative was to ensure we left the organization better than
we found it for the next generations of employees and the citizens of the state of
Washington. Another felt it was critical not to lose sight of the balance between
organizational productivity and care for our employees. Therefore, they thought it
was critical to reinforce employee value through ample training and they felt these
capacity building initiatives must be balanced against the strict pursuit of more
performance gains. One expanded on this point by calling attention to the scrutiny
the performance system engendered, both internally and externally. They observed
some of their employees now worrying about what would happen if results became
harder to achieve. (IPs, 2, 18, 19, 20, 22)
Two hoped the protracted change process would remind the agency
leadership that the agency's employees were the most important organizational asset
and they deserved much clearer direction, regardless of the change under way.
Another felt most of these changes could have been accomplished without such rigid
and less personalized leadership. Two concurred simply by suggesting it was
imperative the agency leadership not forget the human factor during such change
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initiatives. As they witnessed this occurring early in the process in their area of
responsibility, they articulated specific performance expectations, met with each
supervisor and trooper, and sold their message using practical examples, rather than
allowing others to speak for them. (IPs, 2, 3, 19)
In sum, these observations led one participant to conclude: ".. .it all revolves
around treating the employee with respect... and at any point in unveiling.. .this or
any other program or change, whether it's ADL or something else, if the employees
feel that they're not respected and valued... it's just not gonna succeed in the long
run." (IP, 24)
Beyond ADL. One leader felt in the future it would be important to "balance
the process," in a way that connects "what we did yesterday" with "what we want to
do tomorrow." They thought it would be important to avoid becoming overwhelmed
in the myriad of information simply because it could be measured. Another
suggested it was important to train frontline staff continually while making such
changes. Finally, a senior executive was proud of the WSP achievements, but also
began to look forward. In their view, the next evolution of SAF should include
sending agency personnel to see other state performance systems in order to discern
if there were better ways to measure work activities that could help improve the
WSP processes. (IPs, 3, 15, 28)
The Longer-Term Impacts Summary
These interview responses highlighted the need for leaders to remain
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attentive to the longer-term needs of their organizations, even though ADL
implementation focused primarily on short- and intermediate-term performance
measures. In doing so, they also call attention to the fact that the initiatives evolved
over time, yet the leadership approaches were perceived oftentimes by the interview
participants to be frozen. Both observations have important implications for later
discussions related to the practical contributions of the project as well as its
theoretical findings.
With these interview findings in mind, let us pause to consider some of the
successes and challenges described by the interview participants in light of the
contemporaneous performance results. The next chapter will focus on some of this
data and several, key, external reviews.

CHAPTER SIX
Performance Document Reviews
While examining Accountability Driven Leadership (ADL) implementation
in the Washington State Patrol (WSP), the principal researcher located both internal
performance documentation and several major reviews completed by external
organizations. The former reinforced many of the major interview themes, while the
latter provided independent analyses about various aspects of WSP operations.
Therefore, the chapter begins by considering two broad reviews conducted by
external entities, as a means to establish the context for the more detailed
examinations of specific bureau accomplishments. It concludes by summarizing the
content of both the external evaluations and internal reviews.
Rene' Ewing and Associates
In 2004, the Washington State Legislative Committee's Transportation
Performance Audit Board requested the WSP answer nine questions about its
performance and outcome measures. Rene' Ewing and Associates (2004) conducted
a study of WSP performance metrics between September and December 2004, using
a variety of document reviews, interviewing 35 key legislative, agency, and other
agency personnel, and attending a number of strategic advancement forums (SAF)
sessions.

The consultants used five states for agency comparisons- Arizona, Missouri,
Ohio, Virginia, and Texas. They evaluated performance measures based on their
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type (activity, output, and outcome) and their criteria (attributable, well-defined,
timely, reliable, comparable, and verifiable aspects). Therefore, let us pause to
consider some general WSP accomplishments in light of the consultants' findings.
WSP Strategic Plan. The consultants compared the WSP Strategic Plan to
the other agency plans. In doing so, they suggested the WSP planning process began
with the agency's executive staff, who considered the organizational mission, as they
outlined agency goals and objectives. Additionally, they found the WSP had begun
its strategic planning process before any of the other agencies, the agency had been
implemented its content throughout all organizational bureaus, and the strategic plan
was updated yearly.
Performance Metrics. Similarly, the consultancy team found the WSP
Strategic Plan served as the model for each district and division plan. They felt this
alignment led to the creation and use of congruent performance measures down to
the operational levels of the agency. Additionally, their review suggested the agency
action plans contained benchmarks, targets, and trends, which were updated monthly
during SAFs and revisited yearly. Lastly, the team noted regular WSP data
collection, analysis, and presentation allowed the agency leadership to make timely
decisions related to: re-organizing; eliminating work backlogs; changing processes;
developing personnel; managing projects; and budgeting.
Accountability. The consultants also examined the performance review
processes in each state law enforcement agency. They found the WSP utilized
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weekly departmental SAFs to review strategic performance and local SAFs in many
areas, as the project interviews revealed. The team concluded:
"All of the states have some level of strategic plan and some broad agency
goals. Where they differ with [the] WSP is the extent to which [the] WSP
analyzes and uses the performance measures in making management
decisions. Clearly [the] WSP is considered by the other states as the
benchmark in the use of performance measures" (Ewing et al., 2004, p. 10).
In sum, the consultant team's review of WSP performance metrics and SAF
practices acknowledged several agency strengths, which included: "SAF process,
data analysis, budget focus, management culture, focus on results, updated measures,
alignment, agility, communications" (p. 17). However, they also listed several areas
for improvement, which included a need to work to/on: "automate data collection,
TARs coding issues, [lacking] data analysis skills, [additional] citizen feedback, and
systematic review of measures" (p. 18).
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (GALEA) Accreditation
Readers may recall the WSP has been a fully accredited state law
enforcement agency since 1992, and remained so throughout the time period of this
case study. In fact, many of the current 445 CALEA benchmarks relate to
operational data collection, analysis, and utilization in order to further agency goals,

objectives, crime analysis, and personnel allocation. Rene' Ewing and Associates
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(2004) noted the following about WSP CALEA adherence during their performance
assessment:
"In December 2003, the CALEA assessment team described [the] WSP as an
agency that 'exemplifies the philosophy and intent of accreditation, and is a
leader in the profession.' They evaluated the WSP's strategic planning and
performance measurement processes as exceeding CALEA standards" (p. 8).
These general reviews reflected positively on WSP operations. With this in
mind, let us shift focus to consider ADL implementation in greater detail through
examination of some of the major internal performance results.
ADL Implementation Successes
Every key informant spoke about significant successes associated with ADL
implementation during the project's time frame. And, Rene' Ewing and Associates'
(2004) general findings were informative as well as the WSP's continued CALEA
compliance. But, many questions remain about the WSP's actual work actitivities
and results. Therefore, some of the more notable bureau accomplishments are
summarized below.
Field Operations Bureau (FOB)
The Serpas administration had to be pleased with the traffic law enforcement
(TLE) course correction put into place during the Sandberg administration. Yet, as
we have seen, the executive leadership interviews reflected a time of great
uncertainty followed by a time of great discussion, debate, and planning about future
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organizational performance measurement. The principal concern was the higher
activity levels did not necessarily mean this work had been targeted to maximize its
effect.
As noted earlier, the FOB performance measures and the SAF process were
driven by the desire to reduce fatality and injury collisions through the focus on the
core four traffic law enforcement activities described earlier. One senior executive
noted these work activities were chosen because National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration studies indicated the vast majority of collisions were caused by
preventable driver behavior. Meanwhile, many FOB leaders believed the TLE
emphasis on the four core helped shift the fatality curve downward in their areas of
responsibility. One recalled the increases in productivity also positively influenced
criminal interdiction rates as well. (IPs, 2, 8)
The TLE efforts during this time period are worth re-considering in light of
the earlier TLE categorical data, using: Washington State population data; the 2007
WSP 20-year Historical Overview Trooper Traffic Contacts, Collision
Investigations, and Arrest data; and other relevant validation information. The latter
includes several external reviews designed to examine citizen satisfaction and officer
discretion during TLE activities.
Demographics. Washington State population estimates continued to grow
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during the project time frame: 2002: 6,098,300'; 2003: 6,167,800; and 2004:
6,256,400. Meanwhile, the total number of FOB line staff remained fairly stable
during this same time period: 2002: 676; 2003: 675 (-0.1%); and 2004: 671 (-0.6%).
Finally, the average number of line troopers fell somewhat when compared to the
estimated number of residents, as there was only one line trooper for every 9,021
residents in 2002; 9,137 residents in 2003; and 9,323 residents in 2004. (WA OFM,
2007; WSP 20-year Data, 2007, p. 4) At the same time, the annual vehicle miles
travelled by state residents grew and then leveled out: 2002: 31,486,066,000 miles
(2.7%); 2003: 31,663,709,400 (0.6%); and 2004: 3,557,255,300 (-0.3%).
(Washington State Department of Transportation, 2007) Regardless, the FOB
force's success became especially apparent when compared to the 20-year historical
trends, which will be described in greater detail below.
Total violator contacts. Total violator contacts ranged from 1,442,087 to
1,478,540, or 2,133 contacts per FOB line trooper in 2002, and 2,203 contacts per
FOB line trooper in 2004. Interestingly, the highest productivity occurred in 2003,
with 1,505,682 total violator contacts or 2,230 violators per FOB line trooper.
Perhaps most noteworthy, these consecutive, three year, violator contact totals
exceeded any three year period in last 20 years of performance data.
Core traffic law enforcement activity. The driving while under the influence

1

Washington State Office of Financial Management Data publishes yearly population numbers using
April 1st estimates. Consequently, each succeeding year was used as a rough estimate for the
December 31 st data.
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(DUI) arrest, aggressive driving apprehension, and speed citations all pointed to
important turnarounds during this time period. These work results are summarized
in Table 2.
Table 2
Washington State Patrol Core Traffic Law Enforcement Results 2002-2004

2002

Citations
perFOB
Trooper

Driving Under the Influence

18,513

Aggressive Driving

Work Activity

Speed

2003

Citations
per FOB
Trooper

2004

Citations
per FOB
Trooper

27

22,578

33

23,338

35

6,339

9

6,555

10

7,048

11

236,584

350

249,131

369

228,154

340

Rene' Ewing and Associates (2004) reviewed WSP DUI, aggressive driving,
and speed performance data and concluded: "Data demonstrates results of increased
emphasis. No national comparison data was found" (p. 11).
Seatbelt infractions. In 2002, Washington State enacted a primary seatbelt
law, meaning a law enforcement officer could use an occupant's failure to wear their
seatbelt as a reason to initiate a traffic stop. (Salzberg & Moffat, 2003; Ursino &
VanDyk, 2008) During Chief Serpas' administration, both the number of statewide
seatbelt infractions and average number of infractions per FOB trooper surged, while
these trends fell back somewhat during the Porter administration. Both trends are
depicted in Table 3.
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Table 3

Washington State Patrol Seatbelt Enforcement Results 2002-2004

Work Activity

Seatbelts

2002

Citations
per FOB
Trooper

69,521

103

2003

Citations
per FOB
Trooper

2004

Citations
per FOB
Trooper

84,889

126

70,439

105

At the same time, the Washington Traffic Safety Commission's (WTSC)
research data suggested seatbelt compliance remained very high: 91% (June, 2002);
93% (September, 2002); 95% (July, 2003); 94% (July, 2004); and 95% (June, 2005).
(Doane & Thurston, 2007) Finally, Rene' Ewing and Associates (2004) also
reviewed this performance data and noted:
"Washington ranked #1 in usage and highest in reduction in nonuse between
2001 and 2002.2 On November 23, 2004, the National [Highway] Traffic
Safety Administration announced th[at] Washington State ranked #2 behind
Hawaii in seat belt usage based on their study." 3
Collisions. Washington State's fatality rate on interstate and state highways
continued to fall during the project time frame, from 1.10 deaths per hundred million
miles driven to 1.04 deaths (-5%) in 2002. The fatality rate then fell to historically
unprecedented levels, first to .93 deaths (-10%) in 2003, and finally to .89 deaths (Rene Ewing & Associates quoting U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, "Research Note, Safety Belt Use in 2002- Use Rates in the States and
Territories," published by National Center for Statistics and Analysis, May 2003.
3
Rene Ewing & Associates quoting U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, New Bulletin, "New Data Show Rising Safety Belt Use Rates in Most States,"
November 23, 2004.
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4%) per hundred million miles driven in 2004.
The number of WSP investigated injury collisions also showed signs of
improvement, as they fell from 12,711 in 2001, to 11,021 (-13%) in 2002, and
10,114 (-8) in 2003. WSP investigated injury collisions grew somewhat to 10,176
(.6%) in 2004.
Chiefs Serpas and Porter continually tried to articulate a clear linkage
between WSP enforcement activities and their outcomes. These TLE gains were on
the minds of several senior executives during their interviews. One suggested that
SAF could not be the entire cause for the increases in productivity per trooper and
the reduction in traffic fatalities over the course of several years, but they did not feel
it was all just coincidental. A second credited the initiatives with driving down the
number of traffic fatalities in 2004, to the lowest they had been since 1961. Another
executive echoed these themes when they simply suggested: "quite frankly- you
know in terms of FOB, which is the largest part of the agency, we got back to work."
Another spoke about this same observation. (IPs, 4, 8, 11, 134)
Reportedly, these TLE performance gains and their positive outcome
influences were responsible for reversing the legislative skepticism described earlier.
Readers may recall the earlier senior executive anecdote about participating in a
meeting with Chief Serpas and a legislator who had lost his confidence in the
budgetary management practices of the WSP. The story concluded with a dramatic
4

The interview participants (IP) will be referred to by number, which has been scrambled, placed in
ascending order, and grouped where possible to protect their anonymity.
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shift in tenor, as Chief Serpas produced a briefing sheet detailing the first 9 months
of ADL implementation for the legislator, who then reportedly reviewed it and said:
"You know chief, that's a good story... I'm one of your advocates." (IP, 8)
These collision reductions were also evident to Rene' Ewing and Associates
(2004) and led them to conclude:
"National average in traffic fatalities from 2002 to 2003 was - 1 % . WA was
-9% compared to neighboring states for example of OR +17%, CA +3% and
ID +11%.

Reduction in collisions is in direct correlation to the increase

enforcement against aggressive driving, DUI, seat belt, and excessive speed"
(p. 12).
However, great caution is in order here. It would far too premature to
suggest a correlative relationship between WSP TLE activities and Washington State
collision reductions without far more extensive quantitative analyses.
One of the most noteworthy project findings was the sheer number of
achievements located during the document reviews and discussed by the interview
participants. A few of these achievements have been listed below, as derived from
SAF data, unless otherwise noted.
A. Troopers trained as drug recognition experts continued to make DUI
arrests for several drug categories that impair driving ability. Their
arrests included: 2002: 553; 2003: 746 (35%); and 2004: 820 (10%).

Data quoted by Rene' Ewing & Associates from the U.S. Department of Transportation, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts, Early Edition.
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Additionally, their confirmation rates through blood testing remained
very high during the same time frame, or 90%, 90%, and 85%,
respectively.
B. While on patrol, troopers produced a variety of criminal arrests to
include: 2002: 67,5786; 2003: 68,476; 2004: 57,314.
C. Troopers continued to provide roadside assistance to motorists whose
vehicles had become disabled: 2002: 162,787; 2003: 139,323; and 2004:
128/7137
D. WSP warrant team members arrested 4,932 individuals for outstanding
warrants with bail amounts in excess of 17 million dollars in three years.
E. Troopers provided a variety of community safety presentations to include:
2002: 2,7298; 2003: 525; and 2004: 600.
F. The WSP secured Washington State Traffic Safety grant funding to fund
overtime traffic emphasis patrols9: 2002: $1,205,000; 2003: $2,310,000;
and 2004: $1,700,000.
In February 2003, the WSP began its "El Protector" program in Benton,
Franklin, and Walla Walla counties. "The program places emphasis on people with
limited English-speaking abilities... [It] provides public education through dialogue
with the Hispanic/ Latino community, instead of focusing specifically on
6

WSP Budget & Fiscal Services (BFS) Time &Activity Report (TAR) data, February 27, 2008 email.
Washington State Department of Transportation Incident Response Team (IRT) began motorist
assistance patrols in 2002. (February 28, 2008 email) The IRT contact numbers are not included here.
8
WSP BFS TAR data, February 27, 2008 email.
9
Budgetary appropriations rounded to the nearest $5,000.
7
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enforcement measures." (WSP El Protector Annual Report, 2005, p. 2) Among its
positive outcomes, the program has helped reduce the number and severity of traffic
fatalities in these areas, as the Table 4 indicates.
Table 4

Washington State Patrol "El Protector" Program 2002-2005

Year

Total
Hispanic
Total
Hispanic
Total
No
Total Fatal Total DUI-related
DUI
Felony
Felony Seatbelt Deaths in
Collisions Fatal Collisions Involved Collisions Collisions Usage Collisions

2002

20

12

9

4

4

11

26

2003

12

5

2

0

0

3

12

2004

14

9

4

4

1

0

14

2005

8

2-drugs
1-alcohol

2-drugs

1

0

2

9

In summary, the FOB performance between 2002 and 2004, offered one area
where the Serpas and Porter administrations appeared to have influenced the work of
agency employees in furtherance of organizational goals. In other words, FOB
troopers achieved significant gains in core TLE activities as outlined above and,
arguably, contributed to reducing both fatality and injury collision statistics.
Forensic Laboratory Services Bureau (FLSB)
"The FLSB was created in 1999, and is the administrative headquarters of the
Toxicology Laboratory and Crime Laboratory Divisions as well as the Impaired
Driving Section, which is made up of the Breath Test and Drug Recognition Expert
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Programs..." (WSP Intranet, 2008) Some of the most compelling evidence about the
positive impacts of ADL implementation and SAF recreations emerged from a
review of crime lab data during the study period. The data presentations included:
A.

Toxicology cases completed increased: 2002: 7,675 (8%); 2003: 8,490
(11%); and 2004: 9,135 (8%). Average case cycle times edged higher
during the same time frame, or 11.1, 12.1 (9%), and 12.6 (4%) days,
respectively.

B.

Crime scene responses remained steady for the three year period, or
107, 104, and 124, respectively.

C.

Controlled substances analyses completed grew: 2002: 13,057; 2003:
13,114 (.4%); and 2004: 13,208 (.7%). Average case cycle time were
also mixed during these years, or 38, 35 (-8%), and 46 (31%) days,
respectively.

D.

Completed microanalysis cases remained steady: 2002: 307; 2003:
351; and 2004: 331. Average case cycle times were also mixed, or 143,
164 (14%), and 140 days (-15%), respectively.

E.

Firearms analyses completed remained high: 2002: 929; 2003: 777
(-16%); and 2004: 822 (6%). The average case cycle times fluctuated
slightly, or 40, 44 (10%), and 43 days (-2.3), respectively.

F.

Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) STR casework completed surged: 2002:
990; 2003: 1,174 (19%); and 1,661 (42%). Average case cycle times
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included 152, 153 (.7%), and 114 days (-26%), respectively.
G.

Latent fingerprint searches also remained high during this period: 2002:
915; 2003: 1,339 (46%); and 2004: 1,034 (-23%). The number of
positive identifications remained high during this time frame, or 141,
178, and 156 identifications respectively.

Beginning in mid-1990s, Washington State law mandated convicted felons
who had committed certain criminal offenses were required to submit to DNA
testing. The WSP Crime Laboratory became the central repository for these
samples, analyses, and cataloguing. In 2003 alone, the database produced 94 hits,
meaning a DNA sample in the database allowed for the identification of a criminal
wanted in a pending case. In many cases, these analyses allowed criminal justice
professionals to charge recidivist criminals for crimes that otherwise may have been
difficult or impossible to connect them to. One interview participant spoke in some
detail about some of these cases. In particular, Seattle Police Department (SPD)
detectives re-examined 40 cold cases, of which they were able to solve 28 (70%),
due to the massive technology advances in DNA testing that had occurred in the
interim. One involved the tragic killing of a prostitute, whose case had not been
solved previously due to the exhausting of all investigative leads. Another involved
the rape and murder of an SPD officer's pregnant wife. Apparently, the much more
recent DNA testing revealed the officer had nothing to do with the death of his wife
many years before. (IP, 22)
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Bullet casings were continuing to be catalogued during the project time frame
as well, and included: 2002: 4,921; 2003: (36%); 6,698; and 2004: 4,570 cases
(-32%). Meanwhile, the hits from the system surged from 30 in 2002, to 79 in 2003,
and 95 in 2004. This means the casings in the database allowed investigators greater
information about the weapons used in a particular crime and/or to match a weapon
and its casings to an unsolved case.
The FLSB SAF data was interesting because the quantitative performance
metrics were important for telling the overall work productivity story of crime lab
personnel, especially given the scientific advances in this highly technical work, the
victims involved, and the violent crime cases. But, these observations also created
the catalyst to include more qualitative descriptive data in the SAF presentations to
highlight the efforts of those employees who helped solve significant cases, testified
in court, or contributed other important achievements.
The project findings also revealed several important themes related to the
FLSB, which included: concerns about staff capacities including training, validating
technology, and quality controls related to new scientific technology; dramatic
surges in DNA processing technology; cold case hits using felon DNA database; and
corrective action reports aimed at improving lab functioning to name a few.
Regardless of these challenges, the project clearly underscored the fact the FLSB
may have been the single most effective WSP bureau in its ability to translate its
performance metrics into the political support necessary to secure funding to build

Washington State Patrol Change 235
and staff the Vancouver and Spokane crime labs. (IPs, 12, 22, 26)
After reviewing the FLSB's performance metrics, Rene' Ewing and
Associates (2004) made several noteworthy observations:
"The Crime Laboratories have been nationally accredited by the American
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors since 1984... The Labs have a
comprehensive, data rich environment. The scientists and managers running
the Labs are comfortable using data to draw conclusions and make decisions.
The Labs' data is tested often for validity and reliability using a variety of
methods... Lab Managers use measures to monitor performance at both the
strategic and operational levels. Most measures are at the operational level
and allow managers to monitor use of resources, cycle times, and budget.
The Forensic Labs hold monthly divisional SAF meetings. From those
monthly detailed meetings, only key performance measures are presented at
the monthly SAF meeting in Olympia. Performance data is used for tracking
the actual work being done, results, productivity of units, comparing the
productivity of individual employees performing similar tasks; timeliness;
accuracy, validity; hits on data in national and state databases; managing
backlogs, etc. Based on data analysis, adjustments and changes are made in
scheduling work, setting priorities, temporarily assigning or borrowing staff,

productivity and other workload management, and efficiency measures
within resource limitations... The Labs have an excellent IT redundancy and
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disaster recovery plan in place. All data on every case is backed up on all
five servers, one at each physical location" (p. 25).
The consultancy team also made several suggestions bolstered by their
observations. These included:
"The Labs with programs currently maintaining and analyzing data manually,
increase their use of technology to capture and analyze data. Manual data
collection is cost intensive over time, while technology investments add value
over time. Development of an automated data system for the Toxicology Lab
should be a priority" (p. 27).
Investigative Services Bureau (ISB)
Some of the key ISB achievements included significant accomplishments in
Office of Professional Standards and the Traffic Investigative, Investigative
Assistance, and Commercial Vehicles Divisions. A few of these achievements are
documented below.
Office of Professional Standards (OPS). "The OPS provides oversight
responsibility for the agency's complaint and disciplinary procedures. OPS is tasked
with ensuring that the disciplinary process is conducted fairly, that all administrative
investigations are complete, impartial, objective, and consistent, and that
standardized discipline is imposed" (WSP Intranet, 2008). In a Police Chief article,

Serpas, Olson, and Jones (2003) commented on the early success of the WSP
disciplinary settlement process described earlier in the project:
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"In 2002 approximately 43 percent of the proven complaints against
employees were resolved without completing a formal investigation. After
an employee admits misconduct, the case is typically resolved less than 14
days after the acceptance of the complaint. Under the old system,
investigations could take months, and the stress and uncertainty of those
lengthy investigations often left the accused employee bitter and
unproductive" (p. 2).
Additionally, the SAF data indicated settlement agreements were negotiated
in 70 cases in 2002, 60 cases in 2003, and 58 in 2004. Other notable OPS SAF
performance results included: the number of OPS cases opened included: 2002: 104
(21%); 2003: 138 (33%); 2004:128 (-9%); citizen initiated complaints were higher:
2002: 28 (65%); 2003: 33 (18%); and 2004: 43 (34%); and OPS case cycle time
results varied as well: 2002: 49 days (-18%); 2003: 57 days (16%); and 2004: 75
days (32%)
Traffic Investigation Division (TID). TID was formed in 1982, but was
renamed Criminal Investigation Division (CID) during the project time frame to
reflect its broader criminal investigative breadth beyond strictly criminal traffic
investigations. Essentially, CID provides investigative assistance on criminal cases
that extend beyond the initial crime scene. "The division consists of three major
sections comprised of detectives assigned to Felony Collision and Criminal
Investigation Units, Auto Theft Units, and Special Investigations" (WSP Intranet,
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2008).
The CID made several notable accomplishments, as reflected in their SAF
data. First, vehicular homicide investigations completed involved: 2002: 50 cases,
with 54.5 days cycle time; 2003: 50 cases, 74 days; and 2004: 41 (opened), 48 days
(all cases). Similarly, vehicular assault investigations completed included: 200281, 63 days cycle time; 2003: 115 cases, 67 days; and 2004: 129 (opened), 48 days
(all cases). Second, the Major Accident Investigation Team (MAIT) case work
resulted involved: 2002: 17 primary cases, 369 days cycle time; 2003: 15 cases, 117
days; and 2004: 12 cases, 251 days; and 2002: 46 assist cases, 40 days; 2003: 34
cases, 26 days; and 2004: 49 cases, 28 days. Third, auto theft cases completed
included: 2002: 225 cases completed, 37 days cycle time; 2003: 401 cases, 7 days;
2004: 493 cases, 1 day.
In September 2003, CID Detective Greg Miller initiated a POP project
entitled Washington's Most Wanted. Essentially, the project publicized the WSP's
most wanted criminals by posting their photographs onto the agency's Internet page.
The suspects all had active warrants for their arrest, primarily for a variety of felony
traffic crimes. In particular, two observations helped describe the early success of
the project.
"In the 16-month period between the project's inception in September 2003

and December 31, 2004, a total of 29 individuals with felony collision
warrants from CID investigated collisions were arrested from proactive
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investigative efforts... Those arrested represented 45% of the original
postings. The average time that a suspect was free prior to the program
beginning was 1,099 days. The average time a suspect is free since is only 70
days. This is a decrease of 1,029 days (nearly 3 years) that these suspects are
eluding justice" (WSP 2003-2007 CID Strategic Plan, p. 12)
Overall, Rene Ewing and Associates (2004) suggested some improvements to
CID data collection and analysis:
"Data collection and analysis is highly dependent on manual processes...
The division's continued budget challenges have prevented them from
obtaining the technology tools they need to analyze crimes, such as where
they are occurring, in order to improve their performance" (p. 29, 30).
Investigative Assistance Division (IAD). IAD "consists of the Narcotics
Section, Special Investigations Section, and the Special Weapons and Tactics Team"
(WSP Intranet, 2008). Some of their more notable achievements follow.
The Narcotics Section detectives arrested both large quantity and lower level
narcotics dealers, which included: 2002: 278 large, 43 quantity; 2003: 340 (22%)
large, 53 (23%) lower; and 2004: 253 (-26%) large, 71 (34%) lower. Criminal asset
forfeitures remained high as well: 2002: $346,662 (56%); 2003: 637,432 (84%); and
2004: 442,987 (-31%). The Computer Crimes Unit continued to complete a variety

of crimes involving electronic technology: 2002: 132; 2003: 114 (-14%); and 2004:
70 (-39%o). And, the Special Weapons and Tactics team responses remained steady,
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despite a variety of other investigative increases. 2002: 358 (-27%); 2003: 303 (15%); and 2004: 187 (-38%).
Commercial Vehicle Division (CVD). "The [CVD] consists of the
Commercial Vehicle Enforcement Section, the Compliance Review Section, the
Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP), the Tow Truck Inspection
Program, Fuel Tax Evasion Unit, and the School Bus Inspection Program" (WSP
Intranet, 2008). CVD enforcement activities focus on dangerous driving habits,
especially related to speed, following too closely, and aggressive driving, and
defective vehicle equipment. Some of the division's most notable achievements are
outlined in Table 5.
Table 5
Washington State Patrol Commercial Vehicle Key Enforcement Results 2002-2004
2002

2003

2004

7,211

10,312

9,690

Aggressive Driving Contacts

73

419

905

Following too Closely Contacts

596

1,201

1,400

115,884

137,162

135,857

Out-of-Service Placements- Drivers

5,334

6,723

9,146

Out-of-Service Placements- Vehicles

16,175

16,381

16,808

Work Activity
Speed Contacts

Safety Inspections

Rene' Ewing (2004) and Associates found:
"Through careful analysis of their data, they [CVD] discovered that 76% of
commercial vehicle accidents are caused by drivers around them, not the
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commercial trucks. As a result, they increased efforts to target aggressive
drivers around trucks" ... The division currently lacks a mapping system for
collision data. This severely hampers their ability to identify areas of greatest
concern" (p. 28, 29).
Management Services Bureau (MSB)
"The MSB was created to serve the entire agency by overseeing Budget and
Fiscal Services (BFS), the Property Management Division (PMD), and [Strategic
Planning]" (WSP Intranet, 2008). Many of the bureau's significant SAF reported
accomplishments have been explored previously.
Rene' Ewing and Associates (2004) found MSB performance measures were
well defined, collected in a timely fashion, and reliable. They did note some
concerns about data verification and triangulation:
"Management Services systems and the resulting information are used
throughout the agency. Other bureaus have their own methods for collecting
the same data manually for their own use. Significant errors and/or
discrepancies would be noted immediately by those users and brought to the
attention of the appropriate Management Services section or division
administrator" (p. 33).
Technical Services Bureau (TSB)

"The TSB provides support services and information technology for the
entire department, as well as many other law enforcement and government agencies
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throughout the state" (WSP Intranet, 2008). Together with MSB, many interview
participants spoke oftentimes about projects where the Information Technology
Division (ITD) was a critical partner.
A review of the contemporaneous SAF data revealed several, significant,
inter-bureau accomplishments to include: Nearly all WSP offices were equipped
with high speed data lines; the agency computer networks were transitioned away
from Novell operating systems to a Microsoft Windows 2000 operating
environment; Microsoft Outlook was installed to replace the aging departmental
email system; critical data management systems were evaluated, procured, tested,
and implemented for statewide operations- the Laboratory Information Management
System (LIMS) for all crime labs to track evidence, cases, and testing results, the
Automated Data Collection System (ADCS) for statewide tracking of facility fire
inspections, and Web Works to allow PMD staff to track their work projects, time
commitments, and material usage; and planning and development continued on the
centralized Case Information Tracking and Evidence (CITE) system, eventually to be
used by all statewide investigative and field force personnel.
Rene Ewing and Associates (2004) offered several performance measure
recommendations. These included:
"Activity measures are valuable for day-to-day operational decisions but

developing more output and even outcome measures would provide valuable
tools for the overall WSP measurement process. IT should allocate time for
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working with the WSP employees in other bureaus who support the manually
calculated performance measures. Often a little advice and help from an IT
professional will enhance local tools/ procedures to make those employees
more efficient. Service Level Agreements (SLA's) are a key part in
communicating clarity and accountability for support organizations and their
customers. Some SLA's are in place and other are planned. SLA's should be
developed for all IT's key customers. Listening posts provide an excellent
approach to acquiring information that can be helpful in improving
operational processes. WSP managers need to ensure that data is collected
and analyzed from each of the listening posts. Conducting regular customer
surveys will provide another avenue for identifying opportunities for
improvement" (p. 36).
Finally, while many of these achievements were bureau specific successes,
many others relied on significant agency collaboration, which many participants felt
was enhanced through the SAF process. At a minimum, some of these included:
A.

FOB performance data access became computerized, both to time and
activity report (TAR) data (FOB summary reports) and computer
assisted dispatch (CAD) data (Bi-Web reports), which also allowed for
some data triangulation.

B.

Public information officers were identified in nearly every agency
division and proactive media releases/contacts surged: 2002: 5,428;
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2003: 14,750 (171%); and 2004: 18,580 (26%).
C.

Agency personnel hired, oriented, equipped, trained, and commissioned
several basic training classes to include: 87th Trooper Basic Training
Class (TBTC)- March 15, 2002 (48 troopers); 88th TBTC- October 16,
2002 (40 troopers); 89th TBTC- July 1, 2003 (34 troopers); 90th TBTCMarch 17, 2004 (26 troopers).

D.

FOB replaced its aging Beretta 9mm handguns with H&K .40 caliber
handguns, which required significant coordination with bidding,
procurement, issuance, and training.

E.

Aging breath alcohol concentration testing machines were rotated with
newer technology.

F.

"The [Aviation] [SJection has a partnership with the Washington State
Transportation Center at the University of Washington, experts in
traffic congestion management. This partnership has resulted in the
development of a statistically valid formula that demonstrates time and
cost savings resulting from the Aviation Metro program, a traffic
congestion management program. This formula has been requested and
sent to other states. The Aviation Section has collected data to
demonstrate return on investment for the Metro program. In 2004, data
shows that for every $1 spent on the program, the public saved $18.28
in traffic congestion related costs" (Ewing et al., 2004, p. 23).

Washington State Patrol Change 245
G.

An interdisciplinary team of WSP detectives investigated the Tacoma
Police Chiefs murder of his ex-wife and his suicide as well as the
related administrative investigations within the Tacoma Police
Department.

H.

A new computer aided dispatch system was acquired, installed,
implemented, and all dispatchers and field force personnel were trained
statewide.

I.

Amber Alert child abduction protocols were created, initialized, and
implemented statewide.

J.

BFS personnel worked together with Washington State Department of
Information Services and WSP ITD personnel to plan, implement, and
test a massive computerized Human Resources Management System.

Additional External Validation
The principal researcher also located several published external reviews,
which evaluated WSP performance, operations, and outcome indicators during this
time frame. Overall, these reviews highlighted exemplary practices within the WSP,
some of which will be presented below.
Washington State University (WSU) citizen surveys. The 2003 WSU
Division of Governmental Studies and Services (DGSS) citizen survey was
conducted during the project time frame. In addition to their historical trend
analyses related to standardized questions, the researchers began to analyze, present,
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and discuss annual violator contact assessments, geographical analyses, and biased
policing questions, which were added in 2000. (Lovrich, Gaffhey, & Albright, 2003,
p. 4)
In 2003, the WSU research team used a multi-layered sampling approach.
Their sampling approach is summarized in Table 6.
Table 6
Washington State University 2003 Citizen Survey Sampling Approach
Solicitations

Responses

Response Rates

Statewide Random

3,000

1,019

35.6%

Statewide Citations

1,000

232

24.2%

Statewide Verbal Warnings

550

156

29.9%

Statewide Written Warnings

1,000

292

30.6%

Statewide Motorist Assists

1,000

237

25.4%

Statewide Minority Drivers

2,000

371

20.4

Geographicall Specific

2,000

528

27.5%

Total

10,550

2,838

26.9%

Contact Type

Unfortunately, the 2003 survey participant rates continued to reflect the
historically lower response averages: 1999/0- 35% (38% general, 30% contacts),
and 2003- 27% (36% general, 23% contacts). The respondents reported their
ethnicity as: White (80%); Asian (-5%); Latino (-5%); and African American,
Native American, and other (-2%). The non-minority respondents included 65%
males and 35% females, while the minority respondents included approximately 68%

Washington State Patrol Change 247
males and approximately 32% females. Most respondents said their age was 21-39
(-20% non-minority and -40% minority) and 40-64 (-58% non-minority and -45%
minority). And, most reported they had completed high school (-12% both groups),
some college or trade school (~ 40% both groups); and college (-20%). (Lovrich,
Gaffney, & Albright, 2003)
As a whole, both the non-minority and minority respondents generally
reported average to slightly above average confidence in all levels of government,
but both groups reported the highest levels of confidence in the WSP. These trends
were similar when the analyses were performed by contact group. Both ethnic
groupings also reported much lower levels of general trustworthiness and honesty in
people, which was reflected in a similar manner when the analyses were performed
by contact group. (Lovrich, Gaffney, & Albright, 2003, p. 5, 6, 92-101)
The research team also identified several other interesting trends. The
respondents who strongly agreed or agreed "the WSP does a good job performing its
mission" remained fairly constant in both the 1999-2000 and 2003 studies, or 64%,
25% and 64%, 24.5% respectively. (2003, p. 8) The responses percentages relating
to whether "WSP Troopers were judged to have treated citizens courteously" were
higher in 1999-2000 responses than in the 2003 responses. They were reported as
63%, 24% and 59.9%, 21.9% respectively, (p. 9) The response percentages related
to perceptions the "WSP treats citizens the same regardless of their ethnic
background" were higher in the 1999-2000 responses than the 2003 responses.
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These were reported as 48%, 15% and 42.4%, 13.4% respectively, (p. 10) The
respondents who strongly agreed and agreed they were "quite satisfied with the
services provided by the WSP with which they were familiar" were higher in the
1999-2000 responses than in the 2003 responses. These percentages included 63%,
22%o and 58.9%, 21.4% respectively, (p. 11) Interestingly, the respondents who felt
the WSP was "doing a good job removing drunk drivers from state highways"
increased in the 2003 responses as compared to the 1999-2000 responses, or 55.4%,
19% and 52%, 18%, respectively, (p. 12) And, finally, the percentage of respondents
who had received a citation from the WSP and felt they had been treated fairly
increased in 2003, as compared to the 1999-2000 responses, or 75.6% and 71% ,
respectively, (p. 13)
The researchers found positive combined responses (strongly agreed/ agreed
across groups) across contact type for a myriad of other indices in the 2003 survey.
These included responses related to WSP troopers': competency (-85%); politeness
(~85%>); reliability (-85%); and responsiveness (-55%). Approximately 75% of the
respondents believed they had been treated fairly by a WSP trooper who had issued
them a ticket, while 65% of respondents said they had a very favorable or favorable
overall impression of their most recent WSP trooper contact, (p. 20-25) Finally,
minority and non-minority response percentages were similar related to satisfaction
with courtesy(~73%-81%), ethnic neutrality (56% vs. 49%), politeness (75% vs.
81%), and responsiveness (~60%-61%), but more divergent with respect views about
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overall impression (30% vs. 62%), reliability (72% vs. 85%), competency (71% vs.
82%), mission performance (80 vs. 90%), troopers' attentiveness (64% vs. 76%), and
WSP service (72 vs. 82%). (p. 28-54)
As noted earlier, the 2003 WSU DGSS citizen survey also reported the
results of the biased policing surveys. The citizen opinion results offered some
troubling responses, especially in light of WSU DGGs's earlier empirical biased
policing findings.
The researchers identified several major findings. When asked if WSP
troopers engage in differential treatment of certain racial or ethnic groups, the
participants replied they thought these practices were: widespread: -20% (nonminority) and -30% (minority); a few troopers do this: -60% (both groups); and
very few, if any troopers do this: -20% (non-minority) and -10% (minority). When
the same questions were asked to each of the earlier groupings: roughly 20% felt the
practices were widespread across all groups; about 60% said they thought a few
troopers engaged in such activities throughout all groups; and approximately 10%
felt very few troopers engaged in such conduct across all groups. After being asked if
"citizens of certain racial or ethnic groups [were] more likely to commit traffic
violations than are citizens of other racial or ethnic groups," approximately 30% of
non-minorities replied yes, as compared to approximately 20% of minority
respondents. This meant approximately 70% of non-minorities replied no, while
close to 80% of minorities replied no. (p. 86) When asked the same question,
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approximately 30% of all other contact groups replied yes, while nearly 70% of all
other contact groups replied no. (p. 88) After respondents were asked if there were
"situations you could imagine in which you would approve of a WSP trooper
stopping a driver based on his or her race and partially on other relevant facts," 60%
of non-minority and 40% of minority respondents replied yes. This meant 40% of
non-minority and nearly 60% of minority respondents replied no. (p. 89) Finally,
when the same question was analyzed by contact groups approximately 55% of all
groups said yes, while roughly 40% said no. (p. 90)
These findings offer clear proof the WSP commissioned personnel must do a
much better job educating Washington's citizens about the exemplary work its
troopers undertake on a daily basis. Clearly, these public opinions are at odds with
many of the other excellent empirical findings of WSU's DGSS.
Biased Policing. In 2005, WSU's DGSS reported on its second analysis of
WSP data from November 2002 to June 2004. The analyses contained about 1.2
million self-initiated traffic stops. (Lovrich, Gaffney, Mosher, Pickerill, & Pratt,
2005, p. 9) The researchers' analyses offered four general conclusions.
"1. Our analysis of DOL driver photo audit data indicates a high level of
consistency with regard to race designations made by troopers in the field and
members of the WSU audit team reviewing official photos and documents in
the DOL. Our results also indicate a high degree of consistency between
troopers' race codes on TARS forms and on citations. In short, there is no
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evidence that troopers are systematically miscoding race on either the TARS
forms or citations. 2. Using multiple (5) benchmarking methods [population
comparisons, daylight stops, radar and aircraft patrol contacts, accident
involvement, and citations], our results indicate that there is no systematic
pattern of disproportionate contact by race or ethnicity with regard to
troopers' decisions to stop motorists, nor is there evidence of systematic
racial differences with regard to troopers' decisions to issue citations versus
warnings after traffic stops are initiated when key contextual variables are
included in a multivariate analysis. 3. Our results do indicate a small but
noteworthy racial disparity with regard to vehicle searches- in particular, with
regard to Native American drivers. Information gleaned from focus groups
help with troopers and interviews conducted with WSP supervisory personnel
and some Native American leaders in high contact areas of the state help to
shed considerable light on this disparity... 4. Also with regard to searches,
our multivariate statistical analysis indicates that race is, at most, but one of a
number of factors influencing the decision of a WSP trooper to initiate a
discretionary search. Other measured factors, such as the seriousness of the
violation, are much stronger predictors of troopers' decision to initiate a
search after the stop" (p. 2).

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Annual Chiefs'
Challenge. Each year, the IACP sponsors a friendly competition throughout law
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enforcement to determine which agencies are the most accomplished in relation to
their peers. The WSP won first place in 2002, and was also awarded the Clayton J.
Hall Award, which recognized the agency with the most comprehensive traffic safety
program. The WSP tied for third place in 2004.
Additional Recognition. The WSP was recognized with a variety of other
awards during this same time period. These included:
A.

The Governor's Award for Organizational Learning and Growth for an
$11 million dollar land exchange agreement and construction of the
current PMD complex. (November, 2003)

B.

The Governor's Award for Public Benefit and Value for making school
buses safer. (November, 2003)

C.

The Governor's Award for Quality and Performance for SAF. (May,
2004)

D.

The Governor's Award for Quality and Performance for the Amber
Alert Web Portal Project. (November, 2004)

E.

The Governor's Award for Organizational Learning and Growth and
Public Benefit and Value for the El Protector Program. (November,
2004)

F.

The Industry Achievement Award for Outstanding Contribution to
Digital Government. (2005)
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Summary
Rene' Ewing and Associates' performance measure review and the WSP's
continuing CALEA accreditation clearly established the WSP's leadership related to
performance measure management. Additionally, the project interview analyses,
bolstered by the SAF data and the awards presented to the agency, offer compelling
evidence of the changes created during this time frame.
With these successes in mind let us now relate the project findings back to
earlier literature review. This will be the focus in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN
Theoretical Findings and Associated Outcomes
The preliminary organizational change model is compared against the
Washington State Patrol (WSP) performance, practice, and findings in this chapter.
In doing so, the narrative suggests their individual, reciprocal, and collective
importance to organization theory. It concludes by summarizing the major
theoretical findings and advancing a new organizational change model.
Leadership Theory
The research project found evidence that a wide variety of leadership
interactions occurred within the WSP during the project time frame. In particular,
four contingency leadership theories seemed especially relevant to the case study.
These include: transformational, transactional, situational, and path-goal leadership.
(Daft, 1999; Denhardt et al., 2001; Mosely et al., 1996; Rainey, 2003; Robbins &
Coulter, 1996; Shermerhorn et al., 1997, Yukl, 1998) All four theories will be revisited below in light of the project findings.
Early Transformational Leadership
The research project found evidence that Chief Serpas utilized
transformational leadership principles during his tenure in the WSP. As readers have
seen, his leadership strategies began to take shape in the early days of his
administration as he made his initial observations, analyses, and decisions. His
memories of these beginnings combined with those of the senior executives
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interviewed for this project underscored the role many of the strategic management
theory themes explored during the literature review had during his initial planning.
Therefore, let us begin by considering his early perceptions, thoughts, and decisions
in light of this earlier theoretical content.
Leadership of Change. Washington Governor Gary Locke had been a strong
proponent of Kaplan and Norton's (1996) Balance Scorecard during his
administration. As a result, he had asked all state executives to integrate its concepts
in their respective agencies. Consequently, its principles (agency vision and
strategy, customer focus, internal business processes, learning and growth, and
financial needs) had been integrated into the WSP Strategic Plan. At the same time,
the plan incorporated the six strategic planning features recommended by Shafritz
and Russell (2003), which also mirrored many of Bryson's (2004) prescriptive
planning steps. These included: the identification of objectives; a time frame for
accomplishment; an assessment of current organizational capabilities and external
environments; and an appropriate strategy with organizational efforts.
Yet, Chief Serpas' interview identified concerns about the WSP vocalized by
both external and internal stakeholders as he settled into his new leadership position.
This included some dissatisfaction among state politicians and outside law
enforcement executives and frustrations voiced by agency leaders. Beyond their
obvious practical agency implications, these findings support at least two theoretical
assertions. First, the failure to secure the broad support of the political stakeholders
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reinforces Moore's (1991) assertion that public strategic planning processes must
secure such support if they are to be considered valid.
Second, despite all the WSP's earlier strategic planning, it appeared the
agency was failing to realize many of the benefits enumerated by Kaplan and Norton
(1996). In other words, the WSP Strategic Plan and its implementation seemed to
have an inability to: "demonstrate accountability and generate results, attract scarce
resources (funding and employees), create a focus on strategy, produce informationnot data, self preservation, drive change, and inspire trust" (Kaplan & Norton, 2004,
p. 39-42).
Chief Serpas responded to these weaknesses by articulating his
Accountability Driven Leadership (ADL) principles, built on his earlier experiences
with CompStat, and implementing this philosophy throughout the entire agency. His
deliberate planning process in response to a system perceived by many to be failing
to realize its full potential seems to reinforce Mitzberg's (1987) own vision of
strategic planning as involving "skill craft work." In making this decision, he said he
understood the magnitude of the change for the WSP, but he felt it was critical to
begin somewhere. As readers saw, many of the interview participants agreed
wholeheartedly, but they felt the trajectory of the change was steep, employee
demands great, data collection provisions inadequate, and analyst capacity nonexistent.
Leadership and Performance Metrics. Chief Serpas began his leadership
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transition by directing his executive staff to create comprehensive performance
measures for each of their bureaus. In doing so, his interview suggested he hoped to
create more ambitious initiatives, provide a broader planning perspective across
agency units, and increase collaboration between units. (Goold and Campbell, 1987)
The senior executive interviews indicated the discussions that ensued oftentimes
involved asking and answering a variety of questions similar to those posed by
Dilulio (1993).
"What do we want to achieve? What human and other resources do we have
(or can we obtain) that might enable us to achieve it? How can we know the
relationship between the levels and modes of our resource deployments, on
the one hand, and the achievement of our goals, on the other? How can we
measure routinely the extent to which we are achieving what we want to
achieve, or moving toward achieving it?" (p. 66). (cf. Dobbs and Field,
1993; Mendofik, 1994)
These performance metric discussions led to the recreation of the strategic
advancement forums (SAFs) and several other agency measures, all of which were
designed to increase public accountability. Overall, these changes required a shift in
organizational conduct focused on mobilizing the talent within the agency for
maximum productivity in order to pursue, influence, and achieve desirable public
safety outcomes.
This project offered more insights about the success of these initial strategic
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planning initiatives during the study time frame. Therefore, we will return to their
remaining contributions later in the chapter. For now, let us return to our earlier
discussion of leadership theory.
Later Transformational Leadership
As we have seen, Chief Serpas' leadership vision set dramatic change into
motion within the WSP. Dess, Picken, and Lyon (1998) believed "successful
transformational leaders: move quickly and decisively; create a sense of urgency;
develop and communicate both a vision and a plan; set stretch goals and empower
others to act; and consolidate the gains by institutionalizing the change" (p. 724).
Davidhizer and Shearer (1997) added: ".. .Transformational leaders motivate people
to work for a new and greater good and to create change, (cf., Ritscher, 1986) Time
and again, the research findings suggested Chief Serpas and Porter's actions fit
within these descriptions.
While the compelling leadership vision seemed to intrigue and attract many
interview participants, the analyses did reflect some serious differences between
chief executive intentions and follower perceptions. These conflicts seemed to
center on questions related to long-term employee health and public conflict during
the SAFs. Oftentimes, interview participants likened such disagreements as
devolving into directive instruction or coercion, which Ritscher (1986) suggests is
the antithesis of transformational leadership. These findings also support one of
Girodo's (1998) most notable research findings in that the law enforcement
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managers he surveyed expressed their disdain for Machiavellian or "means-end"
leadership styles. The present research project suggests that in the face of such
tensions and perceived loss of empowerment some leaders slipped into simple
compliance, rather than using the initiatives to push themselves to create additional
changes within their areas of responsibility.
The research project produced mixed results about the theoretical assertion
transformational leaders enhance their transactional skill base in order to build
influence among their followers. (Avolio, Waldman, & Yammario, 1991; Bass,
1990b; Bass & Avolio, 1990) On the one hand, the project did not delve into either
chiefs personal background to be able to offer any reasonable opinion about how
their personal leadership styles evolved. On the other, the project interview analyses
suggested the participants regularly used a series of transactional skills to achieve
broader transformational success. The analyses also reflected strong support for
these authors' belief that transformational leaders influenced their followers using
four skills: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and
individualized consideration. Bass (1990a) further clarified these concepts:
"Charisma: Provides vision and sense of mission, instills pride, gains respect
and trust. Inspiration: Communicates high expectations, uses symbols to
focus efforts, expresses important purposes in simple ways. Intellectual

Stimulation: Promotes intelligence, rationality, and careful problem solving.
Individualized Consideration: Gives personal attention, treats each employee
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individually, coaches, advises" (p. 20).
On the other hand, the project underscored the need for both leaders to
combine their transformational charisma, inspiration, and intellectual stimulation
with greater individualized consideration. Its findings suggested these latter
individual breakdowns manifested themselves in both chiefs' failure to: clearly
educate leaders about their intended courses of change; build in measures meant to
ensure reasonable employee workloads; create acceptable practices to address
executive conflicts, especially in public venues and with those leaders who seemed
to be struggling; revisit SAF management processes on a routine basis; and modify
data collection systems, analysis capabilities, and triangulation abilities.
Additionally, the project interview analyses suggested the leadership conflicts
combined with the chief executive communique challenges related to performance
objectives highlighted the need for WSP executives to become much more
conversant with goal setting theory. While both chiefs were reluctant to limit agency
productivity with artificially low targets, the interview analyses clearly indicate the
messages received throughout the agency suggested no amount of work would ever
satisfy the executive staff. Beyond the simple application of goal setting theory to
inform better practice, the integration of these principles into ADL implementation
would have allowed at least three ancillary outcomes. First, better goal setting would
have allowed the agency to prioritize and focus its resources on key measures,
performance indicators, and outcomes. In turn, this may have helped with some
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leadership perceptions the agency had diversified so much in recent years it was
trying to do too much in relationship to its current resource allocations. Second, the
pursuit and accomplishment of such goals might have allowed enhanced
communication and greater ability to celebrate successes with agency employees.
Third, the prior leadership examples may have protected more agency employees
from burnout and provided a healthy example for other work units and individuals
within the agency to emulate.
Even years after the project time frame, the interview participants continually
recounted stories of SAF presentations they had either witnessed or heard about,
where the chief or his designee had berated a presenter. Nearly every interview
participant was uncomfortable with the level of the resulting conflict. And, most
firmly articulated a belief there were much better ways to handle such issues, even if
a presenter had been unprepared for their presentation. Routinely, participants
explicitly or implicitly referred to the timeless management axiom of: "Praise in
public, criticize in private." It became apparent from the interview analyses that
leaders who engaged in such confrontations oftentimes suffered commensurate
losses to their legitimate, expert, and referent power. (French & Raven, 1959)
In fact, the interview analyses regularly prescribed the greater use of
transformational or "personalistic" leadership styles, traits, and actions as a remedy

to the leader-follower conflicts described earlier. For example, most respondents
decried Chief Serpas' steep trajectory of change and cited a real lack of capacity to
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easily collect and analyze data for the SAFs. Many were convinced his change
initiatives could have achieved as much or more had they been better understood by
senior executives and the leadership alike, more education had taken place, and
greater patience had been exercised with people who were trying to do their best. In
this view then, the single greatest impediment to greater progress was a genuine lack
of understanding across and down the agency. Time and again, the interview
participants' suggested the best anecdote to such difficulties would have involved
more personal approaches.
The issues surrounding these conflicts were troubling, widespread, and
profound for many participants. Consequently, it will be necessary to return to both
of these themes throughout the leadership analyses. Later, we will also consider
their possible impacts on group dynamics, individual motivation, and strategic
management.
The project's findings also supported several empirical studies. These
included three surveyed police officers serving jurisdictions in the eastern United
States about how transformational leadership impacts subordinate behavior (Deluga
& Souza, 1991; Castro, 1998; Morreale, 2002) and another involved a meta-analysis
that assessed the validity of transformational leadership theory. (Judge & Piccolo,
2004) Three of these studies found such leadership techniques increased subordinate

job satisfaction and commitment. (Castro, 1998; Judge & Piccolo; Morreale, 2002)
The current project's interview participants seemed to favor transformational
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leadership actions. This was also demonstrated by their engaged shaping of the
broader agency direction and the leadership they demonstrated while helping agency
personnel achieve significant productivity gains during the project's time frame.
Finally, this project found significant evidence to suggest both chiefs'
transformational leadership style involved significant transactional elements. This
finding supports several researchers' empirical evidence in support of these same
claims. (Avolio et al., 1991; Bass, 1990b; Bass and Avolio, 1990; Judge & Piccolo,
2004; Morreale, 2002) With this in mind, let us now shift focus to consider the
project findings in light of transactional leadership theory.
Transactional Leadership
This project found evidence Chief Serpas' implementation of ADL and his
recreation of the SAFs were designed to re-focus the agency on its strategic goals.
By their very nature then, the initiatives created an exchange of senior executive
power, problem solving, resources, and rewards, for executive led productivity
improvements and desirable public safety outcomes. (Burns, 1978) Sometimes these
processes involved the use of positional power and more directive approaches, than
the agency culture had been accustomed to in previous years. Many executive
interviews referred explicitly or implicitly to the fear such active or passive
management by exception practices engendered. Such views were validated
regularly by the senior executive interviews, many of whom had serious reservations
about the tremendous levels of organizational and personal stress that were present
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during this time period. These observations suggest senior leadership- executive
reciprocity existed, as nearly all the key informants recognized executives were
expected to "produce or perish," especially in light of the contemporaneous
retirements and demotion. (Bass, 1990a)
Beyond these tougher leadership approaches, Chief Serpas was also
interested in increasing executive leadership collaboration across bureaus, districts,
divisions, and workgroups. Many collaborative endeavors, projects, and milestones
were achieved during this time frame. In part, this was a testament to both the
leadership initiative and the teamwork across and down the agency that created such
successes. And, many of these leadership initiatives and results were validated by
external reviews.
The analyses suggested executive leadership remarks and commander SAF
presentations remained rather narrowly focused on productivity gains meant to
influence organizational goals. Chief Porter oftentimes described this as maintaining
the "productive tension," or an attempt to balance the demand for results against the
many needs of employees.
The analyses clearly indicated these styles were perceived by followers as
more directive, telling, and publicly critical, and they suffered from some significant
limitations. In fact, several executives suggested the net result became command
presentations given with little enthusiasm or engagement or given so quickly the
chief and senior executives could not ask any questions. In other words, leaders
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fulfilled the SAF expectation, but they were less than totally engaged in the process.
Similarly, the widespread use of transactional leadership techniques worried
many interview participants, who oftentimes lamented the minutiae of SAF
measurements and associated them with over- and micro-management. In short,
many felt these transactional approaches limited the use of more desirable
transformational techniques. Finally, these transactional successes oftentimes
involved situational interactions, which will be considered next.
Situational Leadership
One senior executive suggested Chief Serpas used a variety of leadership
styles and SAFs provided the perfect venue for these interactions to occur. Many
other interview participants provided similar observations. These findings suggest
situational leadership styles were in use during the project time frame. (Hersey,
Blanchard, &Natemeyer, 1979)
This research project and its findings also built on Hersey and Blanchard's
(1979) and Kuykendall and Unsinger's (1982) earlier contributions. The project
results suggest a confrontational "telling style" is far more devastating to leader
credibility, than the simpler Likert scale categorizations could fully characterize in
these earlier studies. Although the WSP continues to be a paramilitary organization
where structure, regimen, and direction are valued forms of organization, the

research interview analyses were unequivocal in their widespread condemnation of
such overly directive practices.
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The participants' criticisms surrounding public confrontations offer clear
proof the respondents believed such techniques were unnecessary, unhelpful, and
unwarranted, except in the rarest of circumstances. The latter seemed to involve the
problems surrounding unproductive employees, problematic subcultures, and
countercultures. In fact, many participants' comments suggested they had great faith
in the executives' competence and commitment and rarely questioned their
leadership examples, directions, approaches, or abilities to create positive change.
The responses often highlighted the resentment and difficulties these public conflicts
produced within the district and division workgroups later on. Other participants felt
the executive staff were unequal in their criticisms of presenters by: allowing likable
personalities "off the hook more easily;" beating up on others, especially after
criticisms had been voiced by other chief executive or executive staff members;
unfairly criticizing a presenter who represented only one half of an issue; or failing
to see some district or division success was inextricably linked to other areas of the
WSP. One participant may have captured the whole tenor of the discussions by
calling attention to the fact the WSP had several regulations governing courtesy and
conflict, but such SAF clashes gave them pause to wonder whether the chief and the
involved executive staff members were being held to that same standard. At a
minimum, these project findings reinforce Kuykendall and Unsinger's (1982) survey
findings of Arizona and California law enforcement managers, which revealed little
support for a telling leadership style.
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These project findings suggest the corrosive power of such leadership
confrontations, for however they once occurred, their negative connotations have
now been added to organizational lore. Indeed, it became clear most participants felt
future WSP chiefs would do well to avoid public confrontations with their executive
leadership. This was viewed as especially true if they hoped to turnaround later and
ask for their help creating meaningful change throughout the agency and to
maximize their chief executive leadership influence throughout the entire
organization.
As noted earlier, the interview analyses also revealed widespread criticism of
the long-term effects of enhanced performance goals, which suggest some
breakdowns in situational leadership interactions. Situational leadership theory
suggests mismatches between a chosen leadership style and their inferred, follower,
developmental levels will result in suboptimal relationships.
The participants' views suggest if a leader is thought to be pre-occupied with
organizational results in an overly-directive manner, especially by down playing or
failing to consider long-term employee health, the leader-follower relationship will
suffer. The interview analyses suggested this sometimes manifested itself through
the loss of respect for the agency leadership. Other times it seemed to affect how
engaged some district and division commanders remained with ADL implementation
and the SAF process.
Looking beyond these two concerns, situational leadership suggests the
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preferred leadership style is the one most closely linked with follower developmental
levels. The literature suggests the leader judgments associated with such
adjustments are coupled often with a specific task. The project findings appear to
reinforce these assertions, since most SAF interactions and the required follow up
regularly involved the use of greater direction, coaching, support, delegation, and
collaboration. Although, it is important to note here that most followers seemed to
perceive many of these interactions as leader-follower mismatches.
Many of these findings call attention to the role of path-goal leadership. Its
role related to ADL implementation will be considered below.
Path-Goal Leadership
This research project found considerable evidence to suggest Chief Serpas
and Porter's change initiatives utilized path-goal leadership principles. In other
words, these organizational changes provided the agency leadership with countless
opportunities to ensure agency employees knew they could attain work goals,
experience satisfaction for work well done, and receive rewards for superior
performance. (House 1971, 1996) Similarly, these changes allowed leaders to
provide employees immediate satisfaction or clarify how they could achieve future
satisfaction. Lastly, the agency leadership oftentimes used these change initiatives to
increase commander and employee motivation as they sought to tie employee

satisfaction to effective performance and provided the "coaching, guidance, support,
and rewards necessary for effective performance" (House & Mitchell, 1974, p. 84).
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For example, the recreated SAFs served as the perfect venues to reinforce
path-goal leadership techniques with their intense focus on ADL principles (timely,
accurate performance data; effective tactics; rapid resource deployment; relentless
follow-up; emphasis on decentralized decision-making; and integration of effective
and efficiency performance measures across bureaus and functional units). (House,
1971, 1996; Serpas, 2004, 2004) These forums allowed both chiefs regular,
unfettered, protracted access to the agency leadership in an environment perfectly
tailored to stress performance controls and to reiterate organizational goals,
employee work priorities, and key rewards. At the same time, the meetings provided
a new platform for regular employee recognition. The public performance reviews
relied on published presentations, which worked to reinforce individual, workgroup,
district, and division work standards, priorities, goals, and rewards. In short, the
SAFs allowed the WSP leadership to maintain their focus on organizational goals
and align employee work path priority with performance attainment recognition.
This leadership alignment appeared to be a powerful motivator in the WSP, as nearly
every interview participant was certain organizational productivity had increased
within their area of responsibility. The reviews of SAF data and external
publications appear to support these conclusions and reveal many public safety
outcomes that appeared to be influenced in a positive manner using such leadership
approaches.
In sum, Robbins and Coulter (1996) concluded path-goal theory highlights
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three sets of variables that affect worker performance and satisfaction, all of which
were found to some degree in the WSP during this time frame: leader behavior
(directive, supportive, participative, or achievement oriented) (cf, Rainey 2003;
Robbins & Coulter 1996; Yukl 1998); organizational environment beyond the
control of the subordinate (task structure, authority system, and work group); and
subordinate behaviors (locus of control, experience, and perceived ability).
Most of these authors' enumerated leader and subordinate behaviors were discussed
in relation with the earlier situational leadership exposition. Those factors that
remain (achievement-oriented; organizational environment; and locus of control)
will be incorporated in the discussion below.
As noted earlier, ADL implementation began with Chief Serpas' direction to
all bureau commanders and directors to create a set of meaningful performance
metrics for their areas of responsibility. In essence, the resulting performance
measures provided leaders the ability to clarify follower path-goal relationships. At
a minimum, these clarifications included: restructured work expectations
emphasizing an achievement orientation; dramatically clearer work roles, including
immediate and future recognition standards; and drastically reduced the ambiguity in
each bureau, district, and division throughout the agency.
SAF presenters were required to present their district or division's monthly

performance achievements, oftentimes within a rigid presentation framework. They
also presented their greatest accomplishments during their presentations. Such
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discussions provided the presenters with public opportunities to recognize exemplary
achievements, present individual and workgroup awards, and celebrate success.
Similarly, presenters were asked to identify their greatest challenges as well.
The ensuing discussions sometimes placed the weight of executive scrutiny on
poorer performing workgroups, relationships, and individuals. They also provided
many organizational leadership opportunities to problem solve in a collaborative
manner, across traditional organizational bureau, division, district, and workgroup
boundaries. Oftentimes, the proposed solutions worked to remove, reduce, or ease
common roadblocks.
In the end, the SAF document reviews uncovered volumes of performance
data presented during these performance reviews. Regardless of organizational
bureau, the documents continually presented performance data in a clear, logical, and
concise manner. Broader outcome indicators and performance outcomes were
documented clearly, as were the links to narrower performance measures designed to
demonstrate progress toward those ends. In short, the sheer magnitude of the
presentations, the supporting data, and the evolution of data tracking highlight
example after example of path-goal leadership principles, relationships, and
reinforcement in practice.
The interview analyses found several examples that suggest follower paths
and goals involved some concerns about individual needs, satisfaction, and future
leadership development, which appeared to increase employee involvement and lead
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to greater success. These findings appear to support Prince, Halstead, and Hesser's
(2005) writings suggesting many of the same themes, using expectancy theory.
These interview analyses broadly supported Jermier and Berkes' (1979)
survey findings. The participants clearly preferred greater leadership clarification
during the early confusion surrounding ADL implementation, using more teaching,
coaching, participation, and less directive telling techniques. Over time, as the
organizational leadership adjusted to the change initiatives, they seemed to crave
more participation and discussions about how to evolve the processes.
Finally, the participants also described organizational leadership, ADL
implementation, SAF preparatory work, and SAF presentation as highly
interdependent tasks throughout the key informant interviews. Consequently, the
participants wanted broader definitions of their roles within the larger agency and the
commensurate level of greater autonomy, discretion, participation, and support.
Leadership Theory Summary
The preceding discussion highlighted the need for a more comprehensive
leadership style, involving each contingency approach, while ADL was
implemented. Transformational leadership provided the means for this multi-faceted
approach. In the beginning, it offered the executive staff members (change leaders)
with a common glimpse of what the change initiative would entail, including its
stretch goals and sense of urgency, as they worked to define its performance targets,
measures, and objectives within their own bureaus. However, the interview analyses
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also identified some weaknesses in its overall approach, as several executive leaders
candidly admitted their difficulty in understanding the broader vision. This
confusion appeared to be transmitted down the agency in some cases, which
ultimately meant the change process may have been far less efficient than it may
have been had the concerns surrounding a lack of a comprehensive unifying vision
been addressed up front.
The interview analyses also pointed to the utility of situational and
transactional leadership styles during the project time frame. The former were
essential as the agency undertook the massive changes associated with ADL
implementation and the new SAFs. Many of the newer executive leaders and
division and district commanders were optimistic about the prospects of a new
direction, but they had limited experience with ADL principles, concepts, and
expectations. Transactional leadership principles proved useful in such an
environment, as WSP personnel were used to taking direction from organizational
leaders with positional power, given the nature of the paramilitary organization. In
many ways then, the SAFs allowed the organizational leadership to reinforce basic
bureaucratic exchanges such as hierarchical organizational goal setting, decision
making, and resource allocation (transactional leadership) using highly structured
leadership processes (situational telling and selling). But, as the interviews noted,
difficulties arose as the leadership perceived an inability to candidly communicate
their significant challenges with employee impacts, public conflict, data analyses,
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and difficult and unproductive employees. In short, these more prescriptive
executive leadership styles were viewed as inflexible in light of mounting leadership
challenges that required greater input, participation, and utilization of the leadership
talent throughout the agency. Time and again, the proposed anecdote offered
throughout the interviews for such oversights was more personalized interactions
with the executive leader and executive leadership.
Finally, path-goal leadership ideals were also in evidence throughout the
project, as the SAFs seemed to offer countless opportunities to celebrate
performance outputs that supported organizational goals and to focus on those
obstacles still impeding greater success. The venues also provided a large stage with
which to thank, recognize, and reward the individual, team, and collaborative
performances that supported such successes. Both undertakings helped reinforce the
expectancy theory tenets that seem to motivate many employees throughout their
daily work.
Leadership and Culture
This research project supports the law enforcement literature which
oftentimes explores the relationship between leadership and culture. (Couper &
Lobitz, 1993; Prince et al., 2005) Chief Serpas' interview seemed to imply WSP
subcultures had not been changed by external sources. This observation appears to
support of Couper and Lobitz' (1993) similar claim that internal change agents must
be the ones to change entrenched law enforcement cultures.
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However, common sense and some of the organizational culture literature
reviewed for the case study call into question the two authors' assertions. In reality,
basic democratic governance principles suggest every public agency that has run too
far adrift of public accountability has been re-focused at some point by the formable
forces of executive oversight, legislative process, judicial action, or all three. And,
the literature review highlighted Governor Gary Locke's demands of increasing
levels of performance measure delineation, implementation, and proficiency
throughout his administration. His publicly espoused intent was to connect Office of
Financial Management budgetary practices with desirable governmental performance
outcomes. Unfortunately, this research project did not examine these external
executive and legislative pressures or their budgetary outcomes in a manner that
identified much proof one way or another, beyond the simple observational
conjecture offered here.
Another important contrarian view related to these claims highlights the fact
Chief Serpas himself was an external chief executive. As an external change agent,
he brought a unique perspective to many of the agency's traditional approaches. By
far and away, the most notable were those examined throughout this project: the
implementation of ADL and the leadership approaches it engendered; the recreated
SAFs and their ability to create continuing agency change; and the other
accountability measures discussed throughout the project. As their earlier
descriptions suggest, there is little doubt that Chief Serpas' initiation of these
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changes and Chief Porter's refinement of them created massive leadership, cultural,
and performance changes in the WSP, many of which were driven down to the
individual employee.
All three administrations studied throughout this project, whether led by
internal or external chiefs, used the five leadership strategies Couper and Lobitz
(1990) prescribed for culture changing success: "a clear, shared vision; a personal
commitment; a system that empowers people; a method that develops and rewards
people; and the ability to think and live in the long-term" (p. 19). (cf., Cummings &
Worley, 1993; Kotter, 1990; Kouzes & Posner, 1995; Quinn, 1996; Rainey, 2003;
Schermerhorn et al., 1997; Smith, 1996) To be fair, some interview criticisms were
leveled against each administration related to their ability to connect daily operations
with a vision and longer-term planning, despite their typical, published, five-year
strategic plans. But, in the end, each administration appeared to try different
approaches to create the change they each championed and struggled to overcome
agency inertia at different points along the way. In the words of one interview
participant, each chief had used their own leadership style to motivate agency
personnel to do the best jobs they could for the citizens of Washington. (IP, 41)
This project also contributed to the broader theoretical understanding of law
enforcement leadership and culture, as it found evidence both chiefs' leadership
infused a greater culture of accountability in the WSP. The characteristics of this
1

The interview participants (IP) will be referred to by number, which has been scrambled, placed in
ascending order, and grouped where possible to protect their anonymity.
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culture included: decentralized leadership, especially for data-driven decision
making; effective tactical deployment; rapid application of resources; relentless
performance assessment; equal treatment of all leadership personnel, regardless of
classification, role, or status; integration, use, and tracking of financial measures;
collaborative problem solving across a variety of work responsibilities spread
throughout fairly traditional organizational bureaus, divisions, and workgroups; and
sharing of best practices. The approach clearly combined many of the best elements
from the policing practices of the last 60 years (order maintenance, crime-fighting,
political, bureaucratic, professional, problem oriented policing (POP), and computer
statistic (CompStat) principles). In this way, the leadership initiative and its
supporting organizational changes cannot be understated, especially in view of the
"rudderless state" the agency found itself in during 2002.
At the same time, it found multiple examples of district and division
commanders engaging the cultures within their areas of responsibility to refine the
implementation of the broader change initiatives. These discussions helped define
relevant performance measures seek support from all operational personnel, and
build mutual trust and respect. (IPs, 2, 4, 11, 13, 14, 20, 23, 24, 28, 30, 32, 33)
Finally, as public conflicts occurred between chief executives and the
executive leadership, the research findings seemed to suggest the agency's
professional cultural values and norms stabilized these situations. Fry and Berkes'
(1983) work described an earlier surge in professional identity that shaped the ethics,
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institutionalized values, internal controls, and individual behaviors in many police
departments, which also seemed to characterize the WSP, during these tense
interactions. They concluded:
"There is evidence that police attach a great deal of importance to need
gratification through their jobs, especially the higher needs, when compared
to industrial workers. Police are relatively more satisfied with the type and
variety of their work and their co-workers and supervisors... (p. 228)"
This research project also found support for some of the organizational
culture theory that explores the relationship between leadership and culture. The
document reviews and interview analyses clearly highlighted productivity gains
throughout the agency during this time frame. Overall, these results offer significant
evidence of Shafritz and Russell's (2003) claim that a transformational leader
changes an established culture by providing a new vision and creating the support
necessary to achieve it. Additionally, the project found the agency change initiatives
created performance assessment measures and reinforced their use throughout the
agency through the monthly SAFs and their divisional counterparts. (Bass & Avolio,
1993) What was much more problematic for nearly all the interview participants was
how many of these changes were initiated, communicated, and managed in an
organization steeped in some very valued organizational and cultural norms.
This research project produced mixed results for some of other
organizational culture theory that explores these relationships. (Aragon, 1993; Bass
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& Avolio, 1993; Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Daft, 1999; Harrison, 1998; Heifetz &
Laurie, 1997; Nahavandi, 1997; Robbins & Coulter, 1996; Schein, 1992b, 1999;
Shafritz & Russell, 2003; Trice & Beyer, 1993) Aragon (1993) believed leaders
could cultivate a healthy culture by paying attention to values, beliefs, and behaviors.
The key informant participants seemed to equate these views as the "ideal state,"
although they regularly expressed concerns both chiefs did not seem to act in ways to
help realize all their hopes related to this best case scenario.
As an outsider, Chief Serpas often acted beyond the well-established values,
beliefs, and behaviors of the WSP, whether in uniform standards or in personal
demeanor. The interviews recounted many stories that suggest concern,
consternation, and dismay related to some of his behaviors. In Chief Serpas' own
defense, his interview revealed his knowledge that key external stakeholders saw the
WSP as a less than flexible organization, which needed some significant change.
But, the research interviews also identified example after example of how such
behaviors were perceived within the WSP leadership culture and the subtle
resentment they engendered at all levels.
Chief Porter was a WSP insider, who had promoted through the ranks and
likely understood the agency cultural values, beliefs, and behaviors. When he
assumed leadership of the WSP, he also chose to continue nearly all of Chief Serpas'
leadership initiatives. Somewhat surprisingly, the interview participants spoke far
less about Chief Porter and were far less critical of him when they did discuss him.
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However, this finding may reflect a weakness in the interview questionnaire, which
sought to examine leadership and management techniques designed to create change.
As such, the respondents regularly grouped these initiatives together and equated
them with their creator, and avoided discussing the administrations in temporal
order.
Aragon's (1993) assertions seemed to imply the WSP organizational findings
of unrealized leader modeling would produce an "unhealthy culture." While this
theoretical proposition was difficult to substantiate entirely in the WSP, there were
hints that some frustrated executives began to fulfill the SAF requirements without
maximizing its use as a change initiative within their area of responsibility.
Culture Theory
This research project found support for much of the organizational culture
theory. By the very nature of its singular organizational analysis, the project
produced more insight about the law enforcement culture in the WSP, than it offered
any description of the profession as a whole. (Paoline, 2000, 2003) In doing so, its
document reviews and interview analyses quickly discarded earlier law enforcement
scholarship assertions in relation to the WSP, which tended to characterize
organizational culture by its single homogenous nature. (Bittner, 1970, 1974, 1983;
Brown, 1988; Davis, 1969; Goldsmith, 1990).
Instead, the project analyses revealed a much more complex organizational
dynamic characterized by heterogeneous cultures with multiple subcultures and even
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some countercultures. (Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Britz, 1997; Harrison, 1998;
Herbert, 1996; 1998; Maguire, 2003; Paoline 2000; Paoline et al. 2000; Reuss-Ianni
1983; Schmalleger, 2003; Simon, 1999) This became most obvious by examining
the productivity and the interview themes across and down the agency. At a
minimum, their results revealed significant differences in leadership views, styles,
approaches, and results as well as cultural dynamics between commissioned and
civilian personnel, district and divisions, workgroups, and even individual members
within the same regions or in different regions across the state. Since the project
found a link between leadership and culture, this diversity of leadership approach is
strongly suggestive of the rich organizational culture and subcultures within the
WSP.
The project findings also found support for Herbert's (1998) notion of a
normative order of policing, or ".. .a set of generalized rules and common practices
oriented around a common value" (p. 347). In the WSP, this order appears to be set
in motion through some common adherence to a professional culture as described by
Hernandez (1982) and Wilson (1968) and enhanced by more recent leadership
endeavors. Its hallmarks in the WSP include: a rigorous paramilitary organizational
structure; Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA)
compliance; an extensive regulation manual, supplemented by district and division
procedural manuals; a detailed training curricula, continuing training procedures, and
re-certification standards; and its strategic planning processes. During the project
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time frame, it became clear that both chiefs utilized ADL concepts, performance
goals, measures, outcomes, SAFs, and their other accountability measures to
reinforce this normative order.
Additionally, the WSP seemed to exemplify characteristics from Hernandez's
(1982) three, remaining, dominant models of police culture, (cf, Wilson, 1968) The
findings seemed to suggest the WSP leadership was highly attuned to the external
political environment during this time frame. There were many examples provided
by the senior and junior leadership about using performance data to help convince
key gubernatorial staff and legislators that the WSP, its people, and programs were
good public investments. Therefore, it is not out of the realm of possibilities that
such discussions carried over to the internal workings of the agency, in terms of
rewards, promotions, and punishments.
ADL implementation in the WSP appeared to embrace bureaucratic model
principles, such as military bearing, professionalism (as suggested above), and law
enforcement. Hernandez (1982) suggested officer motivation was bifurcated
oftentimes in such environments: some officers were enthusiastic about the
directions of their departments, while others bemoaned the over-emphasis of law
enforcement, rigid structure, and inability to make larger internal and external
contributions. Other scholars noted such formalized agency culture emphasized
vertical and horizontal identities based on individual rank, job task, or specialized
unit. (Angell, 1971, Bratton, 1996; Bratton & Andrews, 1999; Bratton & Knobler,
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1998; Cordner, 1978; Hansen, 1991; Kelling & Bratton, 1993; Kelling & Moore,
1988; Moore & Trojanowicz, 1988a, 1988b; Reiter, 1999; Reuss-Ianni, 1983;
Sandler & Mintz, 1974) This project seemed to support all three of these
propositions superficially, based largely on its interview analyses. The senior leaders
and commanders became keenly aware during their ADL implementation within
their respective areas of responsibility of supporters, critics, and those who had no
real opinion. Their general strategies oftentimes sought to reward supporters in order
to convince those with no real opinion to join in, so real pressure could be applied to
the remaining critics. In those cases where such techniques were not helpful, more
formalized disciplinary actions were undertaken oftentimes.
The WSP also continued its utilization of problem-oriented policing
principles throughout the study, which were akin to Hernandez's (1982) description
of a community model. In FOB, the idea was to manage these innovative policing
strategies by highlighting their approaches during the SAF and apply the successful
projects to other geographical areas when appropriate.
In sum, this case study seemed to echo many of the themes outlined in
Hernandez's (1982) four part model and offered some generalizations about cultural
and subculture performance. In other words the WSP seemed to exemplify
characteristics from all four dominant culture types, rather than a single
characterization for the entire agency. Unfortunately, the project's level of analysis
made it difficult to compare its leadership findings with the kinds of motivational
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findings discovered by previous researchers. (Britz, 1997; Harrison, 1998;
Hernandez, 1982; Hunt, 1997; Jermier et al., 1991; Paoline, 2000; Paoline et al.,
2000) Regardless, there is much more to say about this research limitation, much of
which will be discussed later on.
Taken together, these research findings also support much of the broader
organizational culture theory. For example, it found evidence of Schein's (1992b,
1999) "primary embedding mechanisms." Clearly, both chiefs focused relentlessly
on productivity and performance measure, resource allocation, reward presentation,
and personnel moves. In doing so, they helped embed and reinforce ADL tenets and
the SAFs as the primary mechanisms in the organizational culture in order to
accomplish these goals. However, the interviews were a bit more critical that more
role modeling, teaching, coaching had not occurred early on and these facts may
have contributed to some of the leadership failures and public conflict that occurred
throughout the study time frame. The project also found support of Schein's (1992b,
1999) "secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms." Nearly all the
organizational structural changes, systems and procedures, rites and rituals, designs
of space for SAFs, stories, and formal statements of organizational philosophy
stressed the tenets of accountability, ADL, and SAF objectives.
Leadership

and

Motivation

This project highlighted the senior and junior executives' efforts to
implement ADL throughout their respective areas of responsibility. It found the
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district and division commanders were concerned about how they crafted,
communicated, and taught their followers, many of whom were nearer to or at the
operational levels of the organization. The interview analyses provided clear
examples of executive leadership actions undertaken to communicate the new
agency direction, instill a culture of accountability, and to reinforce individual
performance expectations. These efforts included district and division supervisory
meetings, local SAFs, leadership communique of all types, and leadership attendance
at employee meetings.
These findings suggest these executives engendered Prince, Halstead, and
Hesser's (2005) view that the leadership task must "close the gap" between: agency
"purpose, performance, and the need to create future leaders and exemplary
followers," on the one hand; and "fulfilling individual members' needs, utilizing
their talents, while limiting their liabilities, and creating future leaders and exemplary
followers," on the other, (p. xiii) Several caveats are in order. First, the project
results seemed to suggest the leadership techniques were applied unevenly
throughout the agency during the study time frame. Many times, this may have
resulted simply from the variances in their individual knowledge, skills, and abilities.
But, these difficulties may have been exacerbated because of the difficulties
surrounding Chief Serpas' intentions, ADL principles, and their application within

the agency. In any case, it became clear during the project that a fair amount of
confusion existed within the leadership ranks of the WSP.
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Second, the agency leadership's contemporaneous concerns about
establishing agency purpose, performance, and exemplary followers appeared to
trump the need to create future leaders upon first reading. Although a more careful
review of the interview analyses revealed that many interview participants
understood the need to create new leaders within a broader organizational culture of
accountability. In fact, most participants recognized ADL implementation and its
related change initiatives had given current and future leaders access to a far greater
breadth of knowledge, experience, and skills. And, most leaders utilized their
divisional SAFs as a venue to help cultivate the future leadership talent.
Third, the project findings offered some general insights about how some
senior and junior executives and some employees felt about ADL implementation
and its resulting changes. However, the level of the project analyses precluded its
findings from offering specific insights about individual employee needs fulfillment,
especially at the lowest levels of the organization. More will be said about this
limitation in the next chapter.
ADL implementation also influenced the evolution of the larger data
collection systems. In TLE, this meant performance contributions could be analyzed
by district, workgroup, and individual, as one tool that could be used to hold
employees at all these levels accountable. But, other interview participants

highlighted similar trends in investigations, fire inspections, budget and fiscal
services, crime labs, electronic services, technology, and communications. In short,
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ADL implementation enhanced managers' ability to track employee outputs,
compare them to their peers, and force greater accountability.
As discussed earlier, the interview analyses found widespread criticism of
ADL implementation and its perceived increases in employee workloads, public
confrontation, and data collection challenges. Viewed another way each of these
difficulties could be related to problems with equity, fairness, and executive level
support. In other words, these observations seem to support Morris, Shinn, and
DuMont's (1999) earlier survey findings of New York City Housing Authority
police officers designed to learn more about their organizational commitment. The
researchers' analyses revealed the most important predictors of organizational
commitment were individual perceptions of management support and fairness,
followed by the social support in the command. In fact, some leaders interviewed
during the project identified specific peer behaviors they felt exemplified a loss of
interest and support for the change initiatives during this time frame.
Likewise, many leaders felt the SAFs were directive, and while they seemed
to understand the need for this in the beginning, it became clear they began to resent
it as their familiarity with the process progressed. Therefore, these findings appear
to support Winegar's (2003) survey of Oregon police officers, during which he found
officers' feelings of empowerment were related to their perceptions of enhanced
feelings of control and competence within their work environment. Winegar also
found officers who were motivated by intrinsic factors felt more empowered than
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those motivated by extrinsic factors. His work offers at least one possible
explanation about why the leadership tensions surrounding the losses in
organizational commitment and empowerment in the current study did not become
more volatile. In other words, most of the WSP leaders may have been motivated
intrinsically, therefore they did not draw much of their motivation from the chief and
senior executives of the WSP during this time frame.
A totally different way to view this project's findings is to suggest the agency
was a centralized hierarchy that constantly scrutinized its many agency performance
measures through the monthly SAFs during this time frame. Angell's (1971) essay
highlighted his belief that low officer morale often resulted from such centralized
organizational structures and their vertical- and horizontal- organizational
differentiation. Sandler and Mitz's (1974) two-year consultancy with the New York
Police Department (NYPD) appeared to reinforce these earlier observations, as both
scholars noted the centralized nature of the NYPD created "a sense of demoralization
and powerlessness at the lower ranks" (p. 458). This project produced mixed results
as it relates to these assertions. On the one hand, the interview analyses hint at some
of the difficulties these authors describe, as some executives indicated they saw some
of their peers reduce their preparation and enthusiasm during the SAFs.
On the other hand, the document reviews and many of the interview analyses
seemed to suggest dramatic productivity gains throughout the agency regardless of
the organizational structure. In turn, many of these were validated by external
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reviews. Presumably then, these achievements suggest some portion of the agency
leadership and workforce remained personally and organizationally engaged enough
to produce valued work results. This seemed especially remarkable if one stops to
consider their continuing performance improvements regularly required extra efforts
to exceed their earlier performance gains.
The project findings also found support for the motivational theory that
explores the relationship between leadership and employee motivation. WSP senior
and executive leadership were able to set the direction, align people, and motivate
them to work toward their personal and organizational goals. (Kotter, 1990; Mosley
et al., 1996; Prince et al., 2005) Although, the interview analyses were mixed
oftentimes about whether the executives and many employees had been inspired to
do so.
One of the best examples of leadership and employee motivation involved
FOB increases in its TLE core output activities, while many of its collision outcomes
indicators fell. As one of the more focal work missions of the agency, its turnaround
arguably resulted in key external recognition the whole department was able to
capitalize on. As we have seen though, similar gains were seen in other bureaus,
divisions, and workgroups, regardless of work responsibility, status, or role.
The interview analyses suggested both chiefs utilized ADL principles, SAFs,

and the other accountability measures examined during the project to: challenge
commonly held WSP beliefs, assumptions, and processes; and to create a shared
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vision of productivity, action, and effect. These findings support Kouzes and
Posner's (1995) earlier descriptions of leadership strategies. However, the interview
analyses revealed very serious leadership concerns about the nature of the executive
leadership-employee relationships during this time frame. The conflicts between
chief executive intention and interview participant perceptions appeared to focus on
differences related to the long-term health of employees and the level of public
conflict that sometimes surrounded the SAFs. Taken together, these concerns
seriously undermined the respondents' belief that both chiefs modeled valued
organizational norms or encouraged employee well-being much beyond stimulating
their productivity.(cf., Aragon, 1993; Center for Leadership, 2003; Jones, 1981;
Pfeiffer, 2003; Prince et al., 2005)
Motivation Theory
The WSP document reviews and interview analyses highlighted large
productivity gains during the study time frame, in support of motivation theory.
Time and again, the senior and executive leader interviews highlighted the extra
efforts they had undertaken to: sharpen their own understanding of the evolving
agency changes; alter their work routines; and help influence those they were
charged to lead, both to shift the culture toward greater accountability and to move
individual performance upward. Likewise, they clearly identified a wide variety of
additional productivity gains and positive performance outcomes within their areas
of responsibility. (Aragon, 1993) On the surface, these achievements appear to
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demonstrate Schermerhorn et al.'s (1997) suggestion that positive motivation
involves extra efforts in the level, direction, and persistence of work contributions.
In sum, ADL implementation, the SAF recreations, and the other
accountability initiatives allowed the WSP leadership ranks to apply their
performance expectations across and down the agency. At the same time, the microanalyses of performance data allowed operational staff to place peer-to-peer pressure
on those failing to perform. In doing so, the agency leadership appeared to be quite
effective in creating reciprocal influences between organizational cultures and
individual performance contribution.
This project's level of analysis and methodology prevented it from offering a
greater understanding about the variance of motivational factors, typologies, or
characteristics for individual employees, workgroups, or divisions. (Daft, 1999,
Prince et al., 2005; Robbins & Coulter, 1996)

Unfortunately, these same research

limitations prevent comparison of the case study results to other motivational theory
research aimed at describing the variance law enforcement motivation (Chusmir,
1984; Sheppard et al., 1974, Simon, 1999; Reiter, 1999; Van Maanen, 1975) or
public sector employee motivation. (Brewer et al., 2000; Perry, 1996) But, more
will be said about this in a later chapter.
Leadership, Culture, and Motivation

Summary

The interview analyses highlighted the constant interaction between and
among the WSP leadership, its various agency cultures, and individual employees.
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Each administration examined during the project attempted to establish a common
vision, create greater accountability, and align appropriate rewards with the broader
organizational direction. Although the introduction of ADL and the new SAFs
changed the dynamics of these interactions as discussed throughout the project, these
massive agency changes appeared to be mitigated by the latent leadership talent
within the WSP, its professional organizational culture, and exemplary employees.
However, the interviews did identify several challenges related to these
changes, not the least of which were: perceived inflexible executive leadership
styles, even in the face of significant implementation challenges and more
experienced leaders over time; some of Chief Serpas' behaviors that seemed at odds
with the agency culture; several significant countercultures and subcultures
throughout the agency; and many unproductive employees. In the view of many
participants, ADL implementation and the new SAFs became tools that demanded
much more from agency personnel, while they also reinforced many of the more
negative leadership behaviors that had become associated with the status quo.
Leadership and Strategic Management
The research project found evidence the leadership techniques and the change
initiatives studied throughout this project dramatically influenced productivity across
the WSP by nearly every description. It also found the WSP executive leadership
learned to adapt their managerial styles in response to the implementation of ADL,
the recreated SAFS, and the other accountability measures initiated during the
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project time frame. Additionally, other personnel chose to forego such changes or
could not make the adjustments. All these findings support Walsh's (1983) claim the
quality of a police department would be defined by its leadership and its managerial
flexibility, and similar claims by a variety of other law enforcement scholars, (cf,
Bratton, 1996; Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Couper & Lobitz, 1993; Dodenhoff,
1996; Guilianni & Kurson, 2002; McDonald, 2004; McDonald et al., 2002; Thibault
et al, 2001; Serpas, 2003, 2004; Shane, 2004a, 2004b; Stephens, 2005) They also
reinforce Jack Maple's claim CompStat would change policing in America and the
crime picture in America. (Dodenhoff, 1996, p. 6).
The project findings also support the strategic management theory that
explores the relationship between leadership and strategic management. For
example, both chiefs focused on producing results through use of the SAF process,
which allowed them to: introduce managerial and process innovations; empirically
test "what works;" frequently reinforce the improvement process; and create a
continuous learning process building on earlier lessons of previous phases. These
observations offer clear support for Schaffer and Thomson's (1992) assertions that
successful organizational change ought to focus on results. By extension, the project
found compelling evidence about the several levels of organizational change:
macro- and micro-levels (Conner, 1992), as described throughout the interviews; and
deep change (Quinn, 1996), most notably through the recreation of the SAFs and
their requisite accountability changes throughout the WSP.
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The project also found both chiefs produced change in the WSP, using a
strategic or future oriented view posited by Kouzes and Posner (1995), albeit in the
short- to intermediate-term. The chiefs' linkage of the strategic plan with ADL
principles and the recreated SAFs provided the means to implement these initiatives
throughout the entire agency and to reassess their progress using a predictable
schedule. Robbins and Coulter (1996) and Bryson (2004) suggested these last two
steps connected strategic planning with strategic management. This project found
evidence that both chiefs' strategic management of resources helped direct agency
activities toward desirable public safety outcomes. (Shafritz & Russell, 2003)
Further, it found such leadership was undertaken according to Bryson's prescribed
process: the rapid and smooth infusion of change strategies; a clear delineation of
"what needs to be done when, why, and by whom" (p. 239); and a process to identify
and fix problems as new solutions are implemented.
The case study also enhanced the understanding surrounding these leadership
and strategic management linkages. In essence, it called attention to the fact that
strategic leadership differed in focus from strategic management and the SAFs, as
the latter often led to a shorter-term perspective of accomplishments, challenges, and
measures. Indeed, several interview participants felt challenges often arose with an
inability to link SAF processes to broader strategic plan concepts and to re-create the
strategic plan contents as often as was necessary. While these limitations appear to
obfuscate "what works" for the longer-term, several senior executives felt these
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challenges could be addressed through the inclusion of more qualitative performance
measures and more frequent strategic plan reviews, revisions, and enhancements.
Lastly, the project calls attention to the question of whether more frequent
review of performance metrics would reenergize either their improvement or the
continuous learning process. The project interview analyses made it clear the SAF
process appeared to bog down into a fairly predictable routine early on, often to the
point it may have negatively affected senior executive attendance, engagement,
presenter creativity, and continuous learning. Here again, shorter-term coping
mechanisms were identified in the form of more directed questioning to begin and
more generalized overviews later on with the remaining time. Still, most interview
participants seemed to agree more predictable reviews, revisions, and changes
related to the SAF processes might have helped reinvigorate the freshness, energy,
and utility of the process.
Strategic Management Theory
As described earlier, the research findings offered evidence that strategic
management theory principles, including leadership of change and performance
metric re-design, were in use during the study period. The findings also suggested
Chiefs Serpas and Porter utilized strategic management principles to apply strategies
and evaluate their effects (Robbins & Coulter, 1996) and disperse resources to

achieve desired public safety objectives. (Shafritz and Russell, 2003)
The research project found anecdotal support for the existence of Lewin's
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(1947) "force field" concept, or an apparent operating norm protecting the WSP from
change initiatives. More specifically, Chief Serpas' interview offered several
firsthand vignettes about key political stakeholders' perceptions prior to his arrival,
especially as they related to their beliefs about the agency's current TLE efforts.
Earlier organizational descriptions and the interview analyses offered significant
proof that many of these changes in the WSP had been analogous to fine "tuning" or
incremental anticipated changes. These accounts also suggested Chief Sandberg
seemed to be pushing some "adaptation" in the form of reactive incremental change,
as she introduced the new SAF concept, modeled after earlier CompStat initiatives.
(Nadler & Tushman, 1995) All three viewpoints w^re reinforced by the 20-year core
TLE data and the interview themes across the key informant participants.
The interview analyses further traced the evolution of Lewin's iterative
change processes through the Serpas and Porter administrations, as they
implemented ADL, recreated the SAFs, and initiated other accountability measures.
In doing so, the case study offers clear evidence that Chief Serpas provided a
dramatic "re-orientation" throughout the WSP with the introduction of his
anticipatory discontinuous changes. It also identified the "re-creation" that occurred
with his forcing of reactive discontinuous changes, most notably with the SAF
reengineering. (Nadler & Tushman, 1995) Interestingly, the case study offers proof
that Chief Porter returned the agency to more adaptive change during his
administration, both in his remarks and in the executive interviews. (Nadler &
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Tushman, 1995) In sum, Rene' Ewing and Associates (2004) highlighted these same
trends, using slightly different language: Chief Sandberg- "initializing," Chief
Serpas- "focusing," and Chief Porter- "refining" (p. 14).
The project findings also built on the broader understandings of leadership
and strategic management through their identification of several useful clarifications.
First, strategic management endorses a fairly simplistic application of strategy and its
evaluation, which is roughly analogous to the integration of Balance Scorecard
principles into the WSP Strategic Plan or the simple proclamation of the ADL
principles in the agency. Yet, this project found both of these simplistic efforts, by
themselves, struggled to achieve their desired effect. It was only the inclusion of the
SAF processes that the Balanced Scorecard, ADL implementation, and the rigorous
performance measures in the WSP created change.
Second, public safety objectives were integrated within a broader set of
strategic goals designed to accomplish the agency mission through their impact on
desirable public safety outcomes. These objectives were also narrowed to better
focus specific workgroup productivity. As we have seen time and again, this effort
seemed to fuel productivity throughout the agency during the time frame of the case
study.
Taken together, the application of these concepts created meaningful change
through their broader linkage to specific accountability measures and the relentless
follow up during the monthly SAFs. At a minimum, these include: senior executive
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champions; desirable public safety outcomes broken down into logically connected
goals, objectives, and work activities; continuous leadership communique; recreated
monthly SAFs involving scrutiny of performance measures and their divisional
evolutions; meeting accountability standards; clear individual, workgroup, section,
and divisional performance expectations; public recognition of success, workgroup
achievement, and individual contribution; and active management by exception.
The research project analyses also found WSP change could be understood
using four general theories two researchers felt could serve as "building blocks for
explaining processes of change in organizations" (Van De Ven & Poole, 1995, p. 1).
For example, the case study described ADL and the SAF implementation as a means
to create greater public accountability, strategic purpose, and desirable public safety
outcomes (teleological theory), and as the resultant of multiple forces (dialectical
theory). The historical nature of the narrative (evolutionary theory) chronicled
change over time (life-cycle theory). The findings also suggest the first set of
changes were dramatic, while the second were more incremental, which mirrors
these authors' other assertions.
The project document reviews and interview analyses suggest dramatically
different organizational leadership views about organizational momentum before
Chief Serpas' implementation of ADL and related practices. During both chiefs'
administrations organizational momentum became analogous with positive
performance gains and favorable outcome indicators.
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Unfortunately, these broader research findings fell short of Jansen's more
detailed survey analyses surrounding United States Military Academy (USMA)
cadets' response to a change initiative. We will return to consider the broader
implications of this research limitation in the next chapter.
In summary, this theoretical review compared the project results to the
leadership and management literature. The case study found compelling evidence to
suggest ADL implementation and the SAFs helped contribute to greater public safety
in Washington State. Countless examples emerged from the document reviews and
the interview analyses about how the contemporaneous change initiatives improved
leadership approach, application of resources, and organizational collaboration on
projects of mutual interest. This finding also calls attention to the evolutionary
success of CompStat, which served as the basis for much of ADL innovation.
Together, these successes likely exceeded Jack Maple's earlier emboldened claim:
"An organization takes on the characteristics of the leader and if the leaders take on
this posture [CompStat], this will change not only policing in America, this will
change the crime picture in America" (Dodenhoff, 1996, p. 6).
Taken as a whole, these observations highlight several salient strategic
management findings. In short, the project offers a myriad of practical and
theoretical lessons for its readers about how successful change could be implemented
in a state law enforcement agency with a comprehensive public safety mission. In
the next chapter we will explore these contributions a little further.
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Theory Summary
The earlier interview analyses and their illumination of theory suggest the
preliminary organizational change model proposed earlier in the project was oversimplified.

Indeed, the project findings suggest the existence of a far more complex

external environment involving contemporaneous concerns about CompStat, public
accountability, and the Balanced Scorecard. Beyond these external pressures, Figure
4 depicts a more complex CompStat implementation process that begins with the
chief executive and moves downward through the organization, as was described in
the WSP.

Chief Executive

Communication

A
CompStat

Feedback Loops

V
Individual

Figure 4. The Complex CompStat Implementation Process
As illustrated, as CompStat principles were communicated, introduced, and
implemented downward in the organization, work expectations throughout the
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agency began to be influenced. At the same time, individuals began to re-shape
these performance standards by how they performed, communicated with and among
their peers, and provided feedback through informal and formal channels. To the
extent the organizational feedback loops were healthy (which many interview
participants questioned during this project as noted throughout its findings), these
responses were then communicated to the chief executive, so his/her implementation
process could be reinforced, altered, or changed entirely.
This project reinforced the critical role healthy, two-way communication and
feedback loops play in an organizational setting. The interviews suggest these
discussions functioned reasonably well among the executive staff. However, they
call into question the health of these interactions between the executives and the
commanders. Therefore, this depiction leaves little doubt about the criticality of twoway organizational communication and feedback loops up and down the agency
hierarchy and at all levels of the organization. In fact, their prominent locations
suggest that interruptions with either factor can significantly disrupt the quality of
the leader-follower interactions.
Beyond these change logistics, this project's findings suggest the very
leadership of the organization, its cultures, and individuals are altered by the
introduction of CompStat. In part, this may have to do with Walsh's (2001) earlier
observations that CompStat appears to introduce strategic management principles
into the organization. In other words, the infusion of accountability standards affects
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the very nature of the leadership interactions with the organizational cultures and
agency individuals by offering both unique challenges and beneficial rewards. These
reciprocal relationships are illustrated in Figure 5.

Leadership

CompStat

Agency Cultures

Employee Motivation

Figure 5. The Complex Organizational Change Model
Several additional observations can be made about Figure 5, beyond those
discussed earlier in the chapter. Most notably, the model is portrayed using a single
perspective, a series of organizational factors, and many reciprocal relationships.
Each characteristic will be described in further detail below.
A Single Perspective
The model is portrayed as one lens with which to reflect on the change
process examined in this research study. As such, it depicts those organizational
factors believed to have affected ADL implementation in the WSP, as elucidated by
the project findings. Yet, it is worthwhile to note its singular perspective, especially
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in light of: the complexity of the factors under study; the commonalities of many of
the project participants' views, but their remaining individuality and viewpoints; and
the project's limitations, which will be discussed further in the next chapter.
Organizational Factors
The model involves the original organizational factors reviewed in the
literature review and examined in throughout the project. The results of both
endeavors make it clear each organizational factor contributes to changeindividually and collectively. Much more will be said about how the project
enhanced this earlier literature and organizational practice in the next chapter.
Reciprocal Relationships
The organizational concepts have been depicted involving reciprocal
relationships. This project reinforced the notion that many of these factors are
characterized by influential and reciprocal relationships. The literature review found
widespread theoretical support for the idea that leadership influences organizational
culture, individual motivation, strategic management principles, and CompStat/ ADL
implementation. At the same time, the project results found that leadership was
influenced oftentimes by these latter concepts, honed by its application, or
necessitated some change in the interaction between leaders and followers.
Chief Serpas' interview provides one such example. He suggested
emphatically that his leadership style was influenced by what he described as the
formal professional culture of the WSP. This observation alone suggests he made
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the changes in his own style necessary to influence the culture he found in the WSP.
But, he also added he had a keen awareness of an informal culture and its possible
questioning of the breadth, depth, and need for so many performance measures. This
observation led him to recognize a critical need to sell his initiatives throughout the
state in order to positively affect their long-term viability and success.
With these theoretical implications in mind, let's consider the project's
practical insights. This is the focus of the final chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT
Case Study Limitations, Contributions, and Implications
The case study contributions, limitations, and areas for future research
associated with the project are the subject of this chapter. It begins by describing the
case study limitations. The project contributions follow, which involves
consideration of the practical and theoretical utility of its findings. Finally, the
project implications are discussed, both for future practice and future research along
with some discussion about the knowledge gaps such work might be expected to fill.
Case Study Limitations
Perhaps the greatest challenge associated with the case study relates to the
historical realities surrounding Accountability Driven Leadership (ADL)
implementation in the Washington State Patrol (WSP). Indeed, its initiation
occurred before many rigorous, empirical, organizational assessments could be
completed throughout the agency. Although some, quantitative, traffic law
enforcement data existed, it was unclear how much Chief Serpas consulted this
information as he began his transformative process. As noted earlier, the preimplementation organizational climate assessments were limited to the perspectives
provided by external political and law enforcement stakeholders and the internal
executive interviews. As a practical executive leadership approach, key informant

interviews offer invaluable insights, as the project findings highlight. But, overall,
these beginnings sharply curtailed the potential follow-up evaluations.
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Given these historical realities, the principal researcher chose a conceptual
research framework that examined ADL implementation from the perspective of an
executive change initiative, initiated by an external change agent. He felt these
organizational changes could be studied best by examining the related leadership and
management strategies, so he re-traced the rough evolution of ADL as it moved
across and down the agency. One difficulty that may have arisen with this approach
was its reliance on a wide range of participant-observers, as the project sought
information from those most responsible for creating the change studied throughout
the project. Key informant interviews, and especially those of participant-observers,
can suffer from several, significant, empirical limitations, as described previously.
(Creswell, 2002; Patton, 1987, 2002; Polit & Beck, 2004; Singleton & Straits, 1999;
Sylvia et al., 1997; Yin, 2003)
Unfortunately, the project interviews did not begin until three and a half years
after Chief Serpas' departure and two and a half years after Chief Porter's departure.
Both challenges call into question many of the participants' ability to correctly
remember their observations and perceptions. One view of this difficulty suggests
this delay may have reduced the interview descriptions of the more controversial
aspects of these changes. Although, it may have helped that the WSP has continued
to utilize broad ADL concepts and the SAFs in many of the same ways the Serpas
and Porter administrations had done until 2008. Only then, have some changes
begun to occur at the margins. To help further offset these concerns, the project
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interviews included participants from each organizational bureau and several who
had suffered serious career setbacks during this period. Therefore, the 34 project
interviews seemed to resoundingly refute these suspicions.
An alternative view, suggests that this temporal pause provided the key
informants the proper perspective to offer some unique insights about ADL
implementation. One manifestation of this viewpoint became the participants'
surprising candor about the significant challenges associated with these initiatives,
including work-life balance issues, stress level increases, wide emotional swings, and
personal frustrations.
Regardless, the project interviews sought participants' stories, thoughts, and
views about the early beginnings of many of the current organizational operations.
During many of these interviews, the participants used their past experiences with
ADL implementation and the questionnaire content to reflect on many significant
and longer lasting positive and negative aspects of ADL in more cogent and concise
ways. Arguably, this may have occurred because the interviews were undertaken
after some time had passed since the end of both administrations. Therefore, the
project's future utility may be greater than imagined at first blush.
Beyond these general considerations, the project also suffered from several
limitations related to the specific organizational factors under study. Several of these
challenges will be described in greater detail below.
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Leadership
The research findings fell short of offering some, specific, evidence-based
assessment about why WSP leadership confrontations occurred in a public venue.
This is especially troublesome in light of the fact Chief Serpas knew the WSP
leadership often criticized the first SAFs because they were seen as counter
productive and failed to "build presenters up." Some participants suggested these
conflicts were meant to motivate presenters, attendees, and workers to contribute
beyond their current performance outputs, although the passage of time has reduced
such proof to little more than vignettes on both sides. Regardless, this was a very
unfortunate limitation given the fact that many interview participants had asserted
that such confrontations were so contrary to an organizational culture, which had
historically "praised in public and criticized in private."
Culture
Some interview participants suggested the tensions between executive
leadership directives and executive objections worked themselves out through
significant leader alienation. Essentially, this perspective felt a "culture of minimal
compliance" was created in the leadership ranks, where the executives were not
engaged thoroughly in the change processes. At the same time, several
countercultures were identified during the interview analyses. Unfortunately, this

project and its research framework limitations left much more work to be done to
better identify and describe these cultural norms, values, and impacts.
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Motivation
The conceptual framework contributed to several limitations related to
employee motivation. As alluded to just now, one troublesome limitation of this
project was its inability to probe executive leader feelings of frustration, their
magnitude, and effects more completely. Unfortunately, this limitation spilled over
to an inability to decipher a significant number of organizational followers'
perspectives. This difficulty became especially true for the more operational levels
of the organization, which, arguably, could include many middle managers, frontline
supervisors, and the frontline staffs. In doing so, the project failed to locate
conclusive proof about whether leadership activities were designed to satisfy
subordinate needs or how employees felt about the reward valences during this time
frame. Ultimately, both limitations narrowed the scope of the findings and produced
a less comprehensive view of state law enforcement change.
Strategic Management
A final difficulty relates to the challenges associated with truly understanding
how and why public safety outcomes fluctuate- positively and negatively. Perhaps
the most illustrative example of this quandary is best exemplified by considering
seatbelt compliance in the state of Washington. While tempting to equate one of the
Nation's highest compliance rates to the ever-greater enforcement efforts by the
WSP during this period, such an assumption would be pure fantasy. This is because
increased seatbelt usage rates, like many desirable traffic safety outcomes, have
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resulted from a complex array of traffic safety coalition efforts. These partnerships
cross all governmental levels and involve private enterprises and nonprofit
organizations. This example should remind readers that it is critical to conduct far
more extensive studies before correlative claims can be made between law
enforcement activities (positive or negative) and performance outcomes (positive or
negative).
As readers might expect, these limitations helped identify several areas of
possible research. Some of these specific needs will be considered next.
Case Study Contributions
The value of a case study is established by the uniqueness of its artful
narrative, without being so arcane that no one could apply its practical lessons.
(Lowi, 1958; Yin, 2003; Yin & Campbell, 2002; Cooper, personal communication)
This project attempted to fulfill these ideals by balancing its practical applications
with its theoretical content, as a means to advance the scholarly debate with both
endeavors. (Bryman & Stephens, 1996; Burns & Grove, 1981; Waltz & Bausell,
1981) Therefore, its practical and theoretical contributions will be reviewed in
greater detail below.
Practical Value
This case study contributed to public administration practice through its
scrutiny of governmental initiatives designed to produce valuable, comprehensive,
public safety outcomes. In particular, the case study should help guide state law
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enforcement leaders in several ways, as they seek to create results-oriented change.
First, the case study offered readers a rare evidence-based glimpse into a state
law enforcement organization. (Bechtel, 1995) It examined a current state law
enforcement change initiative within the broader leadership and management
contexts, which may have helped propel its success. Its diverse literature review,
document analyses, and key informant interview questions made an important
scholarly contribution to this previously neglected area. Its principal researcher
believes this broader perspective will appeal to a wide audience of public
administration and criminal justice scholars, consultants, professionals, and students.
Second, the case study also examined these broader leadership and
management strategies across a diverse set of law enforcement services and support
activities, which are performed by sworn and civilian employees. Shane (2004c)
alluded to extending CompStat principles to other law enforcement specialties
beyond the activities traditionally undertaken by sworn employees by highlighting
implementation examples in Baltimore and Philadelphia, (cf., Linden, 2002; City of
Baltimore, 2005; Philadelphia Police Department, 2005) However, this scholarship
clearly built on Chief Serpas' earlier leadership example and writings. (Serpas, 2003,
2004)
Third, this broader perspective and its commensurate research methods

explore several diverse organizational development themes. The interview
participants were drawn from the executive ranks of the WSP, whose members
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possess diverse vocational backgrounds, knowledge-bases, and experiences. The
interviews probed these change initiatives' ability to manage an organizational
transition within the parameters of a traditional, hierarchical, unionized, state law
enforcement agency. Consequently, the resulting narrative will provide the next
generation of state law enforcement executives with an opportunity to gather insights
about the strengths, weaknesses, and oversights of these change strategies.
Finally, the research project contributes to the practical debates about how
positive change is created in a state law enforcement organization. Its detailed case
study may help law enforcement practitioners begin to think more carefully about the
relationship between their public safety measures, outputs, partnerships, and
outcomes. In short, this work helps circumvent the tendency to assume all law
enforcement agencies are the same, with rare exceptions (cf, Torres, 1987; Bechtel,
1995), or to consider other unique agency leadership challenges, jurisdictional
realities, organizational cultures, or management practices. (Bechtel, 1995; Cordner,
1978; Falcone, 2001; Schmalleger, 2003; Torres, 1987)
Beyond these broader practical considerations, the project offered some
specific leadership and management contributions. Some of these will be considered
in greater detail below.
Principle One: WSP leadership is a very complex endeavor. The research

project provided unequivocal evidence the leadership of the WSP is a very complex
endeavor at both the senior and junior levels of the agency. Consequently, the
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leader-follower relationships are far more complicated than any one
transformational, situational, transactional, or path-goal leadership style alone.
In some sense, readers can gain some appreciation for the enormity of these
leadership tasks by considering the earlier discussion of the organizational setting for
a moment. During this period, the WSP was a statewide law enforcement agency
with a comprehensive public safety mission, as outlined in Appendix A, split across
six organizational bureaus. The bureaus included: Field Operations (FOB), Fire
Protection, Forensic Laboratory Services, Investigative Services, Management
Services, and Technical Services. The agency employed approximately 2,300
employees, split nearly evenly between sworn and civilian ranks, with a biennial
budget of approximately $338 million dollars. (Serpas, 2003, 2004)
Principle Two: Establish a leadership vision. The interview participants
frequently questioned the existence of a broader executive leadership vision. These
comments highlighted the participants' beliefs that shorter-term change needed to be
linked to a broader direction, strategy, and super ordinate goals. (Prince et al., 2005)
In fact, their comments suggest a massive re-engineering project like ADL
implementation requires these linkages to be clear at the executive leadership levels
of the organization, so they can be communicated easily across and down the agency.
Most recently, FOB, working in partnership with its traffic safety
stakeholders, has endorsed the creation of the Washington State Strategic Highway
Safety Plan or Target Zero. Target Zero and its goal to eliminate all traffic related
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fatalities and disabling injuries by 2030, is predicated on the belief that each of these
collisions and their aftermath is a preventable tragedy. (Ursino, 2007) The initiative
is likely to create a number of its own challenges if the results of this case study
serve as any guide. On the one hand, this new effort probably represents the essence
of Chiefs Serpas and Porter's earlier arguments related to their failure to articulate
firm traffic law enforcement (TLE) goals, as they each believed not even one
preventable death or disabling injury was acceptable. On the other hand, Target Zero
potentially opens a myriad of other agency leadership questions, many of which were
brought to the fore in this case study, albeit in a slightly different time frame. As one
small example, leaders will have to think much more innovatively about the
inclusion of technology to help achieve these unprecedented gains. In many ways
then, agency leaders' ability to learn from this ADL case study may prove invaluable
as FOB attempts to move toward a totally unprecedented performance goal.
Principle Three: Set the leadership tone early, often, and interpersonally.
The project highlighted Chief Serpas' early leadership efforts, executive interviews,
and staff appointments as the means to: define his leadership initiatives, evaluate
agency talent, and appoint loyal supporters to replace older leadership that had
elected to retire. At the same time, the project interview themes suggested several
practical considerations for any senior and junior executives undertaking significant
organizational changes.
The interview analyses also suggested the organizational shift from an
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emphasis on strategic planning and problem oriented policing (POP) principles to
ADL, utilizing the recreated SAFs, represented a massive re-engineering of
operational practices in most districts and divisions. The project found many senior
executive and commander interview participants said they had significant confusion
about Chief Serpas' intended direction early on. They also spoke candidly about
their significant fear about what the organizational future held, especially for its
politically appointed leadership.
The analyses also revealed each of these agency leaders, even with their
confusion, was responsible for leading change within their own bureau, district, or
division. In fact, these leaders themselves candidly admitted their confusion about
the agency direction sometimes engendered significant follower confusion.
Additionally, they were critical of the associated stress accumulations throughout the
agency, due to the confusion that surrounded change initiatives. In short, they felt
many of these problems could have been avoided if greater care had been taken to
shape, market, communicate, and truly listen to the leadership feedback loops.
Consequently, it is worth reinforcing the fact these leaders' higher positions within
the centralized WSP bureaucracy meant more followers, districts, divisions, and
workgroups were affected in a negative manner as a result of this initial confusion.
Principle Four: Teach, teach, teach. At a minimum, these project findings
suggest the importance of chief executive teaching, guiding, coaching, and
communication skills during the initiation of such massive change initiatives. The
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prescribed remedies offered by the participants regularly involved the addition of
greater chief executive communique and executive training opportunities. Finally,
the interview analyses suggest a variety of internal expertise with operational data
collection and statistical analyses existed in the crime labs (cases pending, processed,
and turnaround times as examples) and Budget and Fiscal Services (work activities,
cost accounting, and budgeting to name a few) long before ADL was implemented.
Reportedly, the crime laboratories had been using data charts designed by Dr. Barry
Logan, the Forensic Laboratory Services Director, for some time. (IPs, 11, 12, 22,
26) The project highlights the FLSB successes during this time frame, both with
adding additional lab space and employees during some hyper-competitive funding
cycles. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest these personnel may have proven
invaluable as knowledge brokers during such a massive organizational reengineering.
Principle Five: Communicate relentlessly. The general confusion about ADL
implementation described earlier also carried over into meaningful performance
measure creation, implementation, and assessment in many areas of the agency. The
interviews seemed to suggest ADL implementation in the WSP was far less efficient
than it might have been, as many members of its senior and junior leadership ranks
groped through defining meaningful performance measures, re-orienting their staffs,

and seeking operational buy-in.
However, the research interviews also identified some useful best practices.
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Dr. Barry Logan, the Forensic Laboratory Services Bureau director, reportedly
introduced quantitative and qualitative measures into the state crime labs in 2000.
Interestingly, his reported rationale at the time had been to collect, analyze, and
present data about crime lab technicians workloads to gubernatorial and legislative
officials in order to help convince them about the labs' future expansion needs. At
the same time, the labs had a myriad of external oversight, scrutiny, and
stakeholders, so the data proved useful in helping to convince others about personnel
productivity, quality, and workload. Similarly, Budget and Fiscal Services had been
working with performance data in an effort to support agency budgetary requests for
some time. Both of these endeavors had begun prior to ADL implementation and
apparently had begun with significantly less severe change trajectories. Finally, Fire
Protections Bureau executives and the leadership from at least two investigative
divisions used the challenge of ADL implementation to develop new performance
measures to gather their statewide supervisors and/or workforces together.
Reportedly, the ensuing discussions sought greater operational personnel input about
worthwhile performance measures, targets, and outcomes.
Principle Six: Connect strategic goals and public performance reviews with
broader leadership messages. The project findings suggested transformational
leadership and its principles offered great value during a massive re-engineering like
ADL implementation. Chief Serpas was clear about what motivated him to
implement ADL in the WSP in both his articles and his interview for this project.
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His goals included:
A. Re-focusing the WSP on its strategic goals, objectives, and performance
B. Defining clear work priority in each bureau and functional unit through
the implementation of performance measures designed to create greater
effectiveness and efficiency
C. Increasing collaboration between commissioned and civil service
personnel
D. Including the four CompStat management tenets
E. Utilizing the new strategic advancement forum (SAF) format
Beyond these considerations, the research suggested the new SAFs: required
the participation of the entire executive staff; focused bureaucratic expertise,
resources, and partnerships; allowed the exchange of best practices; and established
middle management accountability. Similarly, the project interviews called attention
to several other common ideals like: equal treatment of commissioned and civilian
personnel; connecting ADL implementation and its shorter-term performance
measures to intermediate-term planning goals; integrating the use of financial
measures in every SAF presentation; and improving levels of service. Additionally,
Rene' and Associates (2004) identified four benefits of the SAFs, which included: a
"process for alignment; broad communications to all bureaus; immediate fixes; and
Chiefs focus areas" (p. 15). Finally, Chief Serpas (2003) broadly described the
benefits of his accountability changes as involving: executive leadership setting the
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tone; creating knowledgeable leaders; highlighting excellence by all staff; building
teams through collaboration; facilitating honest dialogue; solving problems
immediately; creating positive risk takers; and dealing with mixed reactions.
The interview analyses uncovered some truly ingenious attempts by the
district commanders to rise to the level of the related performance challenges
through the use of some very insightful leadership messaging. In particular, they
oftentimes motivated their personnel with more concrete performance targets amidst
the more nebulous chief executive messages that no amount of TLE effort would
ever be enough in the face of even one traffic fatality on Washington's roadways.
Some leaders admittedly struggled in this environment, which allowed some union
representatives to spin the story that the agency was using rigid performance quotas.
Other leaders worked to define their expectations and goals and used their leadership
communique to recognize superior work contributions and reinforce these messages.
Taken together, these findings suggest the chief executive leadership might have
learned a great deal about how to better structure their own messages had they
worked to ensure their own leader feedback loops worked more effectively,
efficiently, and accountably. In short, feedback loops were essential mechanisms to
ensure leadership, systems, and processes remained open, transparent, and useful.
By nearly every key informant account, ADL implementation, the SAF

recreations, and the accountability measures instituted in the WSP during this period
produced significant productivity gains and focused operational endeavors
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throughout the agency. The most commonly cited examples are those related to TLE
successes related to increased visibility, core mission enforcement productivity,
seatbelt compliance, and collision reductions. Arguably, TLE remained the public
persona of the agency, regardless of whether TLE productivity gains were entirely
responsible for all the positive traffic safety outcomes. Consequently, the leadership
emphasis to achieve widespread traffic safety successes arguably created public trust
and legislative capital that extended far beyond these traditional activities.
Principle Seven: Think carefully about how to apply situational and
transactional leadership to achieve the best results. The interview analyses
indicated situational leadership techniques were in use throughout the study time
frame. The results suggest the concerns surrounding greater employee workloads
and higher levels of public conflict during this time period were problematic from a
situational leadership perspective. On the one hand, the findings imply WSP
employees' understanding the chief executive leaderships' need to utilize a directive
approach at times, as the WSP was a para-military agency. On the other, the
interview responses clearly indicated the participants' view that such techniques
were viewed oftentimes as mismatches between leader style and follower
commitment, and regularly viewed as micro- and over-management. Additionally,
these agency executives' leadership techniques were perceived as "harder
approaches," when it seemed like more "influential approaches" might have been
more desirable. In situational leadership terms, this might have required agency
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executives to move from more directive-telling approaches to more participative
techniques like selling, supporting, and delegating.
The interviews seemed to highlight the importance of the followers' self
image to the whole the situational leadership-follower relationship. Clearly, the
analyses suggest most of the followers were comfortable with their leadership
proficiency, support of the chief executive, and desire to create change.
Additionally, the interview analyses clearly highlighted the transactional
nature of the SAFs. In fact, the participants regularly spoke about the monthly
creation of SAFs as the product of a series of data collection, analysis, verification,
and presentation building exchanges between and among workgroups and their
leadership. They also discussed the forum interactions, which many felt focused
fairly narrowly on exchanges of executive power, decision-making, and resource
allocation, based on past achievements and/or promises to produce additional valued
public safety outcomes.
In fact, the analyses revealed the more transactional the SAFs became, the
more they seemed to be perceived negatively, or merely as a means to increase
employee work, using overly directive means. Ironically, this led some followers to
undertake their own "transactional means," which reportedly led to fairly uninspired
participation.
Principle Eight: Utilize path-goal leadership practices to structure valuable
work performance results. The project findings underscored the importance of
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aligning executive leadership messages with performance expectations and realistic
goal setting, as they regularly do in nearly every other sector and profession. In
essence, these messages help shape both the workplace culture and individual
motivation.
For example, the bureau SAFs allowed the executive leadership to help
disseminate their performance expectations, reward criteria, and motivational
guidance to the agency leadership. In turn, the executives utilized their divisional
SAFs to sell this performance measurement direction downward to the operational
levels of the agency. Time and again, the leaders suggested these forums produced
successes within their areas of responsibility. Oftentimes, the local SAFs created
successes by clarifying the performance measures in use, outcome goals, and
recognizing exemplary performance. In essence then, both the bureau and local
SAFs became a path-goal leadership instrument.
Principle Nine: Do not over-rely on situational, transactional, and path-goal
leadership techniques. The research interview analyses offer compelling evidence
that situational, transactional, and path-goal leadership techniques were present
during the implementation of both chiefs' change initiatives in the WSP. But, the
findings also suggest the three leadership approaches suffer from similar limitations
when applied in this organizational context. Their common difficulty appears to
involve their reduction of the leader-follower relationship to a series of tightly
focused interactions designed to accomplish fairly narrow objectives. The interview
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participants pointed most often to the SAF interactions to reinforce these views, as
they often perceived these forums to take on an overly directive, prescriptive, and
telling approach.
The interview analyses also provide clear evidence the leader-follower
relationships in the WSP are far more complex than any one of the situational,
transactional, and path-goal singular styles alone. These observations suggest several
tangential thoughts. The interview participants felt ADL implementation, the SAF
recreations, and the accountability measures instituted in the WSP during this period
were dramatic re-engineering initiatives. By extension then, an over-reliance on
these three leadership approaches may have been a quintessential leader-follower
mismatch, as they seem to work more like leadership tools in this context. The
leadership implication is these three approaches may be most useful when dealing
with fairly narrowly focused challenges, difficulties, and issues in this organizational
context.
Principle Ten: Leadership and performance management should
complement each other. By nearly every description, the leadership techniques and
the change initiatives studied throughout this project dramatically influenced
productivity across the WSP, using each of these broad concepts. The analyses also
highlighted the critical role the relentless follow-up associated with the monthly

SAFs contributed to these productivity gains. Readers may recall, similar
observations led an external team of consultants to suggest: "The SAF process is
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used to 'get things done' at [the] WSP" (Ewing et al, 2004, p. 14). Additionally,
many of the interview participants felt the initiatives served as the foundation of
longer-term changes, mostly in the form of agency leadership development, which
would have been impossible without these earlier beginnings. While none of these
findings suggests there were not other unintended consequences associated with
ADL implementation, the organizational history- before and after- suggests this has
always been the case with every executive leadership initiative implemented
throughout the agency.
Practically speaking, a comprehensive mix of transformational, transactional,
situational, and path-goal leadership techniques seems to offer the best means to lead
during this time frame. The evolutionary combination of these techniques seemed to
balance the complex, dynamic, and multi-faceted leader-follower relationships that
existed in such an environment. These realities call attention to the need to identify
more robust leadership philosophies, which may have been able to create even
greater and more sustainable success. Therefore, let us begin our search by
examining the remaining proposed organizational factor interactions as outlined in
new organizational model.
Principle Eleven: Ensure the leadership vision influences organizational
cultures. This project offered strong evidence the WSP is a very special place to
work. Beyond its Pollyannaish sounding characterization, the interview analyses
made clear there were many leaders who genuinely tried to embrace ADL
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implementation and faithfully present the SAFs according to their intention. Indeed,
by the end of the project, it was clear the former far outnumbered the anecdotes
about some district and division commanders who had difficulties with
organizational commitment, empowerment difficulties, and SAF coping tactics.
These realities also underscore the notion that many other agencies may have had
much more serious problems, conflicts, and confrontations during such a massive reengineering.
These observations suggest a number of useful practical leadership and
culture contributions. First, Chief Serpas' leadership rationale, even as an external
change agent, resonated with most of the agency leadership and employees. It also
seems to suggest there was a reservoir of latent leadership talent in the agency at the
time, meaning these leaders seemed to be waiting for the right leadership catalyst to
galvanize their individual commitments, collective action, and creative collaboration.
No where do such observations become more apparent throughout the interview
analyses than in the nearly universal attempts made by both senior and junior
leadership to sell the advantages of ADL implementation to the organizational
culture. The interviews revealed no shortage of some serious implementation
problems, but these individuals remained committed to fixing many of the problems
that emerged from the very beginning.

Similarly, the senior and junior executives were able to connect with many
cultures within the agency. This became clear as many significant problems related
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to ADL implementation emerged. The project left little doubt many of these issues
centered on data collection, analysis, verification, and presentation issues. Chief
Serpas himself was sensitive to each of these difficulties and the antiquated data
systems within the WSP, but he also understood the critical need to begin sooner
rather than later, even if that meant the data systems were not perfect.
Therefore, there are few better examples of the level of cultural commitment
that existed in the agency, than the dedication exemplified within the TAR support
staff. Readers may recall the time and activity reports (TARs) were used to record
all FOB troopers' TLE contacts and their dispositions. Consequently, the TAR
support staffs were decentralized around the state and were required to enter this data
into a centralized database. Local TAR support staffs were tasked with strict data
entry deadlines and a myriad of special request projects, which included tasks related
to TARs verification, cross-checking data, and hand tabulating other data measures.
In turn, the TAR records were data-mined by the TAR Support Group staff,
assigned to Budget and Fiscal Services in Olympia, in order to develop the SAF
presentations. This workgroup was tasked with very sizeable workload fluctuations
during this time period as SAF presentation formats were developed, modified, and
solidified, and most of these changes required significant data manipulations behind
the scenes. They also became tasked with projects aimed at verifying TARs entry
accuracy, data verification checks, and TLE summary data report creation and
modification.
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Ultimately, this data aggregation, presentation, and detail became the
backbone of the whole performance measurement system in FOB. In short, the TAR
system and its reports cross-tabulated troopers' time commitments to various work
activities with their specific work outputs. This detailed performance data became
the primary means that allowed executives, middle managers, and supervisors to
decipher which workgroups and employees were working steadfastly, superficially,
or not at all. Additionally, this data served as the central repository for all the data
used to create the SAF presentations, which would be scrutinized in public.
Finally, it should be noted the leadership interviews did identify, describe,
and criticize some serious counter cultures within the agency. In the view of many
leaders, several of these groups became entrenched in their own thoughts about ADL
implementation, the SAFs, and the other accountability measures during this time
period. However, it is difficult to know exactly how to quantify the number of
employees who belonged to these groups or to infer how their membership was
impacted by ADL implementation, based solely on the project analyses.
Principle Twelve: Leadership must involve executive and operational
followers. One of the most remarkable findings of this research was how faithfully
the interview participants tried to implement ADL and recreate the SAFs, first
according to Chief Serpas' initiatives and later under Chief Porter's leadership. This
is especially interesting in light of the fact that Chief Serpas was an external change
agent, who re-engineered many of the WSP management and accountability
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practices and totally recreated the SAFs. Additionally, both chiefs persisted with
their dramatic change initiatives despite the highly unionized environment in the
agency at the time and Chief Serpas' total inexperience with such work
arrangements.
These successes may be even more remarkable, given the significant project
findings surrounding the early confusion, stress, and strain with ADL
implementation at the highest ranks of the agency. Time and again, the key
informants suggested the agency culture was one where people were motivated both
to be led and to make the necessary changes to ensure agency success. Chief Serpas
recognized this fact, as he traveled the state at the beginning of his administration to
discuss the future needs of the agency with nearly all the executive leadership. At
the same time, Chief Serpas had made similar, tumultuous, agency changes while at
NOPD with the help of the Linder Consulting Group. (Serpas, 2003) Yet, for some
reason he did not involve any formal consultants, facilitators, or teachers as he made
this massive course correction in the WSP. Consequently, ADL implementation was
not without its personal casualties, some of whom paid with excessive tolls taken on
their careers, relationships, families, and personal lives.
These conflicts hint at significant re-engineering and cultural oversights.
Like several other lessons contained in this case study, it seems reasonable to suggest
future WSP leaders would do well to over-plan, over-communicate, involve more
personnel, and reasonably pace their change initiatives if they want to reduce
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leadership casualties, embrace cultural values, maximize employee buy-in, and
maintain invaluable feedback loops. In short, there was a leadership imperative to
communicate performance expectations and all performance successes- early, often,
and always. The findings also suggested early setbacks demoralized employees who
worked as hard as they could, and many of whom were invested heavily in SAF
presentation success, due to the sheer amount of time they spent assembling it for
presentation. In other words, when SAFs were criticized heavily in public venues,
many of these support personnel reportedly became upset.
The project uncovered many perceptions that the SAFs became forums to
over- and micro-manage executives in ways that oftentimes demoralized presenters
and undermined their commands, independent judgment, and future development.
The interview analyses strongly criticized the continuing string of decisions that
undermine the strategic focus of SAFs and allowed them to devolve into a means to
manage performance benchmarks and local projects only. Some participants
suggested these lessons may have been some of the most important because, in their
view, many of the "easy issues" have been addressed and future performance will
likely become even harder to achieve. Therefore, the future leaders' ability to
remain focused strategically will provide the means to tap all the talent in the agency
and to leverage these massive resources against the most vexing problems.

The project interviews suggest the decisions to remove otherwise competent
leadership personnel should be made very carefully. It was clear the participants felt
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the absence of many of the earlier, badly needed, educational opportunities meant the
later removal decisions were viewed oftentimes with skepticism, suspicion, and
worries about fair play by many remaining members of the agency. This seemed
especially true when those involved were revered by so many other employees. At
the same time, these personnel moves placed even greater pressures on the remaining
organizational leadership to perform, which revealed a myriad of questions about the
proper leadership balance between absolute organizational efficiency and
consideration for employees. At a minimum, these observations suggest
organizational accountability cannot succeed without some concern for agency
leadership success and the employees themselves. The responses also called into
question the wisdom of leadership by intimidation or motivation through fear.
The interview analyses suggested the agency leadership needed to get much
better at facilitating performance discussions with middle managers and operational
personnel. Time and again, the participants said change initiatives struggled early in
their areas of responsibility because these discussions were hard to frame. Over
time, as these conversations became easier and more frequent, the employees began
to buy-in. These findings suggest these leadership communique offered the
organizational leverage necessary to translate fairly complex executive leadership
initiatives into localized productivity targeted to influence desirable public safety
outcomes.
Perhaps the best example of these difficulties relates to TLE management.
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Amidst all the uncertainty surrounding ADL implementation, several leaders
observed most troopers joined the agency to make a difference in their communities
and just wanted someone to provide them some direction, so they could keep their
sergeants happy. Over time, these TLE leadership issues worked themselves out as
the executive needs for high visibility patrols and surges in violator contacts were
aligned with the individual needs for desirable awards, personal recognition,
specialty positions, and teaching opportunities.
In sum, some of the difficulties related to leader and follower breakdowns
during this time period may have been reflected in five year exit interview data
encompassing this time period, as compiled by the WSP HRD in early 2008. Many
of those who left during this time period said what they disliked most about working
for the WSP was their command staff [11/37 (32%)- commissioned] and lack of
leadership [7/45 (28%)- civil service], inequality [7/45 (28%)], and low morale [4/45
(16%)]. It should be noted that this data has significant limitations including: the
use of a small sample size; participant self-selection bias; the involvement of some
employees the agency preferred to leave; and broad categorizations to name a few.
Principle Thirteen: A reciprocal relationship exists between organizational
culture and employee motivation. The research interviews called particular attention
to the reciprocal relationship between culture and motivation. In fact, the junior and
senior leadership interview highlighted their attempts to influence culture and
employees using district and division-specific performance targets. Such discussions
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took place in a wide variety of venues, including: division and district supervisory
meetings; local SAFs; leadership communique of all types, and leadership attendance
at employee meetings. Finally, as performance data became more precise in many
areas of the agency, it provided an invaluable means to pressure both countercultures
and unproductive employees, using both formal and informal means.
The WSP investigative responsibilities provided an excellent illustration of
these relationships. During the initiation of ADL, several executive staff discussions
occurred about how best to measure the investigative function. Reportedly, Chief
Serpas had concerns about some of the investigative productivity in the WSP.
Meanwhile, investigative detectives and many of their managers worried about
sacrificing case work quality in the face of any quantitative performance measures.
One leader encapsulated the difficulty with this tension when they noted if
someone's child is missing they are not really concerned how many cases the WSP is
working, they are only worried about whether their child's case is being properly
investigated. (IP, 24) Eventually, the investigative tensions between greater
productivity and quality maintenance worked themselves out through a balanced set
of performance measures designed to track detective productivity by their case load,
case cycle time, prosecutorial acceptance, and case disposition. In fact, Chief Serpas
was so proud of these enhanced performance metrics during his project interview, he
thought they represented key CompStat improvements, as they were practiced in the
New York Police Department (NYPD) or New Orleans Police Department (NOPD).
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However, several interviews called attention to the fact that the investigative
performance measures were not perfect. Most of the criticisms focused several
themes: the type of case handled (complex versus simpler); detective assistance
provided to another detective or trooper (generally the latter was credited with the
case hours, arrests, and accolades); general teamwork (assisting detectives reduced
their productive hours helping others); and officer safety (sometimes it took many
officers to ensure high risk warrant service or security of some type, which reduced
assisting officers case productivity). (IPs, 10, 15, 24) Therefore, while it may be
true great progress has been made, it seems equally valid to suggest much more is
needed.
These issues were not confined to investigative responsibilities only, as many
other interview participants also voiced worries about the emphasis on quantitative
performance working against valid concerns about work quality. Some leaders
pointed out that rigorous performance measures did little to work out complex
interdependencies that existed between and among workgroups. Others recognized
the more teamwork that was involved the more difficult it was to effect change and
measure productivity. (IPs, 19, 29, 30, 31, 34)
One other small glimpse into the inextricable links between WSP culture and
employee motivation may be reflected in five year exit interview data encompassing
this time period, as compiled by the WSP HRD in early 2008. Even those who left
the agency during this time period admitted what they liked most about working for
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the WSP was their coworkers [16/37 (43%)- commissioned; 14/45 (34%)- civil
service]. They also noted they liked their job satisfaction [14/37 (38%)commissioned] and enjoyment working with people and the public [11/45 (27%)civil service]. Once again, readers should be reminded this data has significant
limitations as outlined previously.
Principle Fourteen: Leadership and strategic management establish shortand intermediate-term priority, but they must be connected to longer-term strategic
goals. The project findings clearly indicated ADL implementation, the recreated
SAFs, and the other accountability measures studied throughout the project enhanced
productivity throughout the agency. As readers have seen, most senior and junior
executives felt the SAFs offered clear advantages related to identifying public safety
problems, proffering alternatives, analyzing tactics, garnering resources,
implementing solutions, and evaluating their impact. One example involved the Fire
Protection Bureau, which was charged with inspecting state care facilities. In the
early days of ADL implementation, bureau employees tracked the number of fire
code inspections completed for the month. This data was then compared to the
previous month, year to date data, and last year's performance. But over time, the
SAF and bureau discussions highlighted many of the outcomes the bureau was
attempting to achieve, which included 365-day safety at these state facilities.
Consequently, this led bureau employees to undertake a wide range of other
activities, designed to help influence this outcome. These included: eliminating a
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sizeable pre-billed inspection backlog within months; establishing re-check criteria
and license revocation procedures for those facilities that chronically failed their
inspections and re-inspections; creating a certified staff training video designed to
train all facility staff about fire code requirements and compliance throughout the
entire year, which could be viewed for continuing healthcare education credits;
recommending facility check lists, including evacuation considerations; and the
initiation of an electronic inspection system used to identify high-risk inspection
items and to track completed inspections.
However, another significant group of participants called attention to the
need to ensure performance measures did not become a panacea. This school of
thought stressed the importance of a leadership vision as an essential beacon to help
guide the creation, initiation, and modification of performance measures over time.
This group of participants suggested that the absence of such focus allowed
performance measures to be put into place, which had a tendency to proliferate over
time. More often than not, these observations were advanced by individuals who
clearly differentiated leadership techniques and management tools, with the later
equated with SAFs. The most widespread criticism by this thoughtful group of
interview participants was the observation the shorter-term measures associated with
SAFs could not be connected to longer-term goals. Similarly, they collectively

worried that in the pursuit of the former the latter was being nearly totally neglected.
Both points of view offer some critical insights about how SAF changed
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many senior and junior executive mindsets within the WSP. This perspective
suggests SAFs served as an essential, organizational, evolutionary step, which
needed to occur in order to help shape the next paradigm shift. The second groups'
comments suggest the next enhancements of SAF will involve more descriptive
measures to help enrich the earlier, mostly, quantitative reviews. The project
participants regularly differentiated the SAF focus on strategic performance
management from strategic leadership principles. Oftentimes, these views were
expressed through the worries the agency's leadership had lost the balance between
productivity accountability and employee welfare. In FOB, these same concerns
were voiced, along with fairly fixed retirement schedules, and concerns about
strategic vision, direction, and purpose. One participant may have captured the
essence of these concerns when they wondered out loud how much more demand
there would be for TLE activities in a more technologically sophisticated future.
They called attention to the massive surge in automobile and highway safety
standards that have already occurred in our lifetimes, as a means to suggest even
greater future technological advances with: wider implementation of red light
enforcement cameras; ignition interlock devices; airbag technology; vehicle speed
regulation; and photographic radar. In short, this participant called attention to the
fact the traffic safety external environment was changing quickly, but they wondered
if the current short- and intermediate-term measures were allowing our leaders to
position the agency and its personnel for future success. (IP, 18)
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In the final analysis, both groups' broader comments suggest even more
dramatic changes yet to come, probably focused on broader leadership ideals. In
fact, several examples have emerged in recent years.
One example involved the more recent creation of legislative review forums
attended by the entire agency leadership for the purposes of considering pending
legislative bills that could have an impact on the WSP's various responsibilities,
budgets, and operations. The WSP executive staff also implemented a means for the
agency leadership to advance their own supplementary budgetary requests within
their areas of responsibility and a system to screen, prioritize, and advance the most
urgent needs. Arguably, both leadership processes relied heavily on the district and
division commanders' expertise honed by the SAF process, while the latter requests
regularly utilized SAF data to justify additional resources.
A final example may have occurred in the fall of 2007, when the principal
researcher met with Tom Lindahl of the WSP Property Management Division.
During the discussion, Tom suggested district and division commanders should
begin to develop long-term capital improvement plans for their areas of
responsibility, which would be updated each biennium. While still not an
organizational reality, the SAFs arguably reinforced fundamental management skills
that will be critical to the success of these endeavors if they are ever initiated.
Lastly, the interview analyses highlighted the fact that employees oftentimes
made up their own performance realities, especially if they were not constantly
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communicated by the executive leadership. This finding underscores the need for
leaders to be clear about their performance expectations, preferably all of them,
rather than a select few. One notable example, was all the criticism surrounding the
District of the Quarter Award. While meant to spur friendly competition in TLE
activities and to highlight exemplary performance, somewhat ironically, the award
seemed to undermine the fundamental basis of monthly SAFs, which was to compare
districts only against their own past performance. These comments clearly
highlighted the fact the SAF expectations and the award criteria seemed to be out of
alignment.
Taken together, these contributions clarify the leadership and management
strategies required to create results-oriented change in a state law enforcement
agency, beyond individual programmatic innovations. In doing so, it should help
readers think more strategically about how to ensure the short-, intermediate-, and
long-term viability of their statewide law enforcement change initiatives.
The project findings identified several personnel who had left the WSP, who
were now using ADL principles in their current organizational leadership roles.
Broadly speaking, these endeavors included local, regional, and statewide law
enforcement endeavors as well as nonprofit work. (IP, 7, 9, 10, 21, 34) In short,
these examples provide more proof of the evolution of CompStat and ADL tenets as
well as the robust utility of the management principles.
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Theoretical Value
The project findings inspired the creation of a new theoretical model
featuring the original organizational factors, but emphasizing their reciprocal
relationships. These interactions were believed to be the true catalysts, or at least the
contributory variables, in the changes observed in the WSP throughout the time
frame. Consequently, the project makes some specific theoretical contributions
related to these areas contained in the new theoretical model, as outlined previously.
Beyond the new theoretical model and its implications, this case study
contributed to public administration and criminal justice theory through its
exploration of how positive change is achieved in a state law enforcement
organization. This was accomplished in several more general ways.
First, the case study provided an archetypical examination of a
comprehensive state law enforcement agency as its leadership grappled with how to
create a more accountable agency. In doing so, it utilized scholarly inquiry and
empirical methods. The research emphasized exploratory techniques, historical
analyses, and inductive reasoning, since very little social science research has
examined state law enforcement change beyond broad historical reviews,
autobiographical presentations, and individual programmatic innovations. (Bechtel,
1995) Its findings suggest the WSP found itself at a unique point in its history in

2002, as Chief Sandberg had begun to forge a new direction, abruptly resigned, and
was followed by two interim chiefs. The interview analyses likened the agency to a
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rudderless ship during this extended transition. Therefore, Chief Serpas' approach
certainly redefined agency vision, mission, and success standards, while Chief Porter
refined many of these earlier efforts.
Second, the literature review presented relevant theory from the
organizational development literature. These included: executive leadership,
organizational culture, employee motivation, strategic management, and
performance measures. This theory advanced several themes that focused the later
document reviews and key informant interviews. This review suggested many of
these organization development factors were integrated oftentimes to maximize
agency success. It also produced the preliminary change model examined
throughout the project.
Third, the case study sought to look beyond the ADL initiative and SAF
process in order to consider a wider range of alternative explanations that may help
explain the WSP productivity gains. (Bechtel, 1995) Throughout its scholarly
inquiry, the research project found clear evidence ADL implementation and the SAF
recreations in the WSP represented another evolution in the use of CompStat
techniques, as outlined in the earlier literature review. (McDonald et al., 2002;
O'Connell, 2001; Shane, 2004c; Weisburd et al., 2003) The case study also
determined organizational change in the WSP was the result of several
organizational development forces, rather than the simple application of CompStattype techniques alone, as others have suggested. (Bratton, 1996; Bratton &
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Andrews, 1999; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Firman, 2003; Kelling & Sousa, 2002;
McDonald, 2004; McDonald et al., 2002; O'Connell, 2001; Sousa, 2003; Weisburd
et al., 2003) In doing so, this research project reinforced many important findings in
the organizational development literature, which generally posited agency change
results from the integrated confluence of organizational factors.
Implications for Future Practice and Research
This case study examined the executive leadership and management
strategies associated with ADL implementation in the WSP between 2002 and 2004.
Consequently, the project raised a variety of related research questions for future
study, many of which deserve further identification and description below.
The Velocity of Change and its Impact on Organizational Evolution
This project highlighted both the external speed of change and its impact on
the internal leadership of the WSP. Although Chief Sandberg had begun to lead the
WSP toward the path of greater public accountability, the project found these initial
changes were not rapid enough to deflect significant external criticism. As an
external change agent, Chief Serpas found it necessary to re-engineer many WSP
practices in order to stave off more drastic political intervention. In the process,
many WSP executive leaders struggled to develop their leadership acumen in a datadriven environment designed to increase public trust, confidence, and accountability.
Finally, Chief Porter's continuation of these earlier organizational changes created
real concerns among the executive leadership about longer-term performance gain
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sustainability. Each of these observations raises a myriad of questions about the
historical, human resources, capacity building initiatives in the WSP. Perhaps the
most useful questions for future leaders involve the issues surrounding how future
initiatives can better prepare the next generation of leadership.
These observations about WSP leadership challenges, combined with a cadre
of more recent human resource recruiting, hiring, and retention issues, raise
important, potential, research questions about the opportunity costs associated with
the leadership of a comprehensive state law enforcement agency like the WSP. In
this case, opportunity costs refer to an acknowledgement that all leadership choices
involve real costs associated with an inability to pursue alternative options. In other
words, the concept suggests that organizations possess limited resources, which
results in intra- and inter-agency scarcity, competition, and allocation issues. Taken
together, these observations raise profound questions about future agency leadership
preparation, training, and succession planning and their associated costs. In turn,
these views call attention to the agency's ability to link its shorter-term successes
with its capacity to execute its mission in the longer-term and the associated
tradeoffs, which can and must occur.
Therefore, further research endeavors aimed at providing state law
enforcement leaders with some ability to decipher leadership development options,
change priorities, and cost assessments associated with marginalized initiatives
might prove invaluable. Indeed, such efforts may help state law enforcement leaders
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better prepare their agencies, personnel, and future leaders for execution of their
short-, intermediate-, and long-term- mission- simultaneously. Above all, this
versatility may prove critical to future leaders as they lead during periods of such
hyper-change, which most experts agree will characterize 21 st century policing.
(International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1999)
Culture
The WSP is a highly professionalized organization as evidenced by its 16year Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA)
accreditation. Therefore, these requisite managerial controls combined with the
agency's rigorous recruiting, hiring, training, supervisory, and promotional standards
may have helped the organization side-step any real difficulties with the chief
executive leadership during this time frame. Certainly, the surges in organizational
productivity reinforce these possibilities. Regardless, there is much more to learn
about how chief executive leadership impacts a professional agency leadership and
organizational culture as well as how group push back can be mitigated.
Level of Analysis
Another critical area for future research would be the empirical study of ADL
implementation among the middle manager, supervisory, and operational levels of
the WSP. This inquiry might proffer invaluable insights about what role these
change initiatives played in these employees' motivation levels and subsequent
productivity changes. The importance of such quantitative studies and their variance
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analyses cannot be overemphasized, since all leadership initiatives are judged
ultimately on their ability to influence followers' work performance. For this reason,
any further research aimed at better understanding state law enforcement employees'
attitudes, perceptions, or satisfaction related to their willingness to accept change and
modify their work behaviors in pursuit of organizational goals would prove critical
for future law enforcement leaders, managers, and supervisors. In sum, this future
research would help fulfill Natemeyer and McMahon's (2001) cogent leadership and
management recommendation: ".. .an understanding of human behavior is
imperative if mangers are to improve the performance of their organization's human
resources" (p. 51).
Beyond ADL?
Arguably, ADL implementation and the SAF processes in the WSP were
accompanied oftentimes by the spread of organizational fear and greed. (IP, 31) If
state law enforcement agencies are ever to move beyond such primeval motivational
pressures, it will be incumbent upon the academic community working in concert
with bright practitioners to identify, implement, and evaluate better motivational
alternatives. Such innovative undertakings will not be easy.
The project has presented clear evidence of the growing socio-political
consensus demanding more measurable results from all governmental agencies,
especially in an age with fewer discretionary revenue sources. The WSP case study
subtly suggested a resultant pressure to measure productivity inherently favors
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measuring easily quantifiable resource inputs, work activities, and simpler outcomes
indicators. It found much less regard was given to measuring more complex and
longer-term organizational and societal needs. Consequently, many of the easier
collaborative projects and outcomes indicators in the WSP may have been identified,
managed, and influenced given current resources. Given the nature of many of these
gains, future successes may be marginally more difficult to achieve over time.
Therefore, future research aimed at a greater understanding of these issues may
prove beneficial for future law enforcement leaders.
Organizational Evolution
This project highlighted the importance of organizational history in general
and more specifically the evolution of change within a statewide comprehensive
public safety agency. Many of the participants credited Chief Annette Sandberg with
the initiation of changes that led to ADL and the recreation of the SAFs, yet her
expeditious departure left a serious leadership vacuum in the WSP.
These observations raise a variety of questions that regrettably exceed the
scope of the project. These might include questions that seek to examine the linkage
between change initiatives started under one administration and their continuation by
a following administration, as opposed to those introduced, championed, and
implemented by one administration only. This research may underscore the need to
think more carefully about organizational history, evolution, and change when
creating future leadership development initiatives.
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At the same time, these observations call attention to the need for the WSP to
somehow accumulate organizational learning lessons in some format beyond its
current leadership and personnel. The failure to do so will likely result in an
inability to apply these organizational lessons to future challenges, especially as
current personnel begin to retire and take much of their learning, experiences, and
successes with them. The ability to create future projects that examine practices
aimed at alleviating this conundrum may help prevent an organizational learning
spiral where each generation of law enforcement leaders must re-learn lessons
previous generations have grappled with and solved successfully.
Temporal Order
Closely related, is a concern about the temporal order of change, at the
individual, workgroup, and leadership levels of the organization, as some
organization theory has described. (Greiner, 1972; Nadler & Tushman, 1995; Van
De Ven & Poole, 1995) In recent years, the principal researcher has had personal
communication with a retired Portland Police Bureau executive, whose professional
experiences included organizational cycles defined largely by external chiefs
followed by internal chiefs. In his view, the former were utilized to introduce
change, while the latter were used to build greater stability, (cf., Greiner, 1972)
By extension, these observations highlight the need for further research to

discern how similar forces may have influenced ADL implementation in the WSP.
This longer historical perspective could provide important insights to future

Washington State Patrol Change 347
executives who will be charged with maintaining comprehensive statewide law
enforcement productivity. By the very nature of their positional responsibility, it
will be critical for them to broadly understand how to balance the external pressures
for change against the internal cultural and individual forces within the agency.
Organizational Learning
Finally, the whole concept of a learning organization was left almost entirely
unexplored in this project, but remains highly relevant and closely connected to the
earlier research opportunities related to leadership, organizational evolution, and the
cycles of change. Yet, recent literature oftentimes describes these environments by
discussing the leadership, systems, and processes that allow organizational
employees to become a community of learners (Prince et al., 2005, Senge, 1990). At
the same time, there can be little doubt that ADL implementation and the SAF
processes, through use of their fundamental tenets and iterative processes, worked to
enhance learning across the entire organization.
Consequently, there is much more research to be completed about how ADL
and its SAF processes influenced the learning that must occur in modern public
organizations. This observation, combined with this project's literature review and
major findings, call readers' attention to the fact that governmental agencies will
likely face a myriad of unique forces and pressures in the 21 st century. Arguably
then, the competitive advantage in such environments will lie in public
administrators' ability to help their agencies become much more agile, responsive,
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and successful organizations. One means to help achieve these goals is to create,
build, and utilize learning organizations. Therefore, research aimed at better
understanding how these organizations are created, maintained, and enhanced in a
policing environment would be important knowledge for future law enforcement
leaders.
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Appendix A
Washington State Patrol Authority Statement
"Established in 1921, the Washington State Patrol operates under the authority of
RCW 43.43.010, which created the department, and RCW 43.43.030, which gives
full police powers to the officers of the department. The Washington State Patrol
began formal assistance to other police agencies with the passage of RCW
43.43.500. This statute created the Washington State Crime Information
Center. Other statutory required services include the following:

• A Central Computerized Enforcement Service System (ACCESS) is authorized by
RCW 43.43.785.

• The Narcotics Section operates under RCW 43.43.600.
• The state Crime Laboratory serves all non-federal police agencies in the state and
operates under RCW 43.43.670.
• State Fire Protection Services operates within the Washington State Patrol under
RCW 48.48 and 43.43.930.
• The Organized Crime Intelligence Unit was created through RCW 43.43.850.
• The Drug Control Assistance Unit (DCAU) was created by the legislature in 1970
with the passage of Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 43.43.600 and 43.43.660.
As a result of the reorganization of the Washington State Patrol in 1981, this unit has
been renamed the Narcotics Section of the Investigative Assistance Division.
• The consolidation of criminal justice services was established by RCW 43.43.785.
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• The Identification Section was established by the 1972 Legislature through RCW
43.43.700. The statutory name has been expanded to the Identification, Child Abuse,
Vulnerable Adult Abuse, and Criminal History Section. The Section is the repository
for criminal history record information and State Department of Corrections activity
based on fingerprint identification. RCW 68.50.310 established the dental
identification system as a repository for dental records of missing and unidentified
persons. The Section also maintains a central registry of sex and kidnapping
offenders as authorized by RCW 9.94A.155. The legislature expanded the use of
criminal history records to include background checks by public and private sector
employers through the Criminal Records Privacy Act (RCW 10.97), Private Sector
Act (RCW 43.43.815), and Child and Adult Abuse Information Act (RCW
43.43.830-845).
• The Washington Crime Information Center (WACIC), authorized by RCW
43.43.510, contains electronic files of stolen and wanted vehicles, outstanding
warrants, missing and unidentified persons, stolen property, protection orders, sex
offender registry information and other files of general assistance to law enforcement
agencies. A Central Computerized Enforcement Service System (ACCESS),
authorized by RCW 43.43.785, consolidates criminal justice service programs within
the WSP.
• The Collision Records Section, authorized by RCW 46.52.030, receives reports of
vehicles and drivers involved in collisions resulting in injury or death, or property
damage in an amount established by the WSP.
• RCW 43.105.330 established the State Interoperability Executive Committee

(SIEC) and its role in providing oversight to the State's wireless communications.
The Chief of the Washington State Patrol and the State Fire Marshal, are required by
statute to sit on the SIEC.
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• RCW 43.43.035 and 43.43.037 mandate the responsibility for the safety of the
Governor, the Governor's family, the Lieutenant Governor, and for the security and
protection of the Legislature.
• The Missing Children Clearinghouse (MCC) was established in 1985 under
authority of RCW 13.60.010. The objective is to maintain and operate a toll-free 24hour telephone hotline. The MCC distributes information to local law enforcement
agencies, school districts, the Department of Social and Health Services, and the
general public regarding missing children. This office also maintains a regularly
updated computerized link with national and other statewide missing person systems
or clearinghouses.
• Known as the Teekah Lewis Act, a multi-agency task force within the Washington
State Patrol responds to requests from local law enforcement on missing and
exploited children. The task force is authorized to assist agencies through case
management and referral, technical assistance, personnel training, and coordination
among local, state, interstate, and federal law enforcement, and social service
agencies under chapter 13.60 RCW.
• The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) (formally known as the Traffic
Investigation Division) operates and receives its authority under RCW 43.43.030.
CID was formed on January 1, 1982 as part of the Investigative Services Bureau
(ISB). The reorganization was the result of recommendations by the Legislative
Budget Committee and the Management Review Team to provide investigative
uniformity of all investigative services on a statewide basis.
• The Fuel Tax Evasion Unit has legislative authority under RCW 82.42.100, RCW
82.36, and RCW 82.38, to investigate Fuel Tax Evasion" (Washington State Patrol
Strategic Plan, 2004-2011, p. 10-11).
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Appendix B
Interview Guide
Introduction
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my WSP dissertation research!
Have you had an opportunity to review my research project intranet site?
Have you had a chance to read the following information?
A) WSP Chief John Batiste's letter of endorsement?
B) The project abstract?
C) Portland State University human subjects research information?
D) The adult informed consent form?
E) And, the intended interview questions?
Did you have a chance to read, complete, and sign an adult informed consent form?
{If No, help the participant complete the adult informed consent form)
With your consent, I would like to tape record our discussion for later transcription,
interview analysis, and comparison with other participants. Is this permissible?
Please introduce:
-

Yourself?

-

Your WSP tenure?

In 2002, Chief Serpas implemented ADL throughout the entire WSP and
reengineered the SAF process in order to continually assess the organization's entire
performance. In 2004, Chief Porter continued nearly all of Chief Serpas' earlier
change initiatives and related performance assessments.
Most employees believe these change initiatives focused on accountability
linkages and changed the nature of workplace interactions and their feelings about
their jobs. Some employees believe several alternative organizational factors may
have contributed to the WSP's public safety successes between January 2002 and
December 2004. This interview will focus on the most notable, which include:
leadership, culture, motivation, strategic management, and performance measures.
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This whole dissertation project evaluates WSP performance gains between
2002 and 2004. Consequently, this interview will focus exclusively on the Serpas
and Porter Administrations, so please consider only this time frame in WSP history,
when providing all your answers. Please summarize:
Your work location(s)?
Your general experiences?
1. The first part of the questionnaire explores organizational leadership activities
during this period.

(10 minutes/

)

1.1: Please tell me about the leadership activities you observed during the
implementation of ADL. Please provide examples.
1.2: How do you believe these changes were viewed within the
organization? Please provide examples.
1.3: Do you have anything to add?
2. The second part of the questionnaire explores WSP culture during this period.
(10 minutes/

)

2.1: Please tell me how you would describe the WSP culture based on your
experiences during this time period. Please provide examples.
2.2: Do you believe ADL implementation changed the WSP culture in any
significant ways? Please provide examples.
2.3: Do you have anything to add?
3. The third part of the questionnaire explores individual motivation during this
period.

(10 minutes/

)

3.1: How did the WSP leadership work to motivate employees during ADL
implementation? Please provide examples.
3.2: Do your experiences indicate that these ADL changes worked as
employee motivators?

De-motivators? Please provide examples.

3.3: Do you have anything to add?
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4. The fourth part of the questionnaire explores WSP strategic management during
this period

(10 minutes/

)

4.1: What management strategies assisted ADL implementation?
Please provide examples.
4.2: How would do you evaluate WSP success based on your experiences?
4.3: Do you have anything to add?
5. The fifth part of the questionnaire explores WSP performance measures during
this period

(10 minutes/

)

5.1: Please describe the performance measures in use within your area(s) of
responsibility during this period. Please provide examples.
5.2: How do you believe these measures influenced work quality based on
your experience during this time period? Please provide examples.
5.3: Do you have anything to add?
6. The final part of the questionnaire asks for your recommendations about state law
enforcement performance measures based on your experiences during this
period.

(10 minutes/

)

6.1: What advice would you offer other state law enforcement executives,
who may be contemplating the implementation of a comprehensive set
of performance metrics and public performance review sessions?
6.2: How would you improve the WSP performance measures in use and the
related review sessions if you could?
6.3: I will be conducting more of these sessions in the near future.
Would you add anything to our discussion?
Wrap-up
Thank you for the privilege to lead our discussion and for all your helpful
suggestions! I want to be respectful of your time because I know you have
generously volunteered to participate in my research.
I would like to keep a copy of your notes in order to review all the
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information you prepared. If this is permissible, could I please get a copy before I
leave?

Thank You!
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Appendix C
Washington State Patrol Chief John Batiste's Endorsement Letters

CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE
Governor
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J O H N R> B A T , S T E

Chief

STATE o r W A M i l i C l O N

WASHINGTON STATE PATROL
General Administration Building, PO Box 42600 • Olympia, WA 96504-2600 » (360) 753-6540 • www.wsp.wa.gov

January 2, 2007
Dr. Scott Cunningham, Dissertation Chair
Portland State University
The Hatfield School of Government
Criminology and Criminal Justice Department
506 Southwest Mill Street
Portland OR 97201
Dear Scott;
Thank you for your continuing support of Lieutenant Tim Winchell as he continues to pursue his
doctoral degree at Portland State University in public administration and policy. I understand his
curriculum requires him to complete his dissertation research project in order to successively
complete his program.
Fortunately, Tim has chosen to examine our Accountability Driven Leadership initiative in
fulfillment of his degree requirements. His research exploring how the Washington State
Patrol's executive leadership and management strategies may have contributed to the success of
Accountability Driven Leadership and the Strategic Advancement Forums is long overdue.
1 am aware of Tim's research proposal to Portland State University's Human Subjects Review
Committee. I understand this documentation outlines the project's parameters and the
assurances undertaken by the researcher to guarantee the confidentiality of those who choose to
participate.
I fully endorse Tim's research project without reservation. I am confident his research work will
help Washington State Patrol leaders, managers, and employees better understand the necessary
components of successful organizational change, performance, and accountability. As a result,
his contributions will help us better plan, implement, and evaluate future change initiatives that
will define our short, intermediate, and long-term success.
Sincerely,
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(ZHIEF JOHN R. BATISTE
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CHRISTINE 0.GKEGOIRE
Governor
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]OHN R. BATISTE
Chief

STATE Of WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON STATE PATROL
General Administration Building, PO Box 42600 » Olympia, WA 98504-2600 • (360) 753-6540 • www.wsp.wa.gov

January 2,2007

WSP Employees:
As many of you may know, Lieutenant Tim Winchell is currently pursing his doctoral degree in
public administration and policy at Portland State University. His curriculum requires him to
complete an extensive research project in order to successively complete his program of study.
1 am pleased to announce that Tim has chosen to examine Accountability Driven Leadership in
fulfillment of his degree requirements. His research will explore how the Washington State
Patrol's leadership and management strategies contributed to the success of Accountability
Driven Leadership and the Strategic Advancement Forums between January 2002 and December
2004.
I have spoken to Tim at length about his project and read his human subjects committee research
proposals. This detailed documentation outlines the project's parameters and the assurances
undertaken by the researcher to guarantee the anonymity of those who choose to participate.
I fully endorse Tim's research project without reservation. I am confident his research work will
help Washington State Patrol executives, managers, and employees better understand the
necessary components of successful organizational change. My hope is that his work will help
us better plan, implement, and evaluate future change initiatives in a manner that will define our
short, intermediate, and long-term success.
Sincerely,

IEF JOHN R. BATISTE
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Appendix D
Adult Informed Consent Form
My dissertation research project (as a Portland State University doctoral student)
examines the executive leadership and management strategies that explain the
organizational changes during the Chief Serpas and Porter Administrations. Its
central research question is: What executive leadership and management
strategies were utilized to create the organizational changes between January 2002
and December 2004?
The interview questions will ask you about five organizational aspects related to the
WSP success: leadership, culture, motivation, strategic management, and
performance measures. I anticipate our discussion will last about an hour.
This research may expose research participants to two forms of risk: (1) damage to
personal and professional reputation and political standing; and (2) emotional
distress. Any harm associated with these two types of risk is expected to be rare
and of minor impact.
The data collection, aggregation, and analysis methods will involve proactive steps
and safeguards to eliminate, mitigate, and reduce these risks. All your interview
responses will be kept confidential and their later dissemination will occur in
aggregate. In general, this means the principal researcher will make every effort to
present his interview results in a manner that will make it nearly impossible to
discern which key informant disclosed what information. Essentially, our taperecorded conversations will allow me to transcribe and analyze all the interview
responses for common themes. These results will help inform the findings of my
research project and hopefully provide new understandings about how leadership
and management strategies help create organizational changes in a state law
enforcement agency.
Your interview participation is entirely voluntary. There will be no penalty if you
choose not to participate or to end the interview at any time. However, I hope you
will take this opportunity to reflect on the larger leadership and management forces
that helped propel accountability driven leadership and strategic advancement
forum success.
If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this questionnaire or
your rights as a participant, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review
Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 111 Cramer Hall, Portland
State University, (503) 725-4288. If you have questions about the study itself,
please contact Dr. Scott Cunningham through the Criminology and Criminal Justice
Department, Portland State University, (503) 725-8070. I can also provide you a
copy of your consent form, if you would like one.
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Thank you in advance for your time, consideration, and assistance. Please feel free
to contact me if you have any further questions, comments, concerns, or additional
information related to the research project, including

Tim Winchell
Washington State Patrol Academy
631 West Dayton Airport Road
Shelton, Washington 98584
(360)426-1661 x 102
Tim.Winchell@wsp.wa.gov

